







A

NEW AND EXTENSIVE
ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION
OF THE
Elements of Mental Science:

CONTAINING

EVIDENCES OF DIFFERENCE, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ELEMENTS OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION, AND ELEMENTS OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MORAL ACTION.

Designed for Students.

BY REV. MOSES SMITH, A. M.

"IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

"Know thyself."



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P R E F A C E.

THE design of laying this work before the public, is to present the Philosophy of Mind in as clear a light as possible—adapting the sentiments and arguments to the demands of the present age, and freed from many embarrassments hitherto connected with the examination of the elements of mind. It is most ardently desired, that the true principles constituting the science should be correctly defined, and that the entire work be auxiliary to the investigation and knowledge of truth. Yet the best efforts are of humble pretensions and partial claims. We could not aspire to solicit recommendations favoring the circulation of these volumes, unless they can exist in the judgment and by the decisions of the student and the philosopher, who carefully and understandingly examine each page and sentence of the work.

THE AUTHOR.

ADVANTAGES.

THE advantages of this work are only partially expressed in the following order:

1. An Introduction, designed as preparatory to the science intended to be taught, commencing with man, an existent—a compound being; his primitive, present, and future state.
2. Psychology, established from the nature, harmony, and distinct qualities of elements only adapted to an immaterial existence.
3. Anthropology, established from the nature and distinct qualities of elements, which are only adapted to the existence of matter.
4. The speculations of materialists examined and refuted, which closes abstract examinations of elements belonging to physical science.
5. This work is divided into two volumes. The first volume embraces the examination of elements of mind which lie at the foundation of mental action. The second volume embraces the examination of elements of mind which lie at the foundation of moral action.
6. Reasons naturally arise as to the necessity of such a distinction in tracing each faculty, either abstractly or in its combined relationship with other powers.
7. Elements which have not hitherto been acknowledged as having any important place in the

philosophy of mind, have been inserted in this work, with reasons why they should be acknowledged.

8. Some of the primary faculties of the mind having ever been left in great obscurity, are defined, with a brief defense in favor of their position and claims.

9. The value of this work has been increased by the correct opinions and sound arguments of all the principal philosophers who have written upon mental science; but we have avoided referring to their various speculative opinions foreign to the true examination of the elements of mind.

10. A design of this work is to present each item distinctly, and with few words. The subjects and items are all numbered in the chapters and sections. Immediate reference can be had, from the Index, to any part or item of the work.

11. When any element appears to have a mental and moral position, or influence in the mind, it will be so defined.

12. As far as ability and labor could go, the effort has been to adapt this work to the science as it is, and not to adapt the science to the work.

13. A decided advantage is, that the student is under no obligations to receive the contents of this work, in whole or in part; yet the objector should be willing to render an equivalent, or give better reasons against the arguments used, than can be given in favor of them.

Man.

INTRODUCTION.

SECTION I.

1. *Man exists.* Of non-existences we can have no satisfactory knowledge, and to define them would be utterly impossible. But man is a definite existent, occupying a point in unbounded space. The certainty of his being is neither imaginary nor ideal; but he is a certain entity, possessing a real place as truly as he does a relative position in the range and limitless extent of existences. He vies in reality and importance with all finite elements and beings around him, and the idea of his entity transcends all possibility of doubt. 2. He either *exists* or has *no existence*. If he has no existence, all arguments about *that* which is incapable of occupying any point in space, or of having being, either in entity or nonentity, must necessarily pause in perpetual silence. But it is impossible to conceive of nonentity as tangible, and having form, size, weight, and action, or that entity could be, in nature and essence, non-existence. Therefore, all existences may be denominated truths, or facts. 3. These *facts*, or *truths*, may be made known to us by demonstration, or be received as self-evident realities. The *former* will produce a result worthy of full confidence, when

correctly deduced from true premises. The *latter* may be regarded as an axiom of knowledge, being independent of either proof or disproof. Then the certainty of our existence is not a matter of either conjecture or of doubt, but of knowledge. 4. The *reasonableness* of our existence is found in the limitless goodness of God. He is the antecedent power or cause of our being. It is impossible for us to conceive that any imperfect or unhappy designs were originally intended by him, but that the created should glorify the creator, and be happy in his unending favor. A being perfectly holy and happy could not create shame, misery, and death as an object of pleasure to exist in the midst of his absolute perfections; if so, we can not understand the perfect purity, will, action, and infinite glory of Deity, by whose creative power man is, and holds so high a position in the range of the intellectual universe. But it is reasonable for him to live to enjoy God, and to perpetuate that blissful communion by love, service, and obedience.

SECTION II.

1. He *exists*, moving with *freedom* over the earth; has been called the noblest work of God, and lord of this world. He has been styled a compendium of creation, standing midway the kingdom of nature and that of immortal spirits. He studies to know every thing below himself—the earth, compounded of its various qualities, and all appertaining to it. He desires and labors to comprehend all unexplored laws connected with zoology, vegetation, and crys-

tallization. Looking abroad upon yonder heavens, he traces the rolling orbs of the vast universe—watches tempest and calm, rain and drouth, heat and cold, seed-time and harvest. Why, then, should he not go still higher, and study to know himself? 2. His faculties of mind are inalienable, and have power of *motion*. He is rationally constituted a being who feels, reflects, thinks, judges, contrives, wills, and acts. He has power to command ideas and communicate them to others by articulated sounds or speech, by the art of writing, or by signonical representations of thought. 3. As a point or dot upon canvas, ever moving uniformly in size and direction, forms a continued and unending line, so is the existence of man; though disconnected with the infinity of the past, yet his being will extend on through the interminable future, incapable of limitation.

SECTION III.

1. His being is *indestructible*, and can never be discontinued by annihilation. The very nature and action of all the elements of mind are averse to any thing like a return to non-existence, or to any idea that we shall ever cease to be. We can have no conception that an all-wise Being could or would create us for the purpose of causing our non-existence. This conclusion can be sustained by the indestructibility of matter. 2. Matter may be decomposed, the elements united or consolidated, may have the laws of affinity and power of adhesion suspended or destroyed; but we have no evidence of

any *possible annihilation* of properties. Actual experiments will show that the existence of elements or atoms of matter can not be rendered inane by any refining or destroying process. The elements of a block of wood having been burned with fire, still exist; the fire has only separated the compound into its natural primary elements, and no property has been annihilated. No evidence has ever been found that any property of either the body or of the soul can or will ever cease to be. If this be true, and we acknowledge that both matter and mind are now real existences, we are forced to the conclusion that those existences will continue to exist in some way forever.

SECTION IV.

1. The existence of man has been divided into *periods*, or *states*, arising from important changes. (1.) His *primitive state* was one of innocence and happiness, and to have been perpetuated by love, service, and obedience. He was constituted with a holy nature, and capable of ever acting from pure motives. The understanding, affections, and will were obedient to, and in harmony with, the perfect law of God. The injunction requiring this law to be kept inviolate, was not the law itself, and a subordinate or contingent law would have been imperfect, and, therefore, could not exist. Hence, the injunction, suspended upon conditions, could not be properly a law, till it was signed and sealed as such by the voluntary act of our federal head. (2.) His *fallen state* is a departure from the primitive one.

The change was caused by a perverted act of volition. The object of his creation was to be, to have enjoyment, and to *act* in glorifying his Creator. Without action in rendering obedience and praise, the design of his existence would have been destroyed. If action is indispensable in glorifying the Creator, then he must act, and he can not act unless he has self-power to act. For if compelled to glorify God, it follows that it is the compulsatory power, or law, which acts, that renders service or glory, while man was and is wholly passive. If such a power or law is operative, and is the source of all glory to the Creator, it had that power to as great a degree without as well as with the existence of man. Hence, there could not have been any object in view in our creation; and if there was no design to be met, we have never had being, and never can exist, for all the acts of Deity exist in infinite wisdom. But if man was the actor, he must have had power to act; and if he had power to act, that power was within himself, and was self-power, or volition. The law of God and volition in man are not one and the same thing. The latter can act without the former, otherwise the object of our creation would have been wholly destroyed by law; then our existence would have been impossible. (3.) By *probationary state* we understand man's recovery, through a Savior, from the fall. This has been called a gracious state, in which life and immortality have been brought to light through the Gospel of peace. (4.) His *future state* is that in which the soul, and, finally, the body, shall have an inseparable reunion and an interminable duration of life.

SECTION V.

1. Man is *compounded* of *spirit* and *matter*; these united constitute but the one being. The ties of affection connecting the two natures seem to be so arranged, that when severed by death the soul sustains no perceptible loss, either of faculties or of true knowledge. The body without the soul is lifeless clay. Therefore, it is incapable of containing any power of action or item of knowledge. If the soul is possessed of powers and knowledge before death, it has them after death, unless death has annihilating power, which is contrary to all evidence, and must be absurd. 2. The spirit contains the *animating principle*, or is the principle of *life*. The science of psychology can not be untrue; for the soul is indispensable to life and a knowledge of self. 3. The soul of man is the *intelligent* part of his being. Reason, judgment, and knowledge can not be matter, nor a result of material elements. 4. It is an *immaterial* or spiritual existence, as a whole, one and indivisible. It can not be inert, neither is it ponderous, or capable of annihilation. 5. It is immortal—limitless in duration. Its faculties are very numerous, vivid in action, and powerful in conception and demonstrations.

SECTION VI.

1. *Matter* is *distinct* from mind. Anthropology can furnish no material element which, in quality or essence, can be called mind in whole or in part. Matter is divisible, tangible, and ponderous—pos-

sessing density and extension, with gradations and dissimilar organic properties. 2. Matter is said to be *inanimate* when insensible and inactive within itself. Inert elements act only from impinging causes, and in conformity to the law or force of gravitation, but they can not possess any self-power of action. 3. It is *animate* when it possesses sensitive motion or action within itself. But the animating principle is not matter; for then all matter would be sensitive, and have action and life. Sensitive action belongs to that which has life; but matter may have motion or action without having sensation or life. Otherwise the vast globe might be an animal or a being of life, by reason of its diurnal motion and orbicular flight. But matter has no power of self-action.

SECTION VII.

1. *Mind is not matter.* It is an internal and intellectual power. From the essential nature of its being, such an intellectual power, when in action, is knowledge. Mind must either act itself, or act from impinging causes. The natural tendency of matter is to inactivity, and its nature is to be and remain at rest. If moved by any external cause, rest is restored so soon as the impinging agent is wholly removed. Having no action within itself, it is impossible for it either to act or cause action. 2. But the mind *acts independent* of remote, contingent, or intermingling causes. It has power to understand, conceive, judge, reason, and feel. These principles can not apply to or constitute insensible and inert

matter. 3. The *term* *mind* is applied to a combination of faculties, or an internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and wills. It is known to us by these faculties, and they are made known to us by our consciousness, the affirmations of which we can not doubt. 4. The *essence* of mind has been referred to something back of these faculties, or forming a still deeper foundation of their being. We can have no clear conception or certain knowledge of such occult qualities. To advance in search of such elements would only plunge us into darkness and doubt. All such speculations would be uncertain, from our ignorance of the subject; therefore, it is useless to try to decide upon uncertainties, and such a process would add nothing to true science. 5. *Imagine* that we *remove* consecutively all the faculties of the mind, and it would be very difficult to conceive of some remaining something called essence. And if we could, how could we analyze it, further than to call it the power or influence which affinitates, in common, all the functions constituting the soul? This is stated to start the mind to thinking, but to dwell on it would not be profitable. Though this subject has been the origin of many speculative arguments, and in a way that it is not capable of, words can not define it or make it known to us. It exists in facts or truths wholly the objects of consciousness.

SECTION VIII.

1. *Knowledge*, the result of *reasoning*, is not so clear, strong, and unerring as that arising from

intuition. The latter is the only primary source of receiving facts as facts, without either proof or dis-proof. In argumentation an appeal to consciousness may be the last acknowledged resort, but it is the most conclusive and certain. Finite objects of the external world, which strike the sense, can never vie with this internal influence or power, nor be the anterior cause of its existence. 2. *We feel intuitively* a power within entirely distinct from all properties of materiality. This combination of elements or internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and wills, can not be questioned or doubted. Yet we have real knowledge of such elements only by consciousness. Matter combines properties which are solid, ponderous, extended, and divisible. They are known to us as such by our senses. 3. If the *power* constituting the faculties of mind, or of blending them together in action, be matter, how could it act within itself in recalling the past, and in contemplating the future—the events and occurrences of the one, and the objects and the hopes of the other? And how could it act in examining the nature and properties of tangible existences, and the design, as evidenced in the symmetry and harmony naturally adapting them to the purposes and ends of their being? Could it send out pioneer thoughts through unexplored creation and interminable duration? How could it examine the properties and laws of existences, and reason from nature up to nature's God? 4. If the principle within us which *thinks and acts is matter*, we are plunged into total darkness, and are entirely ignorant as to the power of perception or knowledge of the existence of any

fact; for that which thinks is known to us only by thinking. Matter is known by solidity, weight, and extension. The former is known by properties entirely different from the latter. Matter contains no principle by which we love, hate, fear, triumph, rejoice, sorrow, and suffer remorse or despair.

SECTION IX.

1. *Matter is not mind.* The substances composing the material universe are severally ponderous, divisible, and possessing density and extension; also existing in liquids or air form. The principles of these existences are known as principles of matter and not of mind. All properties of matter are naturally inert. There are no elements or atoms belonging to the science of physics which can have action within themselves, or self-action. All action or motion produced in them by operative causes, tends to inertness or rest at the suspension of the power of those causes. 2. All material elements *tend naturally to rest.* And rest, or that which is at rest by natural tendency or law, can not originate action, neither can it pervade with action either rest or a series of entities at rest. But mind at rest has power to act within itself, and to cause action in insensible bodies by voluntarily causing them to be impinged while at rest, and by accelerating or by counteracting their inertia. 3. Matter presents a *phenomena distinct* from mind. Its properties, or combination of substances, possesses solidity and divisibility. Our knowledge of their existence and qualities is gained by observation and the test of

the senses. 4. The *essence* of matter is difficult to define. That properties exist is clearly demonstrable; but to go back of these in search of some occult principle or essence of being, would be attended with difficulty, and add confusion to true analysis. Yet the mind should be tested to its utmost power in trying to trace properties back to essence, or in discriminating between them by distinguishing their inhesive affinity in the union of compounds, which, if dissevered and all the clustering properties removed, there is something remaining as unknown or imaginary, to which the term essence may be applied. But we can have no satisfactory knowledge of any thing in physics anterior to, or, more correctly, primary than properties.

SECTION X.

1. If the ideas of *materialists* be true, that there is nothing but *matter* in the vast universe; and that at farthest, the soul of man is only the result of a particular organization of matter in the body, we have no reasons favoring the knowledge of any existence. 2. For inert properties can have *no knowledge* of their own existence, nor of external existences. But we can not conceive of an immensity of space filled with nothing. Nonentity can have no perception or knowledge of non-existence, neither can it have knowledge of entity. There can be no knowledge without existences; and if there be entities, and they exist as insensible and inert matter, they can not have knowledge of any existence. Then there must be an existence capable of thinking

and knowing, and something capable of being the object of thought and knowledge. 3. If all bodies consist of unextended atoms, *moved only* by some law or influence of attraction or resistance, how could we account for the existence and action of that law or laws? If law can not think, reason, and act within and of itself, it is clear that there can be no power to think and act contained in inanimate and inert atoms of matter. 4. The *non-existence* of matter is more reasonable than that nothing exists but matter; for if nothing exists but matter, we have seen that there could be no knowledge of any reality; and if nothing could be apprehended or known, then if there could be existences, all knowledge of them would be lost in non-existence. Our knowledge of the existence of mind is as extensive, and more to be relied on, than is our knowledge of the existence of matter.

SECTION XI.

1. If the soul is matter, it has *power to think and act*. And as matter is matter, it follows that all matter has power to think and act, which is absurd. If some definite portion possesses this power, the difference is the result of the different modifications, magnitude, figure, or motion of some parts of matter in respect to other parts, or to the mass, or the power of thinking and acting must be given to some systems of it and rejected from others. What irregularity in the regular, onward course of nature could have being and power to make this difference, when no such power can naturally exist in the particles

themselves? Surely no one will contend for such a position. 2. If all matter is *cogitative*, it is contrary to all experience and knowledge we have of its nature. And if so, our senses and faculties are formed only to deceive us. A rock possesses no sign or evidence of either cogitation or of sense. The head is the great battery of thought, and there all the ministers of sensation make their appeal; but if all matter be cogitative, the feet would contain proportionably as much thought and understanding as the head, and there would be as much in the mountain rock as in either. Matter is not self-operative but inert, and is no more than a substance extended and impenetrable to other matter. 3. Materialism, in more recent and *modified forms*, maintains that mind is a result of organization, or a function of the brain; that the physical and mental faculties coinhering the same primary substances, grow, mature, decay, and cease together. If the brain is only the organ of the mind, it can not be the mind itself. It may form the center in which exists that influence on which depends sensation and motion. This organ is delicately connected, to a limited extent, with the mind's states and developments. Chemical analysis will show that all nervous matter in the entire system possesses precisely the same properties as that of the brain. Then if mind be matter, or the result of that kind of matter, it would be located all through the system; and if we could live we could have knowledge, to a proportionable extent, as well without the head as with it, in some instances, or as well without it as without a hand or a foot. 4. The *various diseases* of the

brain often modify, impair, or destroy the manifestations of mind. This sequence, if uniform, would not make mind to be the result of material elements, but would prove the brain to be the organ through which the mind acts and has access to external things. An object reflecting light to a perfect eye can be seen; but without light sight would be lost—one of the bodily senses is suspended; yet the mind has power still to retain a knowledge of the object seen. Therefore, the power of the mind to act is not limited to the senses, for it can act when they are suspended.

SECTION XII.

1. Mind is *independent of matter* as to existence, and as to properties or essence; but it is dependent in the origin of its knowledge in regard to them. With this knowledge attained, its manifestations are operative and independent of impressions from external things. It possesses self-consciousness and motion. It can retain distinctly and at pleasure correct ideas of that which has ceased to exist, and can recall long-forgotten events. It can go further, and call up chains of existences, arrange them in order, symmetry, beauty, and grandeur, and present them as facts, independent of either nonentity or of material reality. 2. Matter can exist and be matter without the *power to either think or act*. Mind without these ceases to be mind. If we are wholly material, and matter can think as matter, then we must continue to think always, and in proportion to the number and size of the particles contained in

each compound. Then a large body can think more and more powerfully than a smaller one; and both must continue to think on forever, or till their being, with all their elements, are annihilated. 3. If matter can not be *annihilated*, then materialists are *immortal* unawares and contrary to their purposes and desires, but in perfect accordance with the premises of their own assumption. At least they must have a conscious state of being as long as there are any elements of the body existing after death. Therefore, embalmed and petrified bodies must have consciousness, thought, and action for ages and cycles of ages unnumbered. 4. If matter *thinks through the future*, it must have *always thought in the past*, and there has been no time of our actual physical existence when the mind was not active and thinking. But this is contrary to all experience and knowledge, and must be absurd.

SECTION XIII.

1. What principle of materiality can possess *sensation within itself* or in common, or can constitute that which loves, fears, joys, and sorrows, and is capable of being ecstatic with hope, quickened and excited with enthusiasm, or plunged into remorse and despair? These changes exist and often alternate, without any reference to changes impressed by external things or of physical debility. In perfect health passion, anger, regret, and remorse may fill the soul; and peace, tranquillity, and hope often possess the mind when the body is suffering intensely or is even dying. Whatever may be the uniformity

of physical entities and laws, they can not produce a corresponding uniformity of mental states. 2. The septennial revolutions, or renewing of the system by the changes of its particles, does not *change the identity of self*, nor the one continued being in which man lives, and which he feels and knows, to be himself. If self-action, self-consciousness, and thinking constitute the elements of matter, or are essential to them, all elements of matter, abstractly or combined, in every system must contain them; and then they would be impossible to any, for every system of materiality would possess self-action and a consciousness of its own existence individually in self-thought or thinking; and no self-consciousness or thought of an individual property can exist in common with other properties, or of the compound. Then no element or atom of matter in the vast universe could have knowledge of the existence of any thing beside or beyond itself; and having no power of self-knowledge, it can not determine its own existence. Therefore, there can be no knowledge of the existence of any thing. The near affinity and position of properties can not blend them as one, while matter is divisible and incapable of self-action. 3. If impressions made upon *material organs* constitute the *knowledge* of existences, the occurrences of early life could not be commanded or recalled in old age; for the particles of the system so often changing, and being incapable of self-action, could make no transfer of their knowledge to those succeeding them. Then all knowledge of the past would cease to be, and we could know nothing back of the present moment.

SECTION XIV.

1. Mind is *dissimilar and distinct* from matter, or even a result of materiality, only so far as matter may be the organ of the mind, or through which it holds intercourse with the external world. Thinking can not arise from the figure, size, or motion of the properties which think; for this would only result in gradations of size, or as to the appearance and celerity, which would differ from thinking. The power of the senses can fully test that these changes and affections of matter are different from the principle or causes of thinking and motion. They are the effects or results of the action of other material particles in motion by some acting cause, which shows that matter within itself is inert and can not be cogitative. 2. The human body is *incapable of annihilation*. So far as we can analyze and understand, it appears that temporal death has no power to annihilate the constitutional elements of the body. The earth, air, and water consolidated in the forest oak, may be decomposed or separated by fire; yet not one element or particle of the primary principles can be utterly destroyed. Death sundered the ties of affection connecting the soul and body, and the effect of the change in the body appears to be no more than the change of the arrangements of its essential elements. Chemical analysis will show that it is utterly impossible to annihilate any of its elements or particles of elements. 3. We have no evidence of the *annihilation* of any existent, and our conception of such a result is impossible. There is no evidence of such a possibility in physical analy-

sis, or taught in revelation, and our experience and belief are against it. If any element or atom of a constitutional function of the body or of the material universe, which ever existed, has or can ever cease to be, we have no proof of the fact from any source. Decomposition can take place in fallen elements, but that is no part of non-existence.

SECTION XV.

1. The accumulating *weakness of age* and the very *decay* of the body indicates no annihilation of matter, but a change in the affinity and position of its elements, and is an additional proof of the continuation of the soul; for this decay is continued existence in change and under a new form or abstracted entities. We may prove by experiment or analysis, that all physical properties or particles of elements are indestructible, being incapable of cessation. If this be true, death has the power only to separate the constituent elements, and that they exist as fully when separated after death as they did before it. The term resurrection does not convey the idea of a new creation, but a resuscitation of the very identical body that went down to the grave, in the recalling of the primary elements to their wonted affinity and order in the new organized body; thenceforth their union will be unbroken. Should this be true of the material system, and that it is dissimilar and distinct in properties from the immaterial nature, who can doubt the immortality of the soul?
2. Animal life, as found in the lower orders of natural existences, is not denominated an intellectual

one, but it contains much of the *phenomena of mind*, which is far superior to mere vegetable life or the growth of rocks. Only call it instinct, and it possesses properties which differ from the properties of matter. 3. They have the *power of voluntary motion*, and a sense of danger, and to avoid it; also, a knowledge of causes. Some have been observed to go still further, having comparison, and, seemingly, an intuitive principle of affection or friendship, capable of being cultivated to a limited extent. The fox has been known to run through a fence with a chunk in his mouth the size of his intended prey, then to return and gather his prey from the herd and run through the very same avenue in escaping from danger. The Newfoundland dog evinces natural affection and care for the safety of children; and often, in rescuing them from drowning, they have appeared to give evidence of judgment, as well as affection and compassion, by going to the best, and, sometimes, the only place of escaping from the water. 4. It is absurd to say that these *traits* of the phenomena of mind are the properties of matter, possessing solidity, extension, and divisibility; for they are connected with the power of life, sensation, and action. Vegetable life has no self-action, and can only move in expanding or growth by the laws and influences connected with the seasons. Petrification, crystallization, and the growth of rocks is a still lower and more uninterrupted order of life, being independent of and almost unaffected by either the vernal ray or tropical shadow.

SECTION XVI.

1. Though we do not know matter to be *eternal in duration*, yet we have no evidence to believe that its properties will ever be annihilated. Then, if matter will exist in some way forever, it follows that there is something connected with animal life and motion which is superior in nature to mere matter, and it is of a mental character and nature, clearly distinct from matter, and must be called an immaterial or immortal principle; and we have as little or less proof of its pending annihilation as we have of the final non-existence of matter. 2. The soul is superior to matter in the *knowledge* it has of *its own existence*, and of the *existence of matter*, and its power of self-action. These distinct differences show an immaterial independence, and its states and manifestations are incomprehensible—almost an infinity of meaning within itself. To our certain knowledge we can feel something within us that acts from an internal principle; we experience liberty, the power of choosing, and we have self-government. There is an internal spiritual dominion or umpiracle principle, in which thoughts arise and are commanded, and by and from which they are sent forth through limitless creation like exploring lights, dispersed all abroad. The materialist has this power, and is conscious that he can employ his thoughts voluntarily about any business he may choose or desire. 3. Matter is *naturally insensible and motionless*, and unless motion is communicated to it by some other acting agency, it must remain forever stationary and dead. But the soul has power of

self-action, with a design in acting, with a view of an end to be attained, while, at the same time, the means to effect it are fully considered. Such an existence as this, with such energetic and vivid capacities and powers within itself, can be neither material in nature nor accidental in being and results. Matter, abstractly, can not be excited within itself, or moved by arguments, admiration, love, sympathy, or sufferings. But we are moved to action by reasons existing within ourselves and those imparted to us from others, and by words spoken or written. 4. To hear of or to see suffering will *naturally move* the feelings of the soul, and words written often create joy or excite alternately weeping and laughter. The self-inactive characters on the paper can not mechanically or naturally move the observer in any way. If words are spoken there can be nothing in the simple pulsations of the air that can effect matter creating self-motion, neither to effect in any way the feelings or knowledge. That power which perceives and apprehends the force and sense of these things is far different from any principle of matter. Articulated sounds can awake sensibility and arouse the soul in feelings or passion; and they can produce mirth, tranquillity, or gloomy despair. These results can not be the physical effects of the terms used, or else the effect would be the same and as extensive if not understood as though they were. When we imagine things to have been said, the mind is affected in the same way as though they had been spoken, till such impressions are corrected by the judgment. It is wholly the sense conveyed, or supposed to be conveyed and received, which is imma-

terial in itself, that excites the soul and influences physical action.

SECTION XVII.

1. He who believes that matter possessed *primarily causation*, or that it can of itself come out of nonentity into self-existence, coalesce its particles and then live, think, and act by any process of reduction or arrangements of elements, possessing figure, or is excited to motion by laws of affinity or of repulsion, should first discover and define the degree of fineness existing in a divided hair, and be able to tell all the points of intersection, angling the directions of their localities respectively. Then should he proceed to define the alteration in the situation of the particles of matter in which they begin to breathe life from naught, and live, act, and cogitate.
2. The self-power of particles to *change* to or from each other, or in degrees of difference, is impossible; and if they could, it would still remain, that form, figure, and magnitude are all material accidents. The substance is matter, and, in this respect, can not differ in parts one from another. Then if one part can think and act, all matter can think and act. Therefore, all particles of matter possess causation and action, and must be cogitative. And if there is such a thing as matter thinking, that influence or power must be superadded, which implies a principle differing in essence or nature from matter, and can not be a result of it, but must have been conferred by a superior or an omnipotent cause.
3. No accident of matter can produce *action* or *cause cognition*.

tation, either regularly or irregularly; and it can not superadd that influence or power, for matter is divisible, and that which thinks must be one, or of parts united, so that the action is one. But matter is not one and indivisible. However closely the particles adhere together, they still exist as particles and without self-motion, and are powerless in adhering to or in penetrating each other. If the power of thought existed in those particles, it would exist whether they were in contact or remotely located; and if these are divisible, or are capable of being sundered and scattered abroad, there must be as many minds as there are particles in matter. Then the mountain, the globe, the sun, moon, and stars are all built of mind, or of a combination of innumerable immaterialities, which is absurd. 4. On the other hand, if it requires a *union* of the elements of matter in order to constitute a power to think and act, there would be no power to classify these elements, and it would require all of the material elements in the vast universe to form one mind or soul. Should there be some influence or essence in which they unite or center, so their action or thoughts may be but one, that influence or power is not merely superadded, but is an existent superior to and independent of matter.

SECTION XVIII.

1. Matter can not contain abstract *ideas* of any thing, for the particles could not *reflect* upon what passes within themselves, much less contemplate that which was beyond; for within themselves they

could find nothing but limited material representations or impressions, and these could not form ideas, neither could they be formed by ideas, abstracting themselves; nor have they self-power to form themselves into trains of thought and metaphysical argumentation. Mind being matter, our inward perception of external things could only be in accordance to the impressions they make upon matter. For the notion or idea of that which would be conceived in the mind, could have no existence while the object was prospective or distant; but now the idea is present and exists as it is in itself, while the mind has power to instantaneously grasp the object and scan every part. 2. Matter, within itself, possesses no power capable of *correcting appearances* or *impressions*. In seeing the topsail of a ship, far away at sea, the natural idea would be like the appearance, the existence of something very small; but as it is, there is something within which forms a more correct idea, bringing into consideration the rotundity of the sea and the feebleness of sight. That which commands our senses and reasons correctly against appearances is not matter. Matter by and in itself is lifeless and strictly passive, and acting only when moved by some separate cause, or in conformity to laws of adhesion and gravitation. 3. Man is *conscious* that he *lives* and has *liberty* of motion, in thought and in changing position of place, and by an instantaneous thought change his course or purpose, and counteract, in some instances, the laws both of capillary attraction and gravitation. Inert elements can not of themselves voluntarily suspend the operations or arrest the tendency and

action of the laws of nature. Before matter can effect this its nature must be changed; it must be brought from death to life—from incapacity of self-consciousness and thinking to feeling, breathing, and cogitation. And if its nature is changed, it ceases to be matter, for inertness or passiveness is essential to its entity. 4. No faculty or influence capable of thinking can be *superadded* to matter, for then by such a connection it would be rendered incapable of action. And if matter could constitute the power of cogitation, still our idea of the soul would be imperfect; for it has many faculties, and with the thinking principle we must superadd perception, apprehending, reflection, judging, comparing, willing, reasoning, making deductions, and putting in motion material existences.

SECTION XIX.

1. The soul is not a *faculty* of the body, nor a *result* of matter, but it dwells within the body, and governs it in whole or in part, as the hands, feet, eyes, and tongue. That which governs the body is not the body nor particles of it, neither is it a super-added materiality or accident, but a superior spiritual power or soul. 2. The soul is *incapable* of annihilation, as it is distinct and superior to matter; and matter, so far as we can understand, is imperishable, or its elements can not cease to exist in some way. We know nothing of the nature or the essence of either mind or matter; and to try to define them, or the nature of their mysterious union, would be fruitless. We may reason on these sub-

jects with some degree of satisfaction, though certain knowledge is not at our command. 3. We have no evidence that any *existent* can or will ever pass into *non-existence*. If the elements of matter are imperishable, so far as we can comprehend them, and the immateriality of the soul is established, which would render it more incapable of non-existence, so far as our knowledge of its elements and being can extend, how can we deny an unwavering belief of its immortality? This truth is accredited and exists in the moral constitution resting upon evidences tested and known by the power of intuition. The soul has naturally an indisposition to tarry with the present moment and circumstances; there is ever a disposition to pass on to the future, and a desire for immortality. It can now feel an awe of the future and of God. This varies with its shades of conscientious rectitude or sense of wrong. We look to the future with fear or hope, according to our sense of guilt or innocence; and without the need of argument we naturally feel that we are responsible to some being for all our acts. How can all these be attributed to inert matter? Such an assumption requires no arguments to reveal its falsehood. 4. Conscience has *power of self-action*, and it is often impinged or influenced to action by some unseen cause, both in accordance with and contrary to our will and natural desires. He who follows its dictations, and he who repels them, are both compelled to acknowledge its quickening influence and its power. In contemplating the infinite future, the righteous rejoice while the wicked sink under feelings of remorse; and in both

cases they are conscious that their feelings can not result from impressions made by external things, or from argumentation.

SECTION XX.

1. The soul has a *conscious knowledge of self* with its continued being, while in health or in the wane of life. There is no condition of helplessness or suffering, this side of death, while reason remains, but that the soul feels its nature and being to be immortal. The immortality of the soul is reasonable, from its vast capacities and dread of annihilation. It is evident from its great improvements, boundless desires, natural dissatisfaction with time and things present, a desire for the future and for some kind of religion. Again: it is immortal by the consent of all nations. It is demonstrated to be such in the providence of God, and is made known by the unequal infliction of Divine justice and judgments in this life. 2. The *high moral obligations* resting upon a rational, immaterial, and immortal spirit, are clear and of boundless importance; for the real existence of the human soul is beyond all possibility of doubt; and in the acknowledgment of the great government of an infinite Creator, we are necessarily compelled to acknowledge that all elements and existences should be adapted to the claims and purity of the same, and all that is impure must be rejected from the limitless purity of God in the future world. If the soul was constituted of material properties, and could those properties be dissevered and dispersed by temporal death,

he who had power to create them from naught has power to affinitate those elements in a reunion, and in a future organization. 3. One great object of our being is to *cultivate* the powers bestowed upon us for *usefulness*, *subjecting them all* to the will and service of God. There are impressions connected with the consciousness of every rational being, assuring him that the soul must live forever. We have power to deny this, but there is an internal voice ever arising from intuitive authority, thundering in affirmative appeals of truth, reversing all such false assumptions; and it can never be silenced by any confession or avowed faith to the reverse. This source of truth is unerring and irresistible. 4. If materialism or any kind of infidelity be true, adherents to such doctrines are *more reasonable* in rejecting them, upon the grounds assumed as the basis of their own systems and faith, than they are to adopt them in violation of revelation and its requirements; for if the former be true, we shall all fare just alike in the future world. Then, if we believe them to be true, and act accordingly, and they should finally prove to be false, our loss would be irreparable—all hope would be involved in ruin. But if we should adopt the Christian system and religion, and it should prove to be true in the final test, we would be perfectly safe forever.

SECTION XXI.

1. It is more reasonable for an Atheist skeptic or a materialist *naturally to believe* in revelation, the immortality of the soul, and that that immortality

of being may be pure and holy, than it is for them to reject them as false. It is more reasonable for them to believe in them as true, and to live accordingly, even if they should prove finally to be false, than it is to reject them, from the following reasons: (1.) There is no book on earth which claims to be a revelation from God but the Bible. If it be *true*, we are perfectly safe in believing it; and as it is the only book of the kind, we could sustain no loss in receiving it as true, even if it should prove in the next world to be false; for then it would have had no power to change our condition from what it was going to be, nor to render it worse. (2.) As this is the *only* revelation we have claiming to be inspired, should it be false, we will all share the same fate at last, and can lose nothing by believing it, and in living accordingly. Then, if it be true, we have gained every thing calculated to constitute us happy, and if it be false, it is as equally clear that we can lose nothing by believing it. But if we reject it, and it proves to be true at last, we are lost forever. (3.) Then, if from reason we can *believe* revelation to be *true*, who can doubt but that the soul is immortal? (4.) If the soul is *immortal*, according to revealed truth, it is capable of an immortality of purity and happiness. 2. Man is not a skeptic by *nature*, neither can he become one by the authority of revelation. He has an internal conviction that that principle which thinks, acts, reasons, and wills, must live forever. And if the great moral and infinite government of God is infinitely pure and holy, we must be prepared for it and adapted to it, in order to enter into the joys of a peaceful immor-

tality. 3. As matter belongs to *physical* science, we now close this part of our inquiries, and refer the reader to that part of this work devoted more exclusively to the philosophy of mind, where the mental powers of the student can be fully tested in examining mental elements. He should study to define as clearly as possible the existence and office of the various properties of mind. It will increase his confidence in the true existence of immaterial elements, the self-power of the soul to act, and of its immortality. His belief will be established as to the existence and limitless power, wisdom and goodness of the great first Cause. As standing midway the ascending and descending series in two worlds of existences, he should rejoice in trying to contemplate all demonstrable truths, possessed of submissive composure amid the infinite mysteries connected with the government of an all-wise Creator, knowing that duty more imperatively requires him ever to wonder and adore, to love and praise.

Elements of Mental Science,

OR

THE ELEMENTS OF MIND

WHICH

LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION.

THESE PAPERS ARE PREPARED FOR
THE USE OF STUDENTS AND

ARE TO BE USED AS

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE STUDY

Division First.

ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT.

SECTION I.

1. The *mind* of man is truly and clearly a spiritual existent, immaterial in essence or nature, and unending in its duration. 2. In the philosophy of mind there are *elements* which may be called mental elements. These elements lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind, and are the source of mental action, and without their existence mental action is inane. 3. If *moral* feelings can exist in the mind, and if moral action can proceed from it as an entity, or from its states or motion, there must be elements of mind connected directly with the origin of moral influences, or no moral feelings could ever exist as appertaining to or as a part of self; neither could we ever be capable of moral action.

SECTION II.

1. Those powers which lie at the foundation of *moral action*, or are connected with the origin of the moral influences of the soul, may be called *moral elements* of mind. 2. If there is neither mental nor moral elements in the mind, there can

be neither *mental* nor *moral science*, which can be known to us as such. But mental and moral science are acknowledged to exist and to be true; hence, there must exist in the philosophy of mind both mental and moral powers, when we compare the nature of the actions which proceed from them; otherwise the idea of the power, or the existence of either mental or moral action, is absurd; for an effect to exist without a foundation or cause is utterly impossible.

CHAPTER II.

INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS.

SECTION I.

1. THERE are *various orders* of mind. Finite minds, from the lowest up to the highest gradation of intelligence, are justly responsible to the authority of the great infinite mind and sovereign Ruler over all, to whom we should ever be wholly submissive and obedient in adoration, service, love, and praise. 2. The inferior *orders* of animated and self-acting beings possess something of the phenomena of mind. These properties, if they be only called instinct, are properties entirely dissimilar to and differing from those of matter.

SECTION II.

1. Matter has neither *conscious sensation* nor *self-motion*, but it has inertness, which is essential to its nature and existence, and without which it ceases to be matter. 2. *That* which is analogous to the states and manifestations of mind in beasts, birds, and fish, if it is perceptible at all, it may be denominated or called instinct; yet instinct alone may be called imperishable, from the fact that it is distinct from and is superior to matter; and we have no evidence to believe that any properties or particles of matter will ever cease to be. Hence, the intel-

lectual and immortal powers of the human mind are now prominently before us, and form the true objects of our inquiries.

What is the secret of the power of the human mind? What are the laws which regulate its action? What are the causes which determine the development of its powers? These are the questions which we have to consider in this chapter. We shall first consider the physical causes which regulate the action of the mind; and then we shall consider the moral causes which regulate the action of the mind.

The physical causes which regulate the action of the mind are those which are external to the mind, and which act upon it from without. These causes may be divided into two classes: material and spiritual. Material causes are those which are external to the mind, and which act upon it from without. Spiritual causes are those which are internal to the mind, and which act upon it from within. Material causes are those which are external to the mind, and which act upon it from without. Spiritual causes are those which are internal to the mind, and which act upon it from within.

CHAPTER III.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND.

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SECTION I.

1. MIND is *immaterial in nature*, and exists in essence, or, as to elements, dissimilarly to that of matter, and has a continued being, which is independent of any essential loss or elementary destruction by temporal disease or death. 2. It is not constituted by thought, feeling, or any emotion or act, but it is *that* which feels, thinks, reasons, and acts. Though we examine severally the elements or properties of mind, it can not be regarded as divisible, but it is one in essence or nature, and the union of properties in its existence is forever indivisible. 3. Our knowledge of the existence of mind or of self, independently of demonstration, falls back upon *intuition*, and is knowledge, known to be true, in an unerring assurance received and fully tested by self-consciousness. If the power of knowing existing facts be not referred back to innate elements as truths or axioms, which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind; and if they be not the primary source of the knowledge of all real entities to us, all our knowledge would be inane, and all entities non-existences. In an important sense we know that we exist, because we intuitively feel our existence to be real, and the knowledge of it to be true. 4. Our

knowledge of the existence of mind may be *tested* by the *known existence* of certain facts. It has power to think and will, remember and reason. It holds intercourse with external things by means of the corporeal senses, and receives impressions from them. These operations and results are known to us as facts, which facts are evidences of the existence of a power capable of knowing them to be such, and this primary power, which is capable of knowledge within itself, is mind.

SECTION II.

1. *These results*, which are of the operation or motion of the mind, are not the primary knowledge of its existence, else the whole of mind would exist in motion, and motion can not exist where there is no power of self-action, or cause capable of moving. But the power of knowing all these acts and results falls back upon self-consciousness and intuition. 2. In matter such essences as possess solidity and extension, or that which is essential to its entity, are called primary properties. But contact with a smell or odor awakens a *conviction* in the mind that there is somewhere an unknown cause of this known sensation. This, with color, temperature, and taste, have been styled as secondary properties of matter. Yet these are only the effects or results, as proof of primary elements. 3. If a *knowledge* of mind, as an entity, is wholly and only known by *its motion*, then any knowledge of it is an accident; for motion or action may or may not exist; and if there be no abiding, primary elements capable of self-motion,

and intuitively the origin of all knowledge, we can not have certain knowledge of any existence. 4. Any speculations as to the *cause* of mind are far beyond philosophical inquiries. It is not the cause of its own existence, neither can entity be a result of non-existence. These things go beyond the reach of the human understanding. The true cause can only exist in the wisdom, goodness, and power of Deity, to whom we should bow in submissive awe, amid the yet unrevealed mysteries of the past, the present, and the future. 5. The *nature* or *essence* of mind is *unknown* to us. We know nothing of the essence of either matter or mind; yet we are certain of the reality of that mysterious principle within us, which is a permanent existent of various phenomena or properties. If that principle or power be called the essence of mind, in whole or in part, and it be unknown to us as to its nature, yet it is not unknown to us as an existent.

SECTION III.

1. Philosophers generally agree with Mr. Stewart, that "we are not *immediately conscious* of mind's existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills." To what extent we are immediately conscious of its existence, anterior to the mind's operations, is difficult to define with words. But to say that the power of self-consciousness can extend no further back, in any way, than the consciousness of sensation, thought, and volition, and they admitted to be mere opera-

tions of mind, is absurd. Operations of mind are no more than the original power or primary elements in motion. It is impossible for those operations, which are only sequences or results, to derive no power from the primary cause and supporter of such operations; otherwise the operations or acts of the mind would be the only primary principle or elements of its being. Then, whenever the mind was wholly inactive it would be annihilated, or, at least, we could have no certain knowledge of self, as the mere operations of mind may or may not exist; but if they can "imply something which feels, thinks, and wills," they imply a power which is capable of being the origin of the conscious knowledge of all the acts of the mind; otherwise an effect must be the origin of the cause of itself. 2. *Axioms*, in numerical science, may, in some respects, represent axioms in the philosophy of mind. The whole of mathematical demonstrations or calculations can not be known to us as certainly true or false, were it not for the fact that they are based upon self-evident facts or truths called axioms. We are compelled to admit that things which are equal to the same thing, are equal to one another. If equals be added to equals the wholes are equal. All right-angles are equal to one another. A square block is a square block. Two added to two make four. We know all these to be truths or facts; but it is an absolute impossibility for us, by any process of reasoning or demonstration, to prove them to be either true or false. And without axioms there can be neither mathematical demonstrations or science. 3. How can we *know* such truths to be self-evident facts?

No power can receive them as facts, independently of all proof, but the intuitive self-evident axioms which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind. The innate principles of the soul form the final and conclusive source of appeals, and are the primary test of the knowledge of facts to us. The knowledge of self-evident facts, as such, is tested by an intuitive satisfaction or by self-consciousness, in which it is impossible for us to doubt them.

4. Why may not these self-evident facts, or axioms of the mind, have a *knowledge* of their own existence; and can not the primary power of the perception and the understanding of external facts be traced back to intuition? The origin of the power of knowledge must exist in and arise from the innate elements of mind, or otherwise an effect must be the primary or antecedent cause of itself. We can believe facts to exist, and to be self-evident truths, because we have within an intuitive power to feel and know them to be true independently of either proof or disproof.

CHAPTER IV.

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND.

SECTION I.

1. Our inquiries as to the phenomena of mind are more properly confined to *properties* or *elements*. The origin and nature or essence of mind is beyond the limits of philosophical demonstrations. There is not so much mystery connected with the examination of the elements of mind. 2. The mind is capable of a *threefold division*. (1.) Those which are clearly *mental* elements. (2.) Those which may be called *moral* elements of mind. (3.) The *manifestations* or acts of the mind. Mental elements are connected with all *mental acts*, and without their existence mental motion or action can not exist. They are the foundation or origin properly of such action or character of action. *Moral* elements of mind are connected with the origin of all moral action, and without such for a foundation no moral action can exist. 3. The *operations* or acts of the mind have hitherto been regarded as involving, (1.) Our *duties to God*. (2.) The duties we owe to *ourselves*. (3.) Our duties to *one another*. All these have been claimed as the principal embodiment of moral philosophy.

SECTION II.

1. To every philosopher it is clear that the present *order* of works on mental and moral science is incorrect; for the natural character of the elements of mind, according to the books, without any sufficiently clear distinction, has been lost sight of from the fact that they have been called only mental elements. No separate work has been arranged exclusively upon mental action, further than is found in connection with the examination of the mental elements; while, on the other hand, the action of the mind has been, by common consent, called moral action, connected with moral duties as it is contained in moral philosophy. But we should bear in mind that there are elements of mind which may be called moral elements, growing out of their relation to and influence or position in the mind. 2. This work is intended, as far as possible, to *define*, in the first place, mental elements, and, secondly, moral elements of mind. Then there should be a work adapted to the character, power, and nature of the actions, which are the results of elementary existences which are truly mental. If moral philosophy can apply to the action of mind, which arises in connection with and from moral elements of mind, and in relation to moral objects, so may action, which is wholly mental, arising only from mental elements, be defined as mental action in nature and character. 3. From the position of many writers we would be led to suppose that moral action, or that moral philosophy was *based* wholly upon *mental elements*, while the works on mental philosophy

do not contain moral elements of mind properly acknowledged and sufficiently defined. But they will be defined hereafter in discriminating the difference in the nature or character of mental and moral elements of mind. 4. The mind, so regularly and naturally arranged, contains within itself *immediate power to know* and to extend knowledge by examining elements, laws, and affinities of existences. This is the comparison of phenomena, and the discovery of their agreement and disagreement. Though we can not arrive at the nature of the essence of mind, yet we are certain of something existing within, exhibiting a permanent subject of certain varying phenomena, of which we are conscious, and to doubt it would be impossible.

CHAPTER V. SENSATION.

SECTION I.

1. SENSATION is the mind's reception of an action *felt* and *known* to exist, or it is an impression made upon it. The senses form the medium through which such an effect is realized. In another point of light it may be regarded as a simple state of the mind, in a peculiar way, and connected with action. Abstractly it is incapable of self-action, and must be, to a certain extent, a result of some influence or impingement, which may arise in different ways. 2. It may be *connected* with the *change* or influence of some one or more of the organs of sense, or in being closely accessory to the change of the physical powers. A change in the internal state and condition of the body may awaken the sensation of fatigue, pain, or heaviness. 3. Sensation can not be *separated* from the mind. All sensation is in the mind, and is nothing more nor less than the mind itself in a certain state. Our sensations are diversified and are almost innumerable. The body has parts, and can exist with the loss of some of its members; but the mind and sensation are forever indivisible. A sensation must be the mind influenced, and is the mind in a certain state. But sensation is not wholly the mind itself. By the term mind we understand an indefinable essence, of which only the elements

can come under philosophical analysis; but sensation can be the mind in a certain way. 4. Sensation is *wholly* in the mind, and the cause of sensation may exist in the changes or condition of the body, or it may arise from objects of the external world. Hearing, touch, and seeing are connected with physical organs; but those organs have no self-power to hear, feel, and see. They may be connected with and may be organs of sensation; but sensation within itself is in the mind, and is the mind in a peculiar state.

SECTION II.

1. In another shade of meaning sensation is *feeling awakened* by objects of the external world. The knowledge it gives of external objects is quite imperfect. It requires a combined action of several faculties in conveying to us a general idea of real existences. The various senses, acting separately, can give us no correct idea of existences, nor of the properties of compounds. Sensation can convey to us a result of a known or of an unknown existence; but of itself it can not give us a knowledge of either the essence or of the properties of existences.
2. Sensation may be a *state of internal feelings*, which is capable of being excited by spiritual influences, or by sensations of humility and awe in the presence of the great God. It can be realized in the bare remembrance of startling events in the past.
3. In receiving impressions from external objects, we are to bear in mind that our sensations are not the *appearance* or *images* of those entities, for the

true place of sensation is in the mind. No external property can form any part of sensation, neither can it be added to it. It is entirely different from all material properties in essence or in nature. And it is distinct in nature, so far as we can understand, from all spiritual influences beyond the reality of self. 4. The connection between *sensation* and the *physical organs* is involved in mystery. External objects make an impression or they affect the physical organs, and through the medium of the senses they awake sensations in the mind. To explain the change effected in those organs, or to define their connection with the senses, is impossible. 5. The awakening of sensation, by external objects, through the medium of the senses, is evidence that it is, to a great extent, *consequent to the senses*, so far as it relates to action from these sources. In this respect only it is immediately successive to the action of some one or more of the organs of sense; yet the power of sensation is in the mind, which power can and will act independently of the physical organs connected with the senses, in feelings of awe in the Divine presence, or in bare remembrance of past emotions of the soul, which existed either with or without a known cause. 6. As sensation is in the mind, and is the mind, in a certain way, we are compelled to acknowledge its *connection with the primary elements* of mental science; for sensation can not exist only in connection with the existence of mind.

CHAPTER VI.

SENSE.

SECTION I.

1. SENSE, as connected with the human mind, is that principle or faculty which has power to *apprehend* the existence, and, to some extent, the qualities of external objects. 2. It appears to hold a midway relation between the existence and change of the *physical organs* and the existence of real *sensation*. 3. In this position only it is *immediately succeeded* by sensation, being the medium through which impressions from external objects wake up the power of sensation in the mind.

SECTION II.

1. Sense, at least, *apprehends* some of the qualities of the substances which cause sensations, such as possess hardness, extension, and weight, which comes in contact with physical organs. 2. Its simple state is *spontaneous*, and its action may be wholly voluntary, as well as a result of either voluntary or invoked causes. 3. It may be regarded as the *perception* of the senses, or is that influence or motion which is immediately successive to impressions made upon physical organs toward the reality of that which is felt ere sensation refers it to the

consideration of the mind. 4. It may, in another point of light, be regarded as *the discernment* of the senses, which takes place on contact with an object, and in relation to the real existence of such an object, almost at the same time the beginning of the impression thus made is realized.

CHAPTER VII. THE SENSES.

SECTION I.

1. THE senses connect, in one respect, the *sensations* of the mind with the *organs of sense* in the body, and have power to report to us the existence of external things when they come in contact with the physical organs, and can convey a knowledge of their properties in connection with the action of other powers of the mind. 2. The *connection* existing between the senses and the organs of sense in the body can not be defined. 3. We are *wholly dependent* upon our senses as the medium through which we have knowledge of external things. While the senses apprehend external things, and are a source of knowledge to us, as to their real existence, yet we have other sources of knowledge; otherwise the senses would be the embodiment of all the faculties of the mind.

SECTION II.

1. We are dependent upon the senses only so far as it relates to existences in the *external world*, as the primary medium of access in knowing their existence to be real. Abstractly we can not call the senses the knowledge of external things. They are only the knowledge of external things in connection

with other powers of the mind. 2. The *importance* of the senses as a source of knowledge in regard to external objects *is indispensable*. If we were deprived of smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight, it would be utterly impossible for us to know any thing of external physical existences. 3. Yet the *loss of all these* could not annihilate the mind, neither could they deprive it of sensations within itself, nor from other spiritual influences or existences. 4. We are now about to enter upon the order of the *five senses*. In examining the senses as they occur in their order, it is not intended that we should define the power of the senses as they exist in the mind, disconnected with the physical organs of sense; but to define, as far as possible, their office and power as they exist in their mysterious connection with the organs of the body.

CHAPTER VIII. THE SENSE OF SMELL.

SECTION I.

1. THE *organ of smell* is said to consist in the extension of nerves to every part of the delicate mucous membrane, with which the cavities of the nostrils are lined. These are connected to the sinews and extend up to the brain. So that by real physical entities the organ of smell is delicately and sensitively connected with the brain, which is regarded as the organ of the mind. 2. The sense of smell is clearly *connected* with the *nerves*, and it is impossible to separate it from them only in the destruction of the physical organs; then that power of the mind may remain inactive, so far as it relates to the power of apprehending external objects. 3. The *substance* of the nerves contains precisely the same properties as that of the brain. That part of any nerve which has been severed by disease or by violence, loses all sensation, and is doomed to perish. If all the nerves of the system are sensorial, and are connected in some way with the brain, then all the physical organs of sense are connected with the brain. And the senses are inseparably connected with the nervous system. 4. The *nasal nerves*, or physical organ of sense, may be affected by the odor of a rose, and simultaneously is, or exists, the sense

of smell. The nerves and the sense of smell are not one and the same; yet to define the connection of the two is impossible. Sensation is immediately successive to the sense of smell, and conveys to the mind the impression of the external object, which was apprehended by the organ of sense.

SECTION II.

1. The *sensations* of smell are received by means of the organ, which is the mind's primary, yet the most remote test in apprehending the existence of external things. 2. The nature and elements of *that* which affects the organ may *elude our knowledge*, as to a correct understanding of the manner of the operation; yet there is a state of mind produced by it, varying, in a great measure, voluntarily with the nature and elements of that which produced the impression. This peculiar mental affection is invariably successive to the organic change. And the nature of the connection blending the two in one action is beyond all explanation. 3. We can not *classify*, but to a limited extent, the sensations received by the sense of smell, for they are numerous and diversified. We may use such terms as sweet, sour, and musty; but as a general rule they are classed, being distinguished by their connection with the object which causes the sensation, as the smell of a peach or an apple. The sensations received through the organ of smell are naturally pleasant or disagreeable. Some of the objects which produce them throw off an effluvia which is delightfully exhilarating, and others produce death. 4. The sen-

sation of smell, through the means of the organ, has an *important influence* upon life and health. It aids in the right use of medicines, detecting the harmless from the poisonous. It detects poisonous odors emitted from objects, or that which is destructive in vapors in the air. It aids in the selection of the right kind of food, as well as to impart to us a knowledge of the thousands of sweet odors which are wafted upon the winds of heaven. 5. It is the *properties of external bodies* which produce these sensations. Odoriferous effluvia, or small particles, are emitted from certain substances, and are diffused through the atmosphere. The air which is drawn through the nostrils is impregnated with these particles, and it brings them in contact with the organ of the sense of smell.

SECTION III.

1. The "*perceptions of smell*" are not in distinction from sensation; for perceptions of smell can not exist. Smell, within and of itself, is incapable of perception. We can have perceptions of *that* which is the object of the sense of smell, and we may have certain perceptions of or in relation to the condition and existence of the organ or sense within or of themselves, but not as many writers define perceptions of smell. 2. The argument must differ from former writers; for there can be no sense of smell till that organ has been *affected*. The action, then, which is sensation, conveys the impression to the mind. Till that action reaches the mind there can be no perception. If we can have perception

of smell, then perception must precede sensation, which is impossible. There can be no smell, known to us as such, till the organ is affected. Then if perception precedes sensation, it must act without direction to any definite object. And it will not do to say that sensation within itself is the perception of itself or of the cause of its own action. 3. We can have perceptions of the *objects* which are the cause of the action of the sense of smell, and these perceptions are in distinction from sensation.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SENSE OF TASTE.

SECTION I.

1. The *organs of taste* consist of nervous papillæ, covering the surface of the tongue, and particularly that of the apex and sides. It exists also in the mucous membrane, which lines the palate and the cavity of the mouth. The entrance of the alimentary canal is so guarded that the suitableness of every thing which enters into the stomach is fully tested by the organ of taste. 2. The sense of taste is realized when the organ comes in contact with substances of different natures or qualities of properties. These effect a change in the organ, which is immediately followed by a corresponding influence of mind. 3. To the sense of taste is connected the *sensations* of taste, conveying to the mind, to some extent, something of a corresponding impression arising from the qualities of properties, or from the nature of the external motive cause. This position has been denied; and it has been maintained that sensation can not convey any thing of the nature or condition of its cause, but that it is reserved for some other power or faculty to have perceptions of the qualities and nature of that which causes sensation. 4. If any faculty or faculties have power to convey to the mind any thing of the qualities or nature of objects causing sensation, why may not *sense* and *sensation influence*

the mind in regard to the cause of sensations, and favorably to the apprehending of the qualities of the same? for they are by nature adapted, as the inlet to the mind, to the reality of such existences, and are designed to be more closely connected with such objects than any other faculty or power of the mind. 5. The doctrine that *sense* and *sensation*, which are more nearly and more closely connected with the causes which affect them than any other power, can not affect the mind favorably to the qualities and nature of such causes, is too absurd to require refuting arguments, and especially so, when all that has ever been said to the reverse consists wholly in assumptions. 6. The nature of the sensations of taste are *known*, and are items of experience. The mind having been impressed by sensation, the affections are immediately moved in search of some external cause. Sensation, unaided by other affections and faculties of the mind, and without any assistance from experience, can not convey to the mind a full knowledge of the various qualities of external substances; yet there is a natural adaptation in external objects to produce in the mind a sensation, to some extent, corresponding to their nature, which may be called the sensation of sweet, sour, or bitter, according to the nature or qualities of the objects.

SECTION II.

1. The *modifications of taste* consist in its power to change, or in the inclination of the organ to adapt itself, or to be adapted to the nature of the

various qualities of sapid objects. There is hardly any quality of the objects of taste so disagreeable but that use can make them to be endured, and, perhaps, finally agreeable. And on the other hand the pleasurable may lose its agreeableness by continued use. 2. The properties of bodies which give rise to the sensations of taste are called *effluvia* or *flavors*. The nature of the essence of these flavors is unknown to us; yet we know that such flavors exist. 3. Immediately upon the sensations of taste a state of mind ensues which *refers them* to the external cause, and, in part, correspondingly to the peculiar quality of some sapid object, like unto those which are acrid, sweet, or bitter.

CHAPTER X. THE SENSE OF HEARING.

SECTION I.

1. The ear is the *organ of sound* or of hearing. Its location is convenient and wisely arranged. Its projection forms an external koilon, which is suitable to the gathering of every pulsation of the air as they are wafted from every direction. The internal cavity consists of circular winding passages. These are partitioned or divided by the tympanum, which is a delicate membrane, called the drum of the ear, and which has a nerve delicately and beautifully spread out upon its internal surface. This is called the auditory nerve, and is connected to the brain.
2. The sense of hearing consists in the *power* or *influence* which is principally and mysteriously connected with the union of the tympanum and the auditory nerve. This is affected by the action of the atmosphere. The undulations, waves, or pulsations of the air move upon or impress the tympanum.
3. The sensations of hearing are *realized* when the vibrations of the agitated air are transmitted through the labyrinth, impressing the transparent membrane or drum of the ear, and affecting the auditory nerve, which is connected with the brain. The sensation is almost simultaneously conveyed from the organ, when affected, to the mind, which is

followed by a new state of mind, in which we have perception, and an inquiry as to the external cause.

SECTION II.

1. The *varieties* of the sensation of sound are almost innumerable. It has been said that the ear is capable of detecting about five hundred variations of tone, and as many variations in strength. We are informed that when these are combined they number about twenty thousand, varying in simple sounds, degrees of strength, and difference of tone. Many human voices may sound the tone represented by three in the octave or stave, and each one will differ from all the rest, though sounding the same tone. Fifty different instruments may sound the same note and the ear be capable to distinguish a difference in all of them. A difference can be detected which may arise from light or heavy atmosphere, the good or bad repair of the same instrument, and also of the voice in sickness contrasted with the same in health, and a pleasant with an angry mode, or age with youth.

2. The cause of these sensations is *remotely* in the *object* or agent which produces the vibratory state of the atmosphere, as the air has not irregular self-motion. A sonorous body, when struck, agitates the atmosphere around it; this agitation recedes from it in all directions in wave-like undulations, resembling the concentric encircling waves on the surface of water at rest when ruptured by a falling stone. Yet the air in motion may be regarded as the *operative* and *impressing* cause of the sensations of hearing.

3. The knowledge which

simple sounds convey to the mind *is not intuitive*. The power of the sensations of sound belongs to intuition; but the knowledge we receive of the existence and properties of external objects, as a sequence of the impressions made by sensations, is aided by other faculties in connection with experience. The new state of mind consequent upon the action of these sensations, is that in which we have perceptions and full knowledge of the existing cause.

4. We can not tell the direction of sound, neither the distance it is from us, nor the qualities of the cause *wholly unaided* by other faculties and experience. But in gaining a knowledge of the direction, distance, and existence of the cause, we can and must depend, to a considerable extent, upon the sense of hearing. As to direction and distance, more depends upon the sense of hearing than experience.

SECTION III.

1. To have *knowledge of sound* it is indispensable that we be in the direction and under the influence of the waves of air as they strike the ear. The natural course and motion of sound is always from the cause. There can be no sound without a motion of the air, and if there is motion it recedes from the cause. If we depend upon experience for its direction and location, we can arrive at them amid high and strong winds as though all were calm. But this is absurd.
2. We gain our knowledge of location principally from the *direction of the motion* of the undulations or pulsations of air which strike the ear, producing

a corresponding sensation; and also of distance by the peculiar modifications of the strength or force of such pulsations; for if there be nothing in the sensation corresponding or agreeing in any way with the properties or nature of its cause, then it follows that the mind, in trying to determine the true cause by perception, acts without a guide, and the result is wholly accidental; for no faculty is calculated by nature, or has more power to give correct direction to the perception of cause than sense or sensation, which are affected or are created by it. 3. Further proof that we are in a degree dependent upon the peculiar manner and way in which sound strikes the ear in *determining the cause and its location*, is found in the fact that when we have a confused idea of the direction of sound we intuitively turn the head in different directions to get the direction of the waves of air on the tympanum, in order to know the true direction of the cause, and from the peculiar modulations and force of the sound thus conveyed we judge of the distance to the cause or object. 4. The sense of hearing is of *great importance*. By it we are made acquainted with the music of nature, the melody in the concordant sounds of instruments and of the living voice. Music has charms which are exhilarating and soothing. Verbal language is wholly dependent upon this sense. Articulated sounds or speech in the reciprocal expression of feelings, fears, and hopes, forms one of the principal mediums and sources of human happiness. For such inestimable gifts praise should ever redound to the great Creator.

CHAPTER XI.

THE SENSE OF TOUCH.

SECTION I.

1. THE *organ of touch* may be said to be blended with and exists in the muscles or papillæ, extending over the whole surface of the body. The hands and fingers have been regarded as the principal organ of touch; but it is not clear that there is naturally much more minute delicacy or acute sensations in the tendons, fibers, nerves, muscles, or skin of the hands and fingers, than exists internally and over the entire surface of the body. Very much depends upon the frequent use of the hands and the concentration of the faculties to their use in realizing sensations of touch. 2. The sense of touch is far *more extensive* than the other senses which we have just examined; for in one sense it includes them all in itself, possessing the surface of the whole physical frame; yet a distinction can be made and does naturally exist in the senses. 3. The sense of touch is not the *essence or properties* which compose the nervous system; but it is that power or influence of the mind which is mysteriously and inseparably connected with the tendons, fibers, nerves, and muscles, extending its connection with them to the very apex of the papillæ spread over the surface of the body. Here it comes in contact with and realizes the existence of external objects. 4. The sensations of touch

constitute *that* which conveys to the mind impressions of objects which affect the physical organs. Consequent upon the action of these sensations is a new state of mind which has perceptions of the cause. But to define the mysterious union of the power of the sensations of touch with the physical organ, or nerves, is utterly impossible.

SECTION II.

1. The *extent and variations* of the sensations of touch differ from those senses which we have noticed. By the sense of smell we acquire a knowledge of the effluvia or odors of external objects. By the tongue and palate we gain a knowledge of tastes; and by the ear we hear sounds. The knowledge gained by these senses is restricted to the single medium of appropriate operation peculiar to each one. But by the sense of touch we acquire knowledge of various objects and of different qualities, such as solidity, softness, hardness, roughness, and smoothness, and such as heat, cold, and extension and form. 2. The *influence of the qualities* of external bodies upon the mind, through the medium of the sense of touch, may and does, to some extent, impart a knowledge of those properties corresponding to the peculiar nature of their existence. This can be tested by contact with hardness, extension, and form, solidity, softness, roughness, smoothness, and motion. 3. Whether these properties be of primary or of secondary knowledge, in whole or in part, does not prevent them from producing, when brought in contact with the sense of touch, an *in-*

ternal sensation or feeling corresponding, to some extent, with the peculiar condition, state, or nature of the cause. 4. Knowledge in the mind, which arises from these sources, can not be perfect, received only through the medium of *any one of the senses* without the aid of other faculties. All sensations are in the mind; and the idea that they have no power, when produced by external objects, to influence the mind in any way or to any degree, as to the nature or properties of the affecting cause, is contrary to true analysis and our conceptions of truth.

SECTION III.

1. All sensation is in the mind, and can not *exist* either *with* or *without* external causes. Sensation is known to be true, and within itself is nothing else than what it is felt to be. 2. The *nature* of the sensations of touch is very different from the nature or qualities existing in the external causes of sensation. External causes can exist independently of the sensation of touch, and sensations may exist without any external cause. But when we are brought in contact with external objects, sensation reports the existence of such objects to the mind. And in connection with the sensation thus reporting to or impressing the mind, is the origin of the idea of the properties of such external cause or causes. 3. Connected with the sense of touch is the *origin* of the *idea* of extension, hardness, roughness, and smoothness, and also of edges, corners, and sharp points. The notion of such qualities must first arise in connection with and be conveyed to the mind through

the medium of the sense of touch. And with it is connected the origin of the idea of the form or the figure of bodies. 4. Connected with the sense and sensation of touch is the origin of our knowledge of the *temperature* of bodies. When heat and cold affect the organs of the sense of touch, the sensation may be capable of a corresponding action in the peculiar state, nature, or modulations within itself. And with the nature of its action upon the mind is the origin of the idea of the qualities causing action; for without the medium of the sense of touch we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. 5. The sensation is *not* within itself the *idea* or the *knowledge* of the existence of heat or cold; but connected with the sensation is the origin of the idea of such existences; for if the origin of such ideas be not connected with the sense of touch, then we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. This position is not affected, whether the sensations arise from internal or external causes. It is easy to determine whether the sensation arises from the remote apex of the organ of touch, or from some influence affecting the internal tendons, fibers, or nerves of a healthy system.

SECTION IV.

1. A sentient being may know that heat and cold *do exist*, but as to the qualities of realities which are called heat and cold we know nothing. There is a difference between a sensation and an idea. A sensation may be immediately antecedent to an idea, and we may form an idea of the cause of a

sensation after the sensation is gone; yet the origin of the idea may be connected with sensation, though that idea or notion may be matured after the sensation is gone. 2. That the *origin* of the idea of external qualities which affect the sense of touch, is *connected* with the sensation of touch, has been acknowledged by all the leading philosophers of past time; but many of them contradict their assumed premises in the conclusion of their own arguments, by denying the origin of our knowledge of any external substance as being connected in any way with the sensation of touch. They have fallen into this error by trying to keep up a logical distinction between the elements of mind, severing the affinity of their united being by wild, abstract analysis. 3. In *essence* there is no similarity between the sensation and the external cause. How this dissimilar sensation can carry with it the origin of the idea of the external cause we can not define, but we can not doubt the fact. Sensations are not the knowledge of external things; but what can we know of external objects without the medium of the sense of touch? It is the basis of the mind's action in knowing their existence. 4. This sense can not, within itself, convey to us a *matured knowledge* of external existences; yet the sensations may be affected by the qualities of their cause, sending them, with various modulations, to the mind, and varying in degrees of strength. How far these can impress the mind in regard to the qualities of the external causes we can not tell; but connected with the sensations of touch is the origin of our knowledge of the cause of such sensations.

CHAPTER XII.

THE SENSE OF SIGHT.

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SECTION I.

1. THE eye is the *organ* of the sense of sight. Its location is wisely arranged for convenience and usefulness, and where it can be most readily defended from harm or danger. It consists of transparent substances. The humors are of various refractive powers. They are called the aqueous, crystalline, and vitreous humors. The first refraction of the rays of light takes place when they fall upon the convexed surface of the cornea of the eye. This exterior surface receives the rays of light and transmits them to the aqueous humor. This transparent fluid exists between the cornea and the crystalline humor. The pupil is the center of the iris, and is the avenue to admit, and is for the transmission of the rays of light passing from the aqueous humor to the crystalline lens. It is maintained that here they are rerefracted and transmitted to the retina, which is surrounded by the vitreous humor. 2. The *retina* is a delicate membrane, which lies at the bottom of the eye, and contains upon it the expansion of the sensitive optic nerve. Rays of light affect the sense of vision while passing through the eye, and are undergoing several refractions; but they produce upon the retina or optic nerve the true image of the object which reflects the light. This sensitive organ

receives the image of the external object impressed upon it, and this impression is the origin of vision. The primary power of vision is connected with the optic nerve, and connected with this nerve is the origin of the sensations of sight which report to the mind. 3. The *importance* of the sense of sight to our happiness and knowledge is self-evident. We can not fully estimate the true value of sight without supposing ourselves to have been always deprived of it. Yet in that case we could depend upon others; therefore we must try to imagine the condition of the whole world without the power of vision. One glance of vision can survey hill and valley, mountain and lake, the verdant plain and rock-bound coast, flying clouds and rolling seas. In an instant of time it traverses a great variety in terrestrial existences—matches the flight of the vast globe, then ranges amid the revolving orbs of the planetary universe. But in the absence of vision these might exist and move, yet all would be night—eternal night to us.

SECTION II.

1. The *mysterious* arrangement of the internal structure of the eye, in adapting it to the effects produced by it, displays a design, skill, and wisdom infinitely above the power of atheistic arguments; for it is conclusive evidence of an omnipotent Creator, who fashioned it according to his infinite wisdom. The rays of light are refracted to a proper point by the different coats and humors. The muscular tendons command the action of the ball in

turning the pupil to the desired object. A circular, prominent, and strong orbit is set for its defense. It is protected by lids, lashes, and glands, secreting tears which promote its lubricity, supplying moisture, and, after washing the eye, the fluid passes through the outlet into the nose. This exquisite, mysterious, and successful arrangement can not be a result of accident or of chance. 2. The sense of sight must be *connected* with the retina or optic nerve. It is not the nerve within itself, neither is it the object of vision; but it is connected and has its origin with the sensitiveness of the optic nerve. 3. When we consider the *acute sensitiveness* of the optic nerve, if rays of light reflected from objects paint or impress the optic nerve with the images of such objects in order that they may be seen, may they not, in part, be felt by the optic nerve when seen? 4. The sensations of sight are *awakened* when rays of light from the object of sight affect the retina or optic nerve. These sensations impress the mind. A state of mind ensues in which we have perception of the cause of such sensations. 5. What modern philosophers mean by "*the perceptions of sight*" we can not understand. If they mean that sight has perceptions of objects within and of itself, we beg leave to differ from them, as that would be utterly impossible. And if they mean that we can have perception of the origin of sight, by which we see an object, then sight would be a sequence of perception, and is dependent upon it for its existence, which is not true. Therefore, there can be no such thing as the perceptions of sight, but we can have perceptions of the objects of sight.

SECTION III.

1. *Colors* have been regarded as the principal cause of the sensations of sight. But as to how colors are produced, or as to where they have their origin, is left in obscurity. They may arise partly in the essence or qualities of the objects seen, as well as from the various refracted rays of light reflected from those objects, and which fall on the power of vision. Some bodies, and even some properties, possess power to reflect some rays more abundantly than others. That light within and of itself consists of rays of different colors, unaffected by contact with other existences, is very doubtful. Light passing through a glass prism presents different colors; why can we not have the same result when it passes through prisms of other transparent substances? 2. We find, to some extent, that colors vary with the essence and qualities of the objects *refracting* and *reflecting* the rays of light. They may possess naturally a difference within themselves, but if so we have no knowledge of the fact. It is more reasonable to believe that color arises from the nature of the objects which reflect the light to the eye, or that it results from a modification of the principles of attraction, adhesion, density, or repulsion of such objects. 3. It is *light* reflected from external objects which affects the fibrous expansion of the sensitive optic nerve, and awakens sensations which extend to and impress the mind of the existing action of the reflected light, together with the images of the objects which cause such sensations. The modulations or change imparted to the rays of

light by the objects which reflect and refract them is carried by them to the sense of sight, and a corresponding sensation extends to the mind. This is reasonable, unless we deny that sensations are capable of change or modulations. 4. If we can not deny the *degrees*, or that there is a difference in the strength of the sensations, which correspond to the variations of the action of the rays of light reflected from a bright object, compared with those from an opaque body, may we not conclude that sensations may vary with modulations of light in other respects? But this fact we do not know to be true; yet there is more reason in support of it than can be found on or in regard to a thousand other points assumed by philosophers when they have been unable to render one argument in support of them. This far we can go, that the origin of our knowledge of visual objects may be and is connected with the sensations of sight.

SECTION IV.

1. We have power to *modify* or *change* the rays of light which come from visual objects by intervening transparent substances, and correspondingly our notions of those objects. Though light is the primary object of sight, yet, in order to see external things, there must be objects from which light is reflected, and the change and modulations of the reflected rays carrying with them the image of such objects to the power of vision, or the eye of coats, humors, and retina, or optic nerve. To define the precise office, nature, and powers of any or of all

these is beyond human wisdom or philosophical analysis. 2. The *knowledge* we receive through the sense of sight. This sense can be affected by graduated rays of light and shade coming from an innumerable variety of objects and qualities. At once we see the relative position of bodies, with their magnitude, figure, distance, and color, aided by perception, suggestion, association, and experience. To say that the sense of sight, within itself, has power to impart to us a full knowledge of visual objects is absurd. And to say that within itself it has no power to aid in arriving at a knowledge of such objects is false; for our knowledge of visual objects, as such, has its origin with the sensations of sight. 3. Philosophers have erred in defining the senses so as to *abstract* them from their *affinity* to the other faculties of the mind, thereby rendering them powerless in aiding to the real knowledge of existences, whereas we should bear in mind that the elements are forever indivisible. 4. Our knowledge of color is derived from the sense of sight, and the origin of this knowledge is original with the power of vision. No one of the other senses can be involved in the primary detection of color. Color may be a property inherent in light, consisting in a difference or condition in the rays of light and shades, refracted and reflected, or are so changed, which is a result from contact with the bodies the appearance of which they present or impress upon the optic nerve. If white is not to be called a color, yet it may be regarded as the primary quality from which colors graduate, as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. These are imparted to the

mind by the sensations of sight only. And if the origin of our knowledge of color is conveyed to the mind by the sensations of sight, may not the peculiar manner or way in which the sense of sight is affected, produce corresponding sensations in their modulations or nature in regard to the knowledge of other existences? And may not the same be true of the other senses? We know that philosophers have taught differently, and the substance of their reasons are that it is not so because it is not so, and no higher reason has been rendered by them.

SECTION V.

1. The idea of *extension* as visual is not wholly original from sight, but it is dependent upon it for self-correctness. Light is the primary object of vision, but it is not the only object of vision. The modulations and inherent nature of its refracted and reflected rays present the appearance of objects to the sense of sight. If the power of vision extends no further than the retina of the eye, and that vision consists in the first contact of light with it, then when the image of an object was impressed upon the optic nerve, it would continue to be seen, though the object should be intercepted with a cloud or darkness. May we not have power, in some way, to see the extension of the surface of real bodies? If there was one clear reason to the reverse we would gladly adopt it, and we will do so when such reason or reasons are to be found. 2. If a solid body can present to the eye *nothing* but *colors* and *light*, will that prove that there is no connection

existing in any way between those colors and light, and the object which causes them to fall on the power of vision? We can see the effect of a strong wind, but we can not see the element itself. But it is different with a solid body; it is the cause of a peculiar light and color as the effect upon the eye; these are continuously supported there by the object; hence, the light and color either see for us the cause which continues their stay, or the eye can see, first, the primary objects, light and color, and, secondly, by means of these the real objects. If the optic nerve has power to feel the action of the rays of light and the image impressed upon it, may it not have power by means of them to feel the object which causes their action upon the nerve, and continues it as long as the eye is directed to such objects? 3. The *origin* of our knowledge of the extension, figure, and magnitude of bodies, is properly connected with the sense of touch, and is strengthened and greatly increased by the sense of sight. Beginning with the sense of touch and sight we arrive at a knowledge of the extension of bodies by association and comparison. 4. Our *knowledge* of objects, through the sense of sight *only*, is limited and confused. It has been ascertained by removing the cataract from the eyes of adult persons, that at first visual objects appeared to be touching the eye; and it requires the aid of some of the other senses, and of the action of the mind, to correct these appearances. But as all our senses and faculties are improved by action or use, so is sight, and it tends to correct itself in regard to visual objects.

SECTION VI.

1. If the sense of sight has *no power*, in any way, or to any degree, of receiving visible extension, length, and breadth, we can not tell how we are to judge of the real size of objects, as we can do but very little in association and in comparing distant objects by the sense of touch only 2. In judging of the *magnitude of visual objects*, we are much influenced by the peculiar nature and way the modulations of light strike the organ of sight, and in comparing such objects with other objects, the size of which is known. Objects, in a murky atmosphere, often appear larger and nearer to us than they would in clear air. This may be caused by their dim appearance, and the refraction of the rays of light passing through a denser atmosphere. The sun and moon appear larger in the horizon than they do in the zenith. The principal cause of this is, that the rays of light coming from them strike the atmosphere obliquely, and the oblique portion of the atmosphere, which refracts the rays, occupies an enlarged space in the field of vision and subtends a greater angle at the eye. The refraction makes the appearance of the sun and moon greater than they really are, and this difference increases in proportion as the rays pass parallel with the earth's surface in the denser part of the air. 3. The *purer* the atmosphere the more accurate is our estimation of the distance to objects. And an object upon a smooth plain or a ship at sea, where there are no intermediate objects, always appear to be nearer to us than they really are. 4. Our perceptions of distance,

through the medium of sight, are principally *acquired*. This is clear from the testimony of persons born blind that have been suddenly restored to sight. At first all objects appeared to touch the eye, and there was confusion in locating them; yet experience in associating and in comparing them aided in correcting the false appearance. 5. Though the *above position* is correct, yet we find, by correct analysis, that the primary power of our perception of visual objects and of distance is original or intuitive. Take a child, before it can reason, when it first begins to notice, and place a candle near its face, and its hand will be but partially extended in order to grasp it. But turn its face to the moon or some distant object, and intuitively the arm will be extended at full length.

CHAPTER XIII.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF
KNOWLEDGE.—
SECTION I.

1. THE senses may be regarded as a *secondary source* of knowledge, when compared with knowledge which is direct, or is imparted to the mind or spirit as the result of the mind's own internal action, or is received by a superhuman spiritual influence without the medium of physical organs. 2. If matter has no *self-power* to impress or to move material entities, only when it is connected with spirit, then it follows that self-motion belongs to spirit, and that spirit can impress or move spirit or mind independently of material organs. Therefore, the internal feelings, influences, and impressions, imparted by the infinite Spirit to the mind, may be regarded as knowledge direct, or that which comes to us independently of any feeble, diseased, and perishable material organs, which, from their nature and condition, are liable to deceive us. Then that which we experience from imperishable sources is not only knowledge direct, but such sources are primary sources of knowledge to us, and are worthy of far more confidence and belief than any fact or knowledge we receive through the medium of the senses, which are connected with diseased, deceptions, and perishing physical organs. 3. According to the preceding

argument the senses may be regarded as a *secondary source* of knowledge. And the order of this world is to rely upon the senses in testing the reality and nature of external things with the highest degree of confidence or belief, while knowledge of direct evidence to the mind is often disregarded and rejected as worthless. 4. The senses can not, in connection or otherwise, give us *a perfect* knowledge of external things; otherwise each power of the senses would be a perfect mind within itself. But they are limited in conveying a knowledge of external objects, which, however, is perfected when brought under the inspection of the mind. The deception exists wholly in the nature and condition of the physical organs.

SECTION II.

1. Spirit being imperishable, is incapable of *disease* destroying its action or of *decay*; but the physical organs are subject to be enfeebled or rendered inactive by disease, or they may be entirely destroyed. While under the influence of disease we can not depend upon them with much certainty. The correctness of their reports is accidental, and the mind often has great difficulty in correcting wrong impressions which have been made by them.
2. Our reliance upon the senses, and our power to believe in the correctness of their reports, does not arise in the *existence* and *nature* of the senses, but has its origin in connection with an *internal conviction* or consciousness that what they report is true. But as no one is disposed to doubt the testimony of

the senses when they are free from the power of disease, we will not spend time in proving the necessity of greater confidence in them. 3. The skeptic professes the most positive *belief* in the existence and nature of facts tested by the senses, while he rejects internal convictions and moral demonstrations. A correct knowledge of external facts reported to the mind depends upon intuitive power. We can have no knowledge of external facts, as such, but for the presence of intuition, to which all facts may be referred in order to be fully known and the mind satisfied. If internal affirmations and convictions of truth are to be wholly rejected, then it is utterly impossible for us to have knowledge of any existent in the external world.

SECTION III.

1. It will be seen by the preceding argument that the *primary source* of knowledge is contained in the internal powers and nature constituting the soul or mind which possesses self-action and an immortality of being. 2. By the sense of sight I test the appearance of a proposition in mathematics, and say that it is correct, because the calculation is based upon certain self-evident axioms upon which the whole science stands. He who rejects internal intuitions and moral demonstrations, believes all this with unwavering confidence; but ask him how he knows such truths or axioms to be self-evident, by which we understand that they are incapable of either proof or disproof, and he will not refer to any one or all of the senses as the source or power by

which he knows them to be self-evident truths, but he has to refer to the intuitive principle within which only has power to receive any fact as such, or any self-evident reality as such, without any possibility of proof. 3. So if we reject internal convictions, feelings, and intuitive affirmations, we are compelled to *reject all knowledge*. Then, to be consistent, we must declare that we are incapable of any knowledge, and that our own existence is non-existence. 4. Then it follows that all knowledge of *direct evidence to the mind*, and of which the mind is susceptible, independently of the organs of the decaying earthly tabernacle, is less liable to deceive us than that which comes through the medium of the senses. Therefore we should watch to be directed by this internal source of knowledge, as it can not lead us to deception or disappointment, either in this life or the life to come, if we strictly adhere to the voice and dictates of conscience.

Division Second.

CHAPTER I. PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

1. PERCEPTION is that faculty of the mind which has power of *perceiving internal and external* changes and existences. And in action it has power of perceiving and of receiving a knowledge of external objects by means of the impressions they make on the senses, or it leads to the full action of the mind in arriving at a knowledge of real existences. 2. Sensation and *perception* are regarded as the properties of mind, by which we arrive at a knowledge of external things. Sensation refers to the physical organs and their mysterious union with the immaterial sensibilities, and perception refers to the power and action of mental influences and elements. Perception has been regarded as an association formed between the impressions made upon the organs of the senses and the external substances which are the cause of such impressions. But the acting power of this association is connected with the primary elements of mind. 3. Perception is immediately successive to the action of sensation, or it arises with the new state of mind which fol-

lows the impressions made by sensations. Sensation within itself can have no perception of its own existence, nor of the cause of such an existence; but impressions made through the medium of sensation upon the mind are followed by a peculiar state of mind, in which we have immediate perception of the affecting cause. 4. Whether perception is a *sequent* of impressions conveyed by sensations to the brain we know not. The inlets of the mind, for comprehending external things, appear to be mysteriously connected with the entire nervous system. The nerves are connected with the brain, and thence receive their influence. But this great medium of sensation may not require sensations to go from the extremities to the brain before there can be any action of perception. The mind may have power to perceive the affecting cause upon its action upon the organs of senses; but to determine the precise mode of operation is impossible.

SECTION II.

1. Perception may be regarded as a *voluntary act* of the mind. That aggressive influence or power which strikes out in maturing a knowledge of external objects, requires an effort of the mind in order to a full degree of perception which can be retained.
2. Sensation is not *necessarily* followed by perception. The mind may be employed in thought or in conversation, while a numerous variety of objects may pass through the field of vision and none of them be retained in the mind. This results from a want of the perception of those objects. We may

have experienced the sensations of them, but no effort of the mind was made in retaining the impressions of them; for the mind must attend to what is passing in order to a real perception of external objects. 3. To a limited extent perception may be regarded as *involuntary*. We may open our eyes upon a beautiful forest; the first tree seen may claim our attention till we suddenly turn away; yet we may have faint perceptions of other trees in that forest which are still retained in the mind, and they were not voluntary objects of either sight or perception. If we cast our eyes upon a canvas of pictures and fix our mind upon one of them, so that all the rest are almost as though they did not exist, yet they are unintentionally seen, and our perception of them is involuntary. In leaving our room in eager quest of some object, we pass two men in descending the stairway, one small and the other large—the perception of the difference in their size is wholly involuntary. 4. But *voluntary* perception involves an act of the mind in attending to the cause of sensations; and connected with this act or action of the mind is our perception of external substances and qualities.

SECTION III.

1. Perception makes us acquainted with *external* things, and has its origin in a peculiar mental state, in which the influence or action refers to internal affections of the mind, and also to external causation. It carries the mind out of or beyond the existence of self, and introduces us to the external world. It has power to cause external things to pass

in review before the inspection of the mind. Perception is not the only medium through which we are made acquainted with external things. Our knowledge of external things commences with sensation, and sensation is a sequence of the impingement or of contact with external things; and perception following sensation fully presents to the inspection of the mind the cause of such sensations.

2. If perception should only be regarded as an *affection* or *influence* of the mind, and as consequent upon the action of sensation in apprehending external existences, yet in reality it must be regarded as more than a secondary appendage of psychology or of the mind when we contemplate its power to act in perceiving the internal changes, action, and powers of the mind. 3. If it could be separated from the primary elements of mind and still retain its identity and power to act in whole or in part, then we might reject its *connection* in every way with the original elements of mind. But its existence is either with or is dependent on its connection with the existence of the elements of mind; for an affection or influence of the mind is no more than an original element or elements in action; otherwise such an affection or influence would be a divisible entity, and an independent active being within itself and superadded to the mind, which is absurd.

SECTION IV.

1. Our *perception* of primary properties of matter differs from that of *sensation*. Primary properties are essential to the existence of all material substan-

ces, and are known to be such as solidity, extension, figure, and density, with divisibility. These qualities belong to all real material bodies; but as to their essence we know nothing. 2. Sensation is a *result of contact*, in some way, with external substances, and implies their existence as the cause of such sensation or sensations. Perception *refers* or *leads* the mind to a knowledge of the cause of a known sensation. 3. We have perception of the *difference* between *primary* and *secondary* properties of matter. The latter are such as hardness, softness, roughness, and smoothness, smell, taste, heat, and cold, sound, and color. These may cause certain effects in the mind, or awaken sensations which are immediately followed by perception, bringing the affecting cause under mental inspection.

CHAPTER II.

FALSE PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

1. FALSE perceptions take place when there are no external *objects corresponding* with them, and which are the cause of them. When there are no external causes, as real existences, we are left to conclude that false perceptions exist within ourselves and in the mistake which the mind makes of its own perceptions. 2. False perceptions can arise *first* in the *organs* of sense. The organs of sense can be affected in various ways, and the succeeding sensations are followed by perception, as to the act of the mind, when there are no external substances as cause of such sensations, or as objects of perception. These organs can be changed or affected so as to produce the appearance of realities by disease or by excitement, fear, or grief. And they change within themselves, being affected by age. 3. Again: false perceptions may exist in connection with the *changes* in the *states* of the mind. The mind is capable of an internal error or delusion in believing in the existence of objects as real when they are not. It can be deceived in its own conceptions of real existences. 4. *False* perceptions, which arise in connection with the organs of sense, are caused generally by bodily disorders. These perceptions may

be corrected, as we shall notice in the order of the following section.

SECTION II.

1. By the *concentrated action* of the mind, as affected through the medium of the other senses. Corresponding sensations, resulting from affecting causes upon the organs of sense, contribute, in their united appeals to the mind, toward correcting false perceptions. 2. False perceptions can be corrected by *comparing* our perceptions of objects we suppose to exist or of objects which exist in a different way from their appearance, with the perceptions of others in regard to them. The deliberate decision of several persons, by means of the same organs of sense, while in health, and at the same time, will not mislead. 3. A correction can be made by a proper *exercise of judgment* in comparing with some known object. 4. If we have perception of *two or more* objects of the same or differing in kind, we can turn to some one that we know to be single, and if there appears to be more than one, we know our perception in that respect to be false. But in correcting all false perceptions we are dependent upon a correct exercise of the judgment.

CHAPTER III.

PERCEPTION AND SMELL.

SECTION I.

1. WE will now turn attention to our *perceptions of objects* which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of smell. The office and the powers of the sense of smell have been already defined. Our perceptions of the objects of smell are successive to the sensations of smell. And these sensations are a result of the action of odors or of effluvia upon the organs of smell. Sensation reports its cause, and perception brings that cause under the inspection of the mind in order that our knowledge of it may be matured. 2. *Habit*, in relation to smell and in detecting qualities, tends to higher maturity by repeated and continuous effort in discriminating differences. If there are habits of smell, and if this sense can be cultivated, it follows that there must be something capable of being cultivated. This cultivation is not acquired by the physical organs abstractly, but is conferred upon them by the action of the immaterial influence or power connected with them, and the direction of the mind to them. 3. The origin of our knowledge of the existence and of the difference in odors commences with the *sensations of smell*. May not the modulations and nature of the sensations of smell impress the mind favorably to the knowledge of the affecting cause, and the

qualities of that cause? We know that our knowledge of the degrees or difference in the strength of odors commences with and is conveyed to the mind by sensation. And why may not sensations affect the mind in some way, and to a limited degree, as to the qualities of the cause of such sensations? To say they do not is more absurd than to say they do. But to say and to prove either position to be clearly true is impossible.

SECTION II.

1. If it is impossible for sensations to *affect* the mind in any way *corresponding* to the object and qualities of its cause, then there is no connection between the action of sensation and that of perception. Then when we receive sensations from the smell of a rose or jasmin, we would be as apt to have perception of a rock or mountain as the cause as any other existent; and our perception as to the true cause being wholly unguided, would be accidental in its results. 2. If there is no *connection* between sensation, and perception it would be true that when we have sensation we may or may not have perception; and if, in any case, perception is immediately successive to sensation, it could only be regarded as an accident. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that sensation, in some way, impresses the mind to a limited degree as to the nature or properties of its cause, and that perception brings that cause under the inspection of the mind. 3. It requires *all* the elements of mind to constitute a sentient being, and each one contributes in its office and action to our

knowledge. Dr. Abercrombie mentions a blind philosopher who could distinguish a black dress by the smell of it. The origin of this knowledge did not commence with perception, but with sensation. And the sensation of smell, in this case, appears to have impressed the mind with a knowledge of the object and some of its qualities unaided by the other senses. Mr. Stewart speaks of James Mitchel, who was deaf, speechless, and blind, yet by smell he could detect the presence of a stranger and give the direction to him. This knowledge of the stranger and of the direction to him commenced with the sensations of smell, and that without the aid of the other senses. In this case the mind must have been influenced to correct decisions, in some way, by the peculiar nature or character of the sensations of smell. 4. Sensation *reports* the cause of its existence to the mind, and perception *brings* that cause under the full inspection of the mind, the result of which is real knowledge.

CHAPTER IV. PERCEPTION AND TASTE.

SECTION I.

1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind, through the medium of the *sense of taste*, should be carefully examined. It has been said that sixteen different simple tastes exist. In the different combinations there are almost innumerable modifications, as in the degrees of strength, intensity, and weakness, quickness, and slowness. The properties of external substances which affect the organs of taste, awakening sensations, are called flavors. Our perceptions of these flavors or properties properly follow the sensations of taste. 2. *Habit*, in relation to taste, enables us to distinguish differences by repeated or continuous efforts. In this way the epicurean distinguishes the flavor and qualities of the luxuries of the table to a degree which would pass unnoticed by others. And in the same way the physician can tell the difference in drugs which are similar in appearance, and also in taste, to one not accustomed to them.

SECTION II.

1. Under the law of habit some wine-dealers, by the repeated exercise of this sense, are said to have increased its strength and power of discrimination

till they could distinguish the flavor of one wine from that of another, and tell where each or all were made. 2. The *proper direction* of the action of perception toward the true cause which affects the sense of taste, must be, to a limited extent, connected with and dependent on the nature or modulations of the sensation received; for if there is no connection in this respect, or in any way, our perception as to being immediately successive to sensation, and in bringing the true cause of such sensation to the attention and inspection of the mind, would be wholly an accident.

CHAPTER V. PERCEPTION AND HEARING.

SECTION I.

1. THE perception we have of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the *sense of hearing* is worthy a passing notice. The sense of hearing is more acute in some persons than in others, yet the power of discriminating sounds and the difference in tones or modulations of sound may be cultivated. 2. The sense of hearing has not within and of itself *the power of perceiving* the affecting cause, neither can we have simultaneous perception of the action of external things or of sounds upon the organs of hearing. All we can have is sensation, and sensation may be strong or weak, corresponding to the cause. 3. The sound of a cannon produces a *stronger sensation* than that of a rifle. Who can say that perception receives no influence as to the cause of sensations, from the peculiar way they affect the mind? If mind was divisible, then this might be impossible. But the elements of mind can not be abstracted, like blocks of marble, from the same mountain, and examined by the rules of surfaces and solids and the laws governing inert elements. All the elements of mind are operative, and are connected together in constituting the living soul, and they can and do influence each other, and also each one of them the whole mind.

SECTION II.

1. The application of *habit* to the sense of hearing renders the power of hearing more acute as repeated efforts are made. There are instances of blind persons who can call the names of persons from the sound of their voices, though they may not have heard them for several years. Others can tell when they are approaching a precipice or a wall, by the peculiar sound of their feet upon the ground.
2. If there is no connection in *any way* between sensations produced by sound and our perception of the cause of such sensations, then our perception of the true cause may be accidental.
3. Our knowledge of the existence of sonorous bodies *commences* with the *sensations* of hearing. Sensation and perception hold a peculiar relationship to each other, from the fact that they may and do belong to one and the same mind.

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CHAPTER VI.

PERCEPTION AND TOUCH.

SECTION I.

1. We experience perceptions of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of touch. The sense of touch is more extensive than any other one of the senses, from the fact that in one sense it includes all the other senses. 2. It increases in proportion to repeated efforts in apprehending external bodies. And our perception of external existences is clear in proportion to the acuteness of touch through which such existences are reported to the mind. 3. Habit in regard to touch increases its strength as we rely on and attend to its repeated action. And in proportion to the increase of the exquisite acuteness in detecting and reporting external substances to the mind, is the clearness and proper action of our perception in bringing such substances before the mind.

SECTION II.

1. *Blind* persons can, with greater safety, pass all through a house in a dark night than any one who has the power of vision. Some of them can tell the distance to a burning fire by the action and degree of heat, and also of approaching contact with external bodies by the peculiar action of the air. And

by the sense of touch they can be taught to read by means of large raised letters, which are made by heavy type. The sense of touch can be so cultivated that they can have perception of the different letters, and read correctly when as many as four thicknesses of a silk handkerchief intercepts between their fingers and the letters. 2. Our knowledge of *that* which affects the sense of touch commences with the sensations of touch, and is more fully developed to the mind by the action and power of perception.

CHAPTER VII.

PERCEPTION AND SIGHT.

SECTION I.

1. OUR *perception* of objects which affect the mind through the medium of the sense of sight is worthy of attention. Expansion of surface and color have been regarded as primary objects of vision, but that of distance and magnitude have been rejected. Yet it is maintained that we can judge of limited distances by sight alone. If we can judge of small distances by sight alone, why not, to some extent, judge of greater distances aided by the same power? 2. The inclination of the *axis of vision*, which directs both eyes to the same object, and the peculiar way in which the reflected rays of light fall on the eyes, appears to give rise to an influence which affects the mind in deciding upon the true distance of such an object. To touch any object immediately before us with one eye closed is accidental, but certain with the aid of both. 3. A child, before it can reason or compare, shows an intuitive knowledge of *distance by sight*, in extending its hand no farther than the desired object when it is near, and at full length when the object is distant. Our knowledge of the distance and magnitude of visual objects commences with the sensations of sight. In some way sensations appear to be conveyed to the brain and nervous system, which are followed by perception; but to define

this process, or to tell how the mind is connected with and is affected by the nervous system, is impossible.

SECTION II.

1. *Habit*, in relation to the power of vision, renders it acute in detecting the existence of objects. And in proportion as we try to discriminate visual objects will we have clear perception of the objects which affect the organs of sight. By continued effort the mariner can discover a ship as it nears in the distance, when it can not be seen by a person not accustomed to maritime observations; and he can call its name when nothing more than a blur can be seen by the untrained eye upon the surface of the ocean. Under the law of habit there is a quick and vigorous action of the power of vision, and in proportion to its improvement is the clearness and power of our perception of visual objects.
2. A man existing without the power of hearing may *supply* the defect, to a limited extent, by the *habits* of sight. We know a man who has not heard the sound of speech for about twenty years; yet he can converse with us without much difficulty, by watching the expression of the countenance and the motion of the lips.
3. The *keen discrimination* of visual objects and qualities, which is possessed by the deaf and dumb, gives evidence that the senses can be cultivated, and that in the absence of some of them others can be so cultivated as to supply the loss sustained to a considerable extent.
4. If the mind could exist without having access to external things, through the medium of the senses, how could

we have *perception of external things?* It is evident that the action of perception, in one respect, has its origin in connection with the states of mind caused by sensations; and if these states of mind are not influenced in any way by the modulations and nature of the sensations received, and if these sensations do not correspond in any way with the nature and qualities of their cause, then there is no connection between sensation and perception; hence, any action of perception in perceiving and in bringing under the inspection of the mind the true cause of a certain sensation, is wholly accidental. But this is not true, for a connection does exist, from the fact that they may and do belong to one and the same mind.

CHAPTER VIII.

HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTION.

SECTION I.

1. HABIT, in relation to perception, should not pass unnoticed. It has been said that men, children, idiots, and brutes acquire perceptions by habit; that they are not original with them. Our remembrance of past events or existences may be regarded as weak or strong in proportion to the interest we had in them. 2. We have many perceptions which are not remembered for the want of *attention* and interest in them, and by them our knowledge is not increased; yet when a necessity awakens mental exercise in attending to them, they can be called up as auxiliaries in forming correct decisions. 3. There is a *law of habit*, in relation to perception, under which we may delineate the natural method or process of its action. Perception is connected with the *existence* and *action* of the powers of the mind; yet its action in perceiving is at first weak and confused. That it depends upon habit for the origin of its existence is impossible.

SECTION II.

1. By *repeated efforts* perception is increased in power and its action is made rapid, easy, and is

matured. Its maturity depends upon distinct and successive acts. 2. Though objects of many forms and of different elements may be simultaneously presented to the eye, yet our perception of them all can only be regarded as *concentrated into one act*. And if there is naturally a distinct difference, the true order can not be clearly defined. 3. The *acts* of perception, in perceiving the different forms of an object, are so rapid that the effect upon us, in regard to all of them, may be said to be instantaneous. The power of perceiving is connected with the states and elements of mind.

Division Third.

CHAPTER I.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTINENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT.

SECTION I.

1. It has been said that the phenomena of mind *consists of certain thoughts and feelings*, and that the true inquiry is as to the order in which they arise, and of what these elements are constituted? Though they are of great importance, yet we can not imagine that within themselves they constitute all of mind. 2. Thought exists in the mind, or it is *that* which is formed in the mind as an idea or conception. Thought may be formed by the united action of mental elements. It can arise in connection with internal spontaneous affirmations, or from the affecting influence of imagination, or from conscience. At certain states of the mind thoughts appear to arise in one connected chain, and at other times and under different circumstances, they have a more abstracted existence. 3. We can not doubt the *real existence* of thought in connection with the mind's states. Of the existence and action of thought we can form some idea and have a satisfactory knowledge. The nature of elements, which have been called the original elements of thought,

can not be clearly defined, though they must have their origin in connection with the existence and action of the primary elements of the mind. 4. Thought is *that* which the mind thinks, and it may be said to be *that*, in part, which acts in thinking. And it is *that* which is prominent and leads in cogitation, reflection, contemplation, and meditation.

SECTION II.

1. Thought is not only real within and of itself, but it expresses *action*, as in thinking. It is the act or operation of the mind when attending to any particular subject or existent, and in another sense it may be regarded as the idea consequent on that operation. 2. The mind may act, in pursuing any subject, by a *succession* of thoughts. One thought introduces another thought, in accordance with a certain order which is preserved in the succession of thoughts. Some thoughts seem to be a result of other thoughts, by which some persons have supposed the latter could have been predicted by a strict observance of the nature of the former; but the idea of their inseparable union is only a mere sequence of, their near, yet distinct relationship. Though any train of thoughts may be said to be invariably found together, yet the mind is only capable of a peculiar order of divisible succession of thoughts. All that we can know of the phenomena of thought is the result of observation aided by experience. 3. Thought can not exist as a part of the mind if *separated from it*. Hence, our thoughts are nothing more than the mind itself in a peculiar

way or in different states; yet the proper office of thought has been defined. 4. The importance of *thought* to our *being*, *knowledge*, and *happiness* is forever beyond all power of description. By continued thought the student ever expands the powers of his mind with useful knowledge. Think, think, always thinking, is the motto of true greatness. It will lead to the possession of that true eminence where the mind, with triumphant composure, scorns the perishable glory of earthly fame.

CHAPTER II.

IDEAS.

SECTION I.

1. THE term idea, as that of notion, applies to *that* which perceives or observes in the mind; hence the form or image of any thing in the mind possessed by it for contemplation or inspection. It exists in the mind, and can be a result of mental action. 2. Our ideas may be said to *vary with* or to correspond to their objects in regard to their nature and mode or condition of existence. 3. Our idea of physical existences may be regarded as *contingent*, from the fact that it is natural for us to have conceptions of them as mutable, and that it is possible for the power that made them to cause them to cease to be. 4. Our idea of physical entities may be said to be *relative*, as the very notion of *that* which has bounds or finity will suggest the opposite, which is infinity or non-limitation. 5. Our idea of duration may be regarded as absolute. We know that duration is and must continue, and that its annihilation is impossible.

SECTION II.

1. Our idea of space has been said to be *necessary* or *absolute*. To conceive of the annihilation of all physical entities is possible, but to conceive of the

annihilation of unbounded space is utterly impossible. Hence, the idea of space is necessary; for we can have conception of the real existence of the object of such an idea, and to try to conceive of the non-existence of space is beyond our power. 2. Our idea of *space* is *absolute*, which arises from the condition of its existence. We are immediately impressed of the fact; and our belief is unwavering that space must be, and that it can not cease to be. Though we can conceive of the non-existence of all physical elements, yet to doubt the existence of space is impossible. 3. The idea of *space* implies the *absence* of *limitation*. We can not conceive of it only as real and infinite. Our ideas of material elements, or of the finite, are contingent and relative; and those of space, or of the infinite, are necessary and absolute. These exist in the mind, and are distinct in their orders. 4. If the idea of space and of the infinite is *necessary* and *absolute*, so may we regard the idea of cause. Therefore, it is reasonable for the Atheist, when looking on the works of nature, which are sequences, to intuitively infer a cause of their existence, and to believe that such a cause is all-powerful and all-wise, from the vastness and skill evidenced in visual and tangible existences.

SECTION III.

1. If effects or events are *contingent* and *relative*, their very existence infers and even demonstrates the existence of a cause; for they could not create themselves and arrange themselves with such infi-

nite wisdom. 2. But though we are finite, yet the idea of personal identity, or of self, is *necessary*. The knowledge we have of our own existence is real, and to doubt it is utterly impossible. 3. Hence, the Atheist is compelled to acknowledge the existence of *self*, and that God is necessarily the author of such existence, and to whom he is reasonably and lawfully amenable.

SECTION IV.

1. Though our idea of self is necessary, yet our idea of the phenomena of mind may be regarded as *contingent*. We have intuitive knowledge of self; but the mind is composed of many faculties, and each faculty, in existence and action, holds a certain relation to the other faculties. 2. By *primary* elements of mind, we are to understand the original elements, first in order of time. The appropriate position and action of the primary powers relatively to each other will be defined in analyzing those powers. It will be seen that some faculties which have been defined as primary by some philosophers, are dependent for their existence upon other faculties. And the idea that there are only two or three primary elements in mind is absurd. 3. Intuitive elements, which have been denominated primary elements, *apprehend* their objects, the *action* arising from intuition. Each one unites in testing and receiving truths as knowledge by a simple intuitive inspection, and independently of argument or testimony.

CHAPTER III.

POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY.
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SECTION I.

1. THE *primary elements* of mind may be regarded as the axioms, or self-evident truths, within themselves, which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind. That they have a real existence, and that such existences are true within themselves, is knowledge which we have no power to doubt; and the primary elements are truths, the reality and correctness of which are incapable of either proof or disproof. 2. There is no possible way of *proving* the axioms or self-evident truths, which are the foundation of mathematical science, to be either true or false, yet we receive them as truths. The power to do this is not contained in those axioms or truths, but it lies back of all these, and can only exist in the intuitive powers of mind. Therefore, it is more reasonable for us to regard the primary elements of mind as self-evident truths; for our knowledge of them, and of all other facts or objects, turns upon their intuitive power to know them to be true, and to reject that which is false. 3. The *primary elements* of mind are truths known to be true only from the fact that we know them to be such; and all the power we have of knowing any thing of their existence, nature, action, or of any other truth or fact in the vast universe, arises in connection with

and from the existence, nature, and action of these original elements.

SECTION II.

1. We can not arrive at a *knowledge* of their existence by any form of argument or from any external testimony. They are their own witnesses, testifying within, of, and to themselves, of their own existence, which is knowledge. 2. With *them* is the origin of the power to receive within and of themselves the knowledge of their own existence. 3. With *them* is the origin of the power to arrive at and to know truth in regard to external things, either without or from testimony.

CHAPTER IV.

KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY.

SECTION I.

1. WE have *intuitive power* to arrive at a knowledge of facts and of truth from testimony. The immediate self-knowledge we have of external things is tested by and received through the medium of the senses; but the greater part of our knowledge, in regard to such existences, is obtained from other persons upon the evidence of testimony. 2. *Testimony* is a solemn declaration or attestation made for the purpose of establishing or making known some fact. Testimony is the declaration of a fact, and evidence is the effect of that declaration on the mind, or the degree of light imparted by it. Facts are received by us from personal observation far more readily than from the declaration of others. We must first have confidence in the ability and veracity of the narrator in order to give full credence to the facts revealed. If what he says comes true, we believe him more readily at another time; but if once deceived, his future testimony is apt to be rejected. We can believe the statements of a tried friend more readily than we can those of a stranger. 3. Our *intuitive power*, which is referred to in the reception and belief of external facts, is influenced by the corresponding agreement of such facts with those already known. We should look

well to the evidence upon which we receive facts, and to the capacity of the narrator. A weak mind is apt to have boundless credulity, and seldom ever thinks or reasons for itself. The contracted mind is generally captious, skeptical, and always inclined to reason from imperfect premises, and arrives at false conclusions. An ignorant mind or person rejects the testimony of all philosophers. He believes the earth to be flat and its position fixed immovably. He gives only one foot diameter to the sun, and drives him through the heavens. 4. When we are *limited* in our views and acquirements, there is a tendency to *rely* on our experience, and to reject all knowledge for which we have not the evidence of our senses. A proper understanding of self, and of the true method of arriving at a knowledge of external facts, will remedy false perceptions and conclusions.

SECTION II.

1. In judging of the credibility of any fact from testimony, we are *not to rely wholly* upon our experience of similar events, but we must proceed upon the knowledge which we have received by other means of the nature or properties of that which is presented for our inspection. 2. We can receive facts upon the authority of testimony, and the power we have to receive them must have its *origin* in intuition. The conclusive action of this constitutional power turns upon the fact that the witness is honest. 3. The *principal ground* of our credence is, that the witness had a sufficient opportunity of

knowing the facts set forth in his testimony, that he was capable of judging correctly, and that he was not improperly influenced in testifying. 4. Our confidence is *increased* in proportion to the number of tried witnesses who unite in the same testimony. This kind of testimony the whole world of intelligences are in the habit of receiving and of believing. The principal foundation of incredulity is ignorance. The enlightened mind, in forming correct conclusions, is influenced by a thousand contingencies, which pass wholly unnoticed by the thoughtless or inactive mind.

SECTION III.

1. A well-regulated mind is *influenced* by the recollection of facts, which appeared at first to be deceptions or even false, but subsequently they prove and are known to be true. Hence the conclusion that there may be and that there does exist many elements and facts, though they may be decidedly marvelous or appalling to us at first. We have power to know from experience alone, that facts may and do exist, both in accordance with or independent of our experience. 2. The mind is greatly influenced in deciding upon the truthfulness of *that* which is presented for consideration if we perceive known principles connected with it, if it contains some element of probability, or if it is in any way allied to facts or a chain of known entities, either as an antecedent or sequence. We have power to believe in the existence of realities presented to the mind from the fact that other truths,

at one time, were marvelous, which are now known to be true. And we can go still further and believe, by reason of facts already known, that other facts unknown to us may exist.. 3. We have power to arrive at a *correct knowledge* of facts from testimony. And we have power to discriminate credible testimony from that which is not, by contrasting the manner, the arrangement of parts, or the condition. When a sufficient amount of the right kind of testimony has been received, we feel an internal satisfaction in relying upon it without doubt. 4. Infidelity assumes that we can not *believe testimony* which differs from our uniform experience and the uniform course of nature; but we have seen already that this position is false. The influence or power sustaining and containing the elements of our belief in regard to testimony, has its origin in intuition. To receive proper testimony is natural, but to conscientiously doubt it is unnatural and impossible.

SECTION IV.

1. To arrive at a distinct belief of a *miraculous* interposition or *act*, requires something more than to give credence to facts which are in accordance with the uniform laws or course of nature. 2. *Miracle* we understand to be *that* which takes place in violation to, or deviating from, the established course of nature, and that which is contrary to our uniform experience. If miracles exist in violation of or deviating from the regular course of nature, their existence can not be a result of this uniform course of nature, nor of the laws governing the material

universe. Then, if miracles exist, the cause of their existence must be distinct from and superior to the course of nature. Therefore, they exist by a direct interposition or act of Divine power. Their nature and relation to the course of nature forever precludes the idea of their origin with, from, or by such a uniformity of action. Miracles, as results, and considered as they are, within themselves, clearly demonstrate that their cause must be distinct from and infinitely superior to any uniform course of nature. 3. Divine revelation is regarded as a *miraculous gift* of Heaven, and, as a result, clearly demonstrates or proves an adequate cause of its own existence. All the miracles recorded in the Bible aid in proving the existence of Deity and his power to establish laws and suspend them at pleasure. If he has power to order and arrange common events, which are called natural, he has power and does order uncommon events, which are called miracles.

SECTION V.

1. Infidels assume that events *happening contrary* to the course of nature and our experience should be rejected, and that it is more reasonable for men to lie, and that several concur in propagating the same lie, than that a miracle should take place, according to their testimony, which would be a result contrary to the course of nature and experience. The rejecters of the Christian system hold and teach that the uniform course of nature is true, and that it is the unerring truth of the universe. 2. Mr. Hume says, in regard to the *resurrection* of Christ, "I

must admit one of two things—either that twelve men agreed to tell a lie, or that a man arose from the dead. It is more probable that men should lie than that one should return to life again.” That is, if Christ rose it would be contrary to the uniform course of nature, which course of nature he regarded as infallible truth. He then asserts that it is more reasonable for men to lie than that Christ should arise from the dead. According to his own premises, arguments, and belief, such a lie could not be a part of the course of nature, which is truth, neither can it be a result of it in any possible way. Hence, such a lie being contrary to truth, is contrary to the uniform course of nature, which is truth. Then, according to his own creed and belief, this lie would be a miracle; yet he regards it as *that* which is the most reasonable, and adopts it as the foundation of his faith and future hope. He then tries to disprove the miracle of Christ’s resurrection by assuming, in lieu thereof, the existence of another miracle, according to his own faith and teachings, which miracle, he says, is more reasonable, though he acknowledges it to be a lie. And, of course, if in this respect the foundation of his faith or belief be a lie, all the arguments and conclusions drawn from it must be wholly and forever untrue. 3. And as this is the *only* argument which has ever been referred to, which can have any claims to be an argument against the resurrection of Christ, it is, therefore, true, that Christ rose from the dead, and the truthfulness of our holy Christianity is forever incontrovertible, notwithstanding the great and celebrated argument of Mr. Hume.

Division Fourth.

CHAPTER I. CONCEPTION.

SECTION I.

1. CONCEPTIONS exist in connection with *peculiar* states and operations of the mind, by and in which they appear to arise. 2. Conception of and within itself is the *power*, and acting is the *act* of conceiving and of receiving, or of admitting facts to the inspection of the mind. It is closely connected with our sensations and perceptions. When we have conceptions they are revived and followed by certain mental states, in which present or past ideas, sensations, or impressions can be and are examined. 3. In a *certain sense* we may have conceptions of ideas, images, sentiments, and thoughts. And in another sense it may apply to *re-occurring facts* and to re-existing emotions and sensations, which we, at one time, had realized. The mind, in the peculiar states with which they are connected, is moved and influenced in reference to both external facts and internal feelings and sensations of the soul.

SECTION II.

1. Conceptions in *nature* and *action* appear to differ from sensations and perceptions. Perception

is characterized by an egressive action, or by its striking out in apprehending objects, while conception is more passive, with internal power to be revived or awakened as an inlet to the mind of existing facts, and of the re-occurring of facts, feelings, and ideas which had been real in the experience of the past. 2. Conception *differs* from memory and from the action and objects of remembrance. The causes and objects of conceptions are absent, which is not true with sensations and perceptions. Sensation and perception act from and in reference to their causes and objects; but we have conceptions of truths in the remembrance of past feelings and ideas, when the causes and objects are not taken into the account. In this way we may have conceptions of any thing within the control of memory, independently of time, condition, or place. Our conceptions of past occurrences take no account of the time when their causes were present; and the regulation of our conceptions are influenced by the power and laws of association, and can arise under the action and controlling power of volition. 3. Conception is not confined to our impressions of *past time*, but can be connected with our feelings in regard to *present* existences. We can not only have conceptions of present and real existences, but we can have them in connection with peculiar mental states or conditions, upon which depends the peculiarities of illusions, dreaming, and partial insanity, though such conceptions may be misguided or be entirely false.

CHAPTER II.

CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES.

SECTION I.

1. OUR *conceptions of facts* or influences connected with the objects of the sense and sensations of smell may be explained in few words. When any odoriferous body, as the rose or jasmin, is presented to us, the effect experienced is a sensation; this, in the course of time, may appear to be erased from memory—the power which replaces memory and perception, in recalling it, and revives in the mind any thing of the nature, kind, or qualities of *that* which is brought to remembrance, is conception. And in this way we may have conceptions of other qualities of the objects of smell once known, which are detected and revived in memory by reason of corresponding qualities or resemblances. And when we have conceptions of any thing formerly perceived, it becomes an object of thought. 2. Our conceptions in regard to *objects of taste* may be clear or confused, in proportion to the ratio of difference as to qualities. He who has ever tasted the bituminous water of Lake Asphallities, or of the mineral water of some celebrated spring, will be at no loss in forming proper conceptions of them. And the same is true in tasting that which is sweet or sour. Our taste can be followed by vivid conceptions of any thing pleasant or unpleasant. The

qualities we taste in one object may affect the mind in recalling and in replacing our conceptions of similar qualities in some other object. 3. In regard to *hearing*, we may have conceptions of sound or sounds, as to their existence, the difference of tones, degrees of strength, and of their harmony or discord. Any peculiarity connected with sound or sounds that we have ever heard may be recalled and our conceptions of them be vivid, having been experienced; and we can have brilliant conceptions of the nature or character of such sounds. 4. We can have conceptions of the objects of the sense or sensations of *touch*. Having once experienced severe heat or cold, we are at no loss in having proper conceptions in relation to them at any subsequent period. Some philosophers say they have knowledge of men having been blind through life, who had true conceptions of the forms of letters and of figures once known, and that they could even detect colors, and have true conceptions in relation to them.

SECTION II.

1. Conceptions of *objects of sight* revive and are replaced in recalling visual objects, especially great objects, or those pervading the field of vision with that which is wild or is filled with terrific grandeur. The conceptions of visual objects are, perhaps, more easily recalled, and appear to be more vividly connected with the mental states, than those immediately connected with that which affects the other senses. This may arise from the fact that there are

a great variety of particles in each object of sight, which taxes the power of attention, association, and comparison. The conceptions of objects once seen are apt to be very clear ever afterward. There are examples of persons having been blind for years, yet their conceptions were strong, and, aided by them, they could give lucid and correct descriptions of that which had been seen. A descriptive writer or speaker must necessarily have vivid conceptions of truths or facts in order to present them full of interest. 2. The *power* of conception and of correctly conceiving facts is essentially important in constituting a well-regulated mind. We are greatly dependent upon it in distinctly delineating objects and influences once experienced, their synchronizing properties, differences, and their resemblance. 3. The power of conception or of conceiving facts has its *origin* in connection with the original powers of the mind, and from its nature and office it is worthy of higher claims than to be regarded as a mere accidental and indefinable halo, wandering amid elements called primary lights or entities constituting the soul.

SECTION III.

1. The *power of conceiving* facts can be cultivated by repeated efforts to paint and repaint, distinctly to the mind, the scenes and facts described by some other mind. 2. It can be *cultivated* by carefully and repeatedly painting to the mind the scenes of the landscape, mountain, or ocean, or by impressing the mind with the features and traces of

beauty and grandeur as exhibited in the scenery of nature. 3. Different minds manifest *different degrees* of vividness and of power in conceiving facts. A mind of vigorous and clear conception is apt to be gifted in lively descriptions. Some artists can paint the likeness of a friend from recollection, but it is necessary for them to have vivid conceptions of their features in order to give a correct expression of the countenance. It has been stated that some artists have such brilliant conceptions of paintings once seen, that in their absence they can paint a fac simile, so that when they are compared no difference can be detected. 4. When we are brought in unexpected contact with objects which suddenly arrest our attention, we *rely* on our conceptions of them as true till they are corrected. Either from education or from debilitation we may be led to believe in nocturnal apparitions or ghosts, and when involved in the gloom of night, in some lonely place, our conceptions of the features and countenances of dead persons whom we have seen in time past become quick, vivid, and extravagant. Such conceptions can be corrected when tested by reason and experience; yet it can be done only with great labor and care.

SECTION IV.

1. When the attention is given to fictitious or tragical scenes, though we know them to be untrue, yet at some *exciting appearance* or incident, our conceptions are attended with a *belief* that what we witness is true; yet this is soon corrected when we

appeal to reason, unless the mind is verging to a state of derangement. 2. If we are suddenly afflicted by contact with some object, the cause is naturally the subject of revenge, from the fact that for the moment we *conceive* it to be capable of suffering, though, in fact, it be really inanimate. And our vivid conceptions as to how much greater the injury might have been is attended with a momentary belief that a greater injury has been really received. Some persons in turning unexpectedly to the likeness of an absent friend, have had such vivid and strong conceptions of them as to involve a momentary belief that the person was really before their eyes. 3. The *influence of habit* on our conceptions aids in correcting those which are incorrect or confused, and in strengthening, with distinctive clearness, those which are true. Further we will not speak of the influence of habit upon our conceptions of objects, and influences affecting the mind through the medium of the senses. The influence of habit upon our conceptions of internal and moral truths and feelings will arise and be defined in the moral department of this work.

CHAPTER III.

MEMORY.

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SECTION I.

1. MEMORY is that faculty of the mind by which we retain the knowledge of past events, or ideas which are past. It is the *power* of retaining impressions, facts, or events; and remembrance, or recollection, is the *act* of recalling them, and of presenting them, by a voluntary effort, to the mind for inspection. By conception we recall perceptions or the impressions of scenes or events without reference to time, causes, or objects, but memory retains past ideas or events with but little effort in connection with time, causes, and objects. Ideas, facts, and events seem to be spontaneous or abiding realities in the existence of memory; but remembrance, or the act of recalling past events or ideas, is controlled by an effort of the will. 2. Memory is that power or susceptibility of the mind which *contains* and *retains* ideas or events without any special, voluntary, or involuntary action. Within itself its capacity or power contains facts in connection with either active or inactive states of mind. It is the retentive power of events or realities which become the objects of thought and of knowledge. This power, in vigorous and voluntary action, calling up past events or truths, is remembrance, or recollection. Memory is not the origin of knowledge, but it is a source of

knowledge, in connection with other mental powers, and it is essential in forming ideas of realities. 3. The existence, nature, and power of memory are closely connected with those of conception, perception, suggestion, association, and imagination. 4. When we speak of an object of memory, we have *immediate conceptions* of its appearance and qualities. 5. In *remembering objects* which afflicted us in the past there is an immediate recalling of *perceptions* or impressions, in regard to which we have perceptions of the relation of past time. 6. It is common for us to say, when we think of a fact within the compass of memory, that it *suggests* to us another fact, perhaps from the similarity or their nearness in the order of time. 7. Memory has been called a department of *association*, or, under and within the extent of its power, there is an affinity of ideas or events, forming a chain or association, in which they naturally recall each other. 8. Imagination is *dependent* on memory in forming new combinations of ideas from materials stored up in the memory.

SECTION II.

1. There appears to be *original differences* in the power of memory. Some persons have remarkably strong and retentive memories, which are essential to a rapid and extensive acquisition of knowledge; but when memory is very prominent or predominant, it is seldom connected with a properly-balanced and well-regulated mind. The strength of the endowment of such minds depends principally upon what

has been seen and heard, as they are apt to be very much limited in originality, yet quick and untiring in the pursuit of an object, with but little caution or judgment. Some have been known to repeat almost any number of words which they had heard without any connection or meaning. One writer speaks of a man who could repeat the entire contents of a newspaper, and of another who could retain words spoken to him to the number of six thousand, while their other intellectual powers were of an inferior order, though this is not universally true with persons of such remarkable memories. 2. Memory *founded upon* and embracing real *analogies* is an element of mind more important to true mental cultivation and the acquisition of knowledge, than that which remembers facts only in the order in which they occurred. The former is an important auxiliary in forming and arriving at intellectual attainments and character, while the latter is connected with but little judgment; yet it appears to be more sprightly, attended with show, and embraces that class of facts in common demand. 3. We have *embraced* and *implied*, in the nature and power of memory, in its peculiar connection with the action of the intellectual principle, (1.) A *sensitive impression*, or a certain mental state, resulting from contact with some previous existent, and synchronizing with the perception of the cause recalled. (2.) The *involuntary recurring* of internal impressions and feelings, or of those which may arise from their similarity to some existent of present knowledge. (3.) An *involuntary recurrence* in the mind of some previous existent related to the object or

cause apprehended in close affinity or order of time. (4.) It not only implies suggestion, but *conception* of past events with the *perceptions* of epochs in past time.

SECTION III.

1. *Local* memory, which refers to and has power over local entities or facts once known, existing either in matter or mind, is generally combined with but little caution and judgment. It merely remembers facts or events in the order of their occurrence, resting upon local or incidental relations, especially in regard to place, order of priority, and aposteriority. It is not founded upon general principles, clearly known or understood, nor upon real analogies, but upon facts more abstracted or disconnected in existence and relationship. 2. Memory contributes to *true* knowledge and the belief of truth. If the power of memory to retain and remember facts be removed, our knowledge of past events is swept away. Then knowledge would principally depend upon our consciousness of present existences and our perceptions of those things which are the objects of research. Events of the past could not suggest any thing in regard to the present or future; but having knowledge of past events, through and by the power of memory, we believe in and know them to have been real existences. 3. There are *degrees* in the power of memory in different persons. There are some who can not retain facts in the mind for any length of time when compared with others. Some recollect that which they have seen, but soon

forget that which they have heard. Others recollect that which they have read or heard, but can not remember objects of sight. Some of the greatest and most affecting orators known in history could write in two hours more than they could memorize in a week. It is true that some persons can give a long chain of facts narrated by an author, only in the author's words; while others can give all the facts, only in their own language. 4. *Philosophic* memory embraces general principles and universal truths. General principles are of more importance than minor items, and also the facts appertaining to and which are explanatory of such principles. This description of memory is sustained principally by the relations of cause and effect, resemblance and contrast. Thus, our inquiries extend to the nature and origin of existences, scanning their analogies and oppositions, causes and results. 5. This *species* of memory is more clearly distinguishable in some minds than others. The mind naturally possessing philosophic perceptions and remembrances corresponding, is often more tardy in the acquisition of general knowledge than one of lively local or circumstantial memory. The former is best adapted to the theoretical department, or principles of science, and the latter to the practical department, or facts of relevance and rules of proceeding. These facts and rules form mediums of rapid progress in circumstantial memory. Philosophic memory is connected with minds which look into principles, analogies, classifications, and deductions. Circumstantial memory may lose its interest and power over facts and rules, while the other, commencing

with principles, traces out the analogies and tendencies, bursting through or rending in sunder all opposing difficulties.

SECTION IV.

1. A *ready* memory embraces qualities, resemblances, and rules of progression with ease, and without any special process of exploring and of understanding the truths or facts illustrative of general principles. Local or circumstantial memory is brilliant and ready in common composition or hasty and desultory conversation. 2. A *retentive* memory is connected with that species of memory called philosophic. It is supported by facts and realities, connected with general principles, and in remembering any fact the action is apt to be prolonged by recalling the general principles with which it is connected. Though it may be slow, yet it is generally progressive and irresistible in conquest. 3. *Artificial* memory is cultivated and attained by connecting things easily remembered with those not so readily recalled. This operation is connected with and is dependent, to some extent, upon suggestion in a modified form. The whole system of mnemonics principally depends upon suggestion, as when in recalling two synchronizing objects, with one and the same state of mind, the object of easiest recollection exciting the mind in recalling the other of more difficult remembrance. This system may be useful to a limited extent; but much effort in carrying out the system is injurious to the mind, by burdening or overloading the memory with many useless and foolish items and influ-

ences, in order to the suggesting and remembrance of other things difficult to recall synchronizing with elementary agreement or disagreement. 4. An *efficient* memory has power to retain facts, with vividness of action in recalling them. There is an acuteness and peculiar quickness of retentive power connected with the memory of some persons which is not exercised by others. A good memory is not only tenacious and quick in the reception of facts or existences, but it retains impressions or ideas with a great degree of freshness and vividness amid the crumbling of mutable elements and the blight of time. 5. Another feature of an efficient memory is the *readiness* and *ease* with which it recalls and presents to the mind facts or impressions. 6. The absence of these good qualities may arise, (1.) From weakness or incapability of the tenacious reception of facts or impressions. (2.) It may result from the inefficiency of the *retentive* power. 3. It may be attributed to a habit of *inattention* or carelessness.

SECTION V.

1. The memory of persons at advanced age is not *efficient* as in earlier life. There is an apparent weakness in the retentive power of memory, and an inability to recall ideas and facts. The loss of the power and activity of memory can not be regarded as wholly arising within and of itself, but is principally attributable to the state or condition of the medium through which it acts, though it has been accounted for in different ways. 2. This feebleness can not arise from an impaired state of the *organs*

of perception so much as it does from a defect of the *organs* or medium of its own immediate action. The organs of perception are no more liable to derangement than the organs or medium through which memory acts. Therefore, memory is not dependent upon the organs of perception further than it is dependent upon perception itself. 3. Memory is *dependent* upon *perception* for facts with which it is stored, only so far as perception aids in the bestowment of such facts. But it can not be regarded as dependent upon it for its retentive power, nor for its action in the recalling of ideas or facts. 4. Memory may be weakened by *defects* in attention from its close connection with it; for with attention there is an emotion of interest which is not so acute and tenacious in old persons; yet it is necessary to implant facts upon the mind so as to be readily remembered. 5. The faculty or power of memory, in aged persons, is *not capable* of any *diminution* or loss within and of itself. The defect is attributable to the change and enfeebledness of the organs or medium through which its manifestations are realized. Otherwise the mind of an aged person would be annihilated in proportion as it ceases to be developed. But this is contrary to experience and knowledge. The memory of the aged can retain the events of early life so that they can be correctly rehearsed, while present events or truths are forgotten by them in an hour. This shows that the original power within itself has suffered no elementary loss, and that it is free from any annihilating power.

SECTION VI.

1. The *improvement* of memory depends upon the tenacious manner which attends it in the perception of facts. Many facts or truths may come within the compass of a careless or inattentive memory and not become the objects of its retentive power. By strict attention we may cultivate acuteness in the manner of receiving facts, which are to be the objects of the retentive power of memory. 2. The retentive power of memory can be *cultivated* by *repeated efforts* to impress upon it the facts we wish to recollect; and by often pausing in order to impress *that* which is to be remembered upon the mind by associating it with objects known, easily retained, and readily recalled. 3. In order to *improve memory*, the effort should be to deeply and distinctly impress the mind with those things which are to be the objects of memory. Hence, our attention should be turned to the distinct differences of objects, and we should form distinct conceptions of all facts and objects which we wish to remember. In this way memory can be cultivated.

SECTION VII.

1. Memory may be aided by carefully considering the condition and relationship of *that* which is to be remembered, together with the time and circumstances of, and in connection with, the objects of memory. 2. The memory will often retain facts better by *writing them down*, and also by classifying them, or by tracing them back to first principles.

3. He who fears to *trust* memory will always feel embarrassed in delivering what he knows on any subject. In order to conquer and to feel at home on any or all subjects, we must make memory responsible, and freely throw ourselves upon it. 4. Memory should be constantly *exercised* and burdened only with the most important facts. 5. We should receive the impressions of things to be remembered in *their natural order*—from premises to relations and results, from elements to manifestations and from causes to effects.

CHAPTER IV.

REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE DURATION OF MEMORY.

SECTION I.

1. REMEMBRANCE is the *retaining* or the *continuing* in the mind ideas or facts which have been present at previous mental states, or it is an idea or impression previously received from some object recurring to the mind at a subsequent period without the presence of its cause. 2. Remembrance *implies* the *occurring* of ideas or facts to the mind spontaneously, or with but little mental effort. 3. The ease, distinctness, and readiness with which we remember an impression or fact, is proportionably to the *tenacity* with which they are received. Deep impressions are lasting, and are continued as property of the mind without any special voluntary mental effort.

SECTION II.

1. Recollection is the *act* of recalling impressions or facts which have been the objects of memory at some former time. 2. Remembrance *differs* from recollection. The former implies that an idea or impression occurs to the mind spontaneously or with but little voluntary exertion. The latter implies not only the power, but it is the *act* of recalling ideas or facts which do not spontaneously recur to the mind,

and with seemingly voluntary efforts. 3. Recollection, in one sense, is *voluntary*, and in another sense it is not. We can not remember because we merely choose to remember. To will to remember any fact or facts, implies that such facts were once the objects of memory, and that they are still in the reach and subject to the power and the act which recalls them.

4. *Memory* may be said to be the power which receives and retains ideas or facts. *Remembrance* appears to preserve facts once known from passing away from the mind so as to be utterly beyond recovery. *Recollection* is the act of recalling facts, once the objects of memory, for the inspection and use of the mind.

SECTION III.

1. The *duration* of memory is clearly evidenced in its power to recall and present to the mind the events of its past experience. Memory, within itself, is absolutely imperishable, and thoughts which are the objects of memory are indestructible. If the impression is revived with which any thought in time past was connected, the thought itself can be reproduced. The reviving of any impression once realized necessarily involves the presence and the action of a power which can affect the recalling of thoughts coexisting with it. 2. Thoughts and feelings, which have been forgotten for years, often *recur* unexpectedly. It is believed by some that the mind possesses within itself power in its different states, and while affected alternately by innumerable existences and influences, to recall, at different periods,

all the events and feelings which have ever been the objects of memory. 3. The different conditions and states of the physical system *exert* an influence over the power of memory. But no influence of this kind has absolute control over memory itself, or any object of memory, so as to annihilate any thing which is essential to them. 4. If all that is *essential* to memory can not be in whole or in part annihilated by physical elements, what must be the power of memory when freed from all entanglements in the future world? This is no more than memory as an abstract entity. Its present indestructible existence is only the beginning of its immortality. The memory is said to become weak and to lose its retentive power, and also its vividness of action in recalling past events; yet we have no proof that memory within itself has suffered any elementary loss. So that this defect in the memory of aged persons must be attributed to the change, enfeebledness, and inactivity of the physical organs or medium through which it acts.

SECTION IV.

1. Memory can be and is *affected* by the physical organs, when those organs are under the power and influence of disease. There is a connection between the mind and the physical organs, in which each exercises a reciprocal influence. The action of the mind may be increased or diminished in proportion to the manner and intensity of the influence of disease upon the body. Accordingly as the body is affected the mind may be retarded or quickened in

action. 2. Memory may be impaired from *injuries* of the head or *affections* of the brain. An Englishman has been mentioned who was in a state of stupor, the result of an injury of the head, who, when reviving, spoke only in Welsh. He had been thirty years from his native country, and previous to the injury he had forgotten his native language, and when restored to health he recovered the English language again and could not recollect the Welsh. This was evidence that the power of memory had not been destroyed, and that its inactivity in recalling facts can not be attributed to any defect within and of itself. A Frenchman on going to England when quite young, finally lost the power of speaking French; but while suffering from an injury of the head he spoke only French. 3. When the body is *affected* in *different ways* the effect upon memory differs. A boy has been mentioned who seemed to be insensible under the operation of trepan for a fracture of the skull, and when he was restored to health he had no recollection of it; but during the delirium of a fever eleven years after he gave a correct description of the operation, and of the persons present. An Italian gentleman, when first attacked with disease of the brain, spoke English; as the disease progressed he spoke French, and for some time before his death he spoke only Italian. These facts, with many others, show that diseased organs have an influence over memory, and also that memory must be imperishable.

SECTION V.

1. Often when the mind appears to be in an *inactive state of coma*, the result of violent fever, the powers and action of memory are not wholly suspended. There are instances of persons thus affected, and supposed to be perfectly unconscious, who, on recovery, have had a perfect recollection of the events and conversation which took place. And on the other hand, an attack of disease often suspends the action of memory, so that all anterior knowledge, for some length of time, is lost. Some recover correctly the ideas of things, but can not recollect their names. These facts go to show that the most intense disease can not destroy the elementary power of memory. Hence, we can but come to the conclusion that temporal death has no power to annihilate the elements of mind. 2. States of *stupor or coma* are often the result of intemperance, or other habits of dissipation. In the case of some memory is suspended, but with others there is a brilliant recollection of impressions and facts. 3. When the subject of intemperance is under the *influence of delirium tremens*, it would appear impossible for him to retain any thing of what was passing; yet there is a vivid and horrible recollection of real feelings and of facts which are regarded as true. When the drunkard revives from this state of mental torture, he can recall and give appalling descriptions of snakes, hooks, pincers, and devils. With tremors of horror he can describe the wailings of the lost and the undying flames of an interminable hell. That which was true to him, and that

which appeared to be true, were of tenacious recollection, showing the power of memory. Though he may try to drown his sorrows and forget his sins in the lethean poison of earth, yet faithful memory, in the future world, will gather them all around him with more than scorpion sting of unrelenting remorse. If this be the real condition of the mind, what will be the future hope of the soul while descending amid the melting bowlders of the flame-encircled walls of woe, as though it were seeking a deeper electricity of more fervent wrath eternal!

SECTION VI.

1. Truths, which are the *first objects* of memory in the minds of the young, are those which are of most importance. Though they are the first received, yet they are the last to be forgotten. Those things which we learn first are generally closely connected with our education, and they greatly influence our course in life, and aid in forming our characters for eternity. Therefore, there can not be too much care in selecting proper truths for the mind in the beginning of its education. 2. In view of the judgment of the great day, what manner of persons ought we to be? Memory will then and there present to the mind all the impressions, ideas, feelings, and acts of our whole lives. All, all will be remembered. From the very *nature* and *duration* of memory we should be guilty of no act that we will dread remembering in that day, or to have revealed before the countless millions of the vast universe.

CHAPTER V. ATTENTION.

SECTION I.

1. ATTENTION is that faculty of the mind which has power to *attend* to or *heed* any object or fact. 2. By general consent it has been defined to be the *action* in, or the *act* of attending to, objects or facts. 3. If it has power to act, or if it can be *acted upon*, then it is a real entity. And if it is a real entity, it must be capable of being called an element of the mind. 4. If it is an *element* of mind, it can not be a result of any other element or elements. 5. The strong efforts made by some to prove that it is not an *original power* of mind, has convinced us that the reverse is true, from the fact that their conclusions failed for the want of correct arguments. 6. *Attention* expresses not only the state of mind, but the *act* by which it is directed to any object or fact, to the exclusion, for the time, of all other considerations. Though it is closely connected with perception, yet we may have perceptions of objects, to some extent, before the attention is directed to them. The musician can perceive the order of the bass of a piece of music which he is playing on an instrument, while his attention is at the same time upon the air he is singing. When our attention is steadily fixed upon an object, other objects may pass within the field of vision unheeded till our attention is withdrawn; then, without difficulty, the mind can

be directed to the object which had received no previous attention. While the attention is intensely fixed upon some object, a friend may ask a question which may seem, for some time, to be lost; but when the attention is diverted and turned to the question, it can be answered with ease.

SECTION II.

1. Attention is said to be voluntary when it is under the *power* and *action* of the will. An object may have our attention so as to lead us to a general examination of its appearance; but we can determine to attend to the nature or elements of such object or objects, upon which a penetrating investigation takes place. 2. Attention is said to be involuntary when it is *suddenly arrested* and turned to an unexpected object before the consent of the will is obtained to forsake an object of previous pursuit or investigation. 3. The *degrees* of attention differ from small to great. The mind may be but slightly and momentarily arrested by an object, and the attention may not be quickened by any voluntary action or powerful emotion; therefore its action is feeble. But attention is tenacious and intense when it acts under the continuous earnestness and power of volition. 4. Intense and successful attention depends upon our determination to *thoroughly investigate* and understand the objects or facts to which the mind is directed. This determined perseverance is, or soon will be, accompanied with a desire to conquer, and a love for the investigation of truth.

SECTION III.

1. Much depends upon a *proper* exercise of attention in listening to the truths and arguments of a discourse. If we listen with seemingly an involuntary indifference or carelessness, that which is learned, cogent, and beautiful is to us almost if not entirely lost. And if we give attention in a hurried and confused manner, our remembrance of that which was heard will be confused and defective. 2. In attending to truths we read in the perusal of books, the mind should be *concentrated* upon *that* which we read with earnestness of thought and with calm and mature deliberation. If we are apt to become weary and inattentive, it is better to read less at any one time; and we should read but few books, and they should be of the best selection. 3. Memory is *dependent* upon attention. In proportion as our attention to facts is intense or slight, so is our remembrance vivid and of long continuance, or brief and imperfect. That which receives our undivided attention becomes the object of remembrance. If the peculiarities of a tree in the midst of the grove receives our undivided attention, it will be remembered, while all those which surround it, with equal peculiarities and within the field of vision, if remembered at all they will be remembered as almost indistinct entities. Any object of which we can have knowledge through the medium of the senses, if it does not become the object of attention, our remembrance of it will be imperfect, if not entirely lost.

SECTION IV.

1. Attention is easily *influenced* by disease. Many persons under only a slight influence of febrile affection, are often discovered to be incapable of fixing their attention upon any thing with any degree of certainty. 2. Bodily diseases, in most cases, seem to *affect* this faculty of the mind first. And as disease advances its victim becomes so far incapable of exercising attention that present occurrences, with him, can not be remembered. When the mind is so much affected by disease that we are incapable of receiving correct impressions from external objects, and we begin to regard the objects of our thoughts as real existences, we are in the first degree or state of delirium. 3. Fever, intemperance, and old age so affect the body, that in the majority of cases the attention can not be *concentrated* upon a long chain of arguments, neither can it be fixed for a long time upon any one object. Though diseased physical organs may exert a great influence over attention, yet the power of attending to facts is in the mind, and is incapable of any essential destruction or annihilation within and of itself.

CHAPTER VI. ASSOCIATION.

SECTION I.

1. THE *power of association* is in the mind. This power has its origin in connection with consciousness, original and relative suggestion, and by it the objects of their action seem to be blended for the inspection and use of the mind. Its action is the associating of ideas where two or more ideas constantly or naturally follow each other in the mind, so that one almost infallibly produces the other. 2. The *act of associating* is sustained by a remarkable tendency, in which facts or conceptions, having been contemplated together or in immediate succession, become so connected in the different mental states, that one of them, at a subsequent period, recalls the others, or introduces a train of thoughts which succeed each other in the order of their original association. 3. Association may be regarded as *voluntary*, to a certain extent. There can be a mental effort made in calling up ideas or facts which have been associated with those which are clearly the objects of volitive action. 4. But we are led to regard association principally as *involuntary*. It is spontaneous when any fact present to the mind suggests another resembling or having some kind of affinity to itself; this may suggest a third and so on till many arise. This may take place with but little or no mental effort, and without attention, so that

the facts can not be remembered till something occurs to arouse the attention; then, by a mental effort, we are confident that facts have intervened since the attention was withdrawn from some fact far back, which is the object of remembrance.

SECTION II.

1. If association *consists only* in the adhering, natural affinity and the blending of our ideas, or thoughts, or feelings, then philosophers have argued cogently and effectually. But if "resemblance, contrast, contiguity, in time and place, and cause and effect" are primary laws of association, we can not understand their undefined definition of the primary power of association. If there is a power in the mind capable of associating ideas, that power lies back of the act of associating them; and if the act is acknowledged, the cause of that act belongs to and is in the mind. It is impossible for the original power of association to be a result of the action of one or more of the elements of mind. No primary element of mind has power to form itself, and consequently it can not, by mere action, form a power which fills the office of a mental faculty. 2. It is not contended that the *associating* of ideas or facts, as a result, is an original element of mind, nor that it is any thing more than an ultimate existent in mental phenomena, but that the power which *acts* is in the mind. 3. Association is *furnished* with materials in the occurrences and facts which are connected with the laws of cause and effect, resemblance, contrast, and contiguity in time and place.

SECTION III.

1. Objects which are connected, or those which sustain to each other the relation, to any degree, of cause and effect, do *suggest* each other as objects of the power of association. 2. *Resemblance*, in the form or qualities of objects, will mutually suggest each other to the mind, and the objects or facts thus presented are the property of the power of association. 3. *Contrast* appears to contribute to association. A very large man seems to suggest to the mind of the beholder the idea of a dwarf, the rivulet a river, and a lake the ocean. 4. Association is aided by facts connected with the *law of contiguity* of time and place. The nearness of time in which facts occurred or feelings existed, and the close connection of localities or places aids the power of suggestion and contributes to association. Some parents can always tell the ages of their neighbors' children by recalling to the mind the birthdays of their own children, which correspond to or are near, in time, to the birthdays of their neighbors' children. When we think of the cities of London and Paris, we immediately think of the countries where they are located.

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SECTION IV.

1. *Natural* association takes place when any fact, which is the object of attention, is by the mind associated with some fact of previous knowledge to which it has a resemblance or a relation. In this way associations may be formed. The referring of

facts to some principle or subject, which they are calculated to illustrate, fixes them in the mind, and the association is easy and natural. If a question arises which we can not at the time decide, any subsequent information deciding the question will be referred by the mind to such question; whereas, such information might have passed unnoticed or have been forgotten but for the original question.

2. Association can arise out of the *natural* and *real* relations of facts to each other, or to objects of thought which have long existed in the mind. The remembrance of facts or truths does not wholly depend upon the acuteness of attention, but it depends, in some degree, upon the previous existence of truths or facts in the mind, with which new ones can be and are readily associated. And to these subsequent facts or truths which may arise can be added, extending the power and increasing the energy and activity of the mind. Thus, every new thought or truths received by the mind are valuable within themselves, and each one forms a new basis for a new and extended association of facts by which we progress in knowledge. The same facts, associated in the minds of different persons, may *vary* with their intellectual habits and be associated in various ways. Many truths thus associated in the mind are so related to each other in their affinitating tendency as to readily recall each other in the various mental states.

SECTION V.

1. The calling up of facts is *voluntary* when we direct the mind to a particular train of truths or

thoughts best calculated to lead to those we wish to command. We may have an impression of some item of knowledge which we have been in the possession of, and from the present knowledge of a portion of facts belonging to a certain class or association be enabled to recall all others of the same association. We can turn the mind to the examination of the known truths till they lead to the recalling of those we desire to have at our command. In remembering a part of associated facts we can command and direct our attention to them till all of the same connection are revived and recalled. 2. Associations recur *involuntarily* when the mind is turned to some subject which is calculated, in its nature, or by its elementary existence or tendency, to lead to them. The mind can pursue trains of thought without any volitive effort, and often without any consciousness of its action, till some object arrests the attention. The process which leads to such an object of thought appears to be lost till we trace the associations of thought back to some existent of previous and intentional examination. In this way ideas, truths, and occurrences which had not been the subjects of thought for years are revived and recalled. Thus they may recur spontaneously, being associated, according to their natural and real relation, to each other. 3. *Casual* associations are formed only in connection with persons, incidents, or place. An idea or thought is associated with the source it was received from—the person, the book, or the place, of whom, or of which, or where we came in possession of any truth or fact. Such truths or facts are recalled in the mind whenever the source is

thought of, seen, or mentioned. If we think of a certain city where we have been, the mind is immediately presented with direct facts, incidents, or occurrences in connection with it to almost an innumerable extent.

SECTION VI.

1. Facts or occurrences *associated* with places or localities are *revived* when we think of or visit them. The Christian loves to revisit the place where his manner of life was changed, and to think of and review the associations connected with it. And even on the other hand, the murderer dreads to think of or to revisit the places of his dark criminal deeds, and he shudders in dwelling upon the associations which there arise as portentous of wretchedness and woe. 2. Associations formed in connection with *localities* seem to impress the mind with facts almost independent of memory. In some instances occurrences, which have been experienced in connection with certain locations, have been entirely forgotten till the place or places were revisited, when the facts associated with them were revived and recalled. 3. If we meet with a person or persons who know us, but of whom we have no recollection, and being unwilling to ask their names, we continue to converse with them till we learn the location of their homes, or the places where we met with them, from *some fact* connected with the former associations, and even their names *revive* and are at our command. If we wish to call the attention of a friend to any item or truth he has forgotten, we

speak of the circumstances which were associated with it till some one which he remembers recalls the fact, and probably all that was connected with it.

SECTION VII.

1. *Intentional* association involves a volitive mental action. The truths associated are not connected so much by the external relation they sustain to each other as that existing in the states and action of the mind. We can establish a connection between the thing we wish to remember and some other known object, which may have no relation to that which is to be remembered. 2. Often, when persons go in the pursuit of two or more objects, and fearing that some one will be forgotten, they will select some familiar phrase, carry something in their hand or in their pocket, only as realities, to prevent them from *forgetting* the object desired. 3. We can associate any thing we wish to remember with some *known* existent, which does not resemble that which we wish to remember, so that it can be recalled. Merchants can tell the prices of their goods from marks, which can have no resemblance to prices in any way. The order of successive periods, or the observance of the commemorative rites in the Christian system, must be regarded as intentional. 4. Different objects can produce impressions which excite *similar* feelings in the mind, and they mutually suggest or recall each other. This arises from the natural resemblance in their mutual relation. Thus objects of natural resemblance can not but excite similar feelings. Similar feelings are the result of

entities, which have any thing in common assimilated to the original principles or nature of our being. And any thing of such resemblances or relationship may suggest or recall another object which will produce a similar result upon the mind.

SECTION VIII.

1. The principle of *intentional* association is further illustrated by the way in which the mind is affected in regard to the real existence of the Christian system and the truths connected with it. Infidels who have urged that the common course of nature is the only truth that is universal and infallible, have, on the other hand, denied that human testimony is sufficient to establish the events connected with our holy religion. Though this is a sophism, yet it should be met. If we had no means or way of judging of the lapse of time, or of the remote ages of the world, than the testimony of inert elements as contained on the face of the globe, or those which are now regarded as being contained in the stratified archives of its own periods and ages, we would as readily infer that the existence of the earth was an accident of recent occurrence as to have any other supposition. 2. A proper belief in the arrangements and occurrences of such facts depends upon human *testimony* and experience in relation to the chain of associated truths in the past. By means of traditional and written testimony we are led to the belief that the earth is more than five thousand years old; but without this testimony it would all be in the confusion of uncertainty, and in

darkness. 3. The commemorative rites or periodical observances, can be transmitted from age to age by traditional *testimony*, or that which has been written by many individuals, and at different times, during the lapse of thousands of years; yet there is the regular return of the fact, the occasion and the day associated with them, the unbroken series which carry us back to the time of the original events, and the persons who witnessed them. Hence, we have as much faith or belief in the real existence of such facts as we have in the series of years which have marked the course of time and the existence of the globe. 4. By the *association* of the events and facts connected with these observances we are freed from every impression of false testimony, from the fact that we are conducted back by regular steps and periods to the time of the original events. An impostor can not fabricate a system of theology which can be even the object of investigation till it is marked with rites, periods, and events; then the harmony and regular occurrence of them would be of the utmost importance. But such a system as this, bearing a sufficient resemblance to the Bible to be believed, has never been known; while the Bible has them in the series of facts extending through the past and described as pending in the unbounded future to a degree and extent infinitely beyond all other books, systems, or facts ever known.

CHAPTER VII.

ASSOCIATION CONTINUED.

SECTION I.

1. THE true analysis of language will not allow the terms *law* or *laws* to be applied to the principle of association, nor to those principles or existences closely connected with it, only as such connected entities are clearly contingent in nature or relationship. 2. Truths may sustain such *relations* to one another as to mutually suggest each other; this relationship can not reveal the law or laws of the principle of association; but it is *that* by which objects suggest each other upon the ground of a common influence or impression made by them upon the mind. Objects which have no known relation to each other are often associated from the fact that the effect of them upon the mind is similar. 3. A *variation* of the associating principle may be found in, and in connection with, the original difference in mental powers. It may arise from the difference in primary elements and their action, all of which may affect the associating principle. One mind may differ from another by possessing one or more faculties of a higher order than those corresponding to them in the other mind; yet when all the faculties of both minds are examined they are found to constitute them equal in strength, yet the associating principle varies, being affected by them. The ac-

tion of many minds differ, and these differences influence the associating principle. Three men of equal minds in strength journey together; one of them is naturally inclined to notice the face of the country, a second the road and internal improvements, and a third the manners and customs of the people. All these different objects give rise to corresponding associations. 4. The associating principle varies with the *energy* and *strength* of the emotions. Objects which cause or have in connection with them realities, giving rise to intense feelings of sorrow, are readily recalled; as permanent columns, amid ruins, they stand out, the enduring objects of memory, while facts connected with slight emotions are soon numbered with things that were. And in like manner those things which excite feelings of joy, becoming the objects, not only of feeling, but of attention and thought, will be readily at our command, together with all the associated facts.

SECTION II.

1. The influence of the lapse of time *affects* the existence and action of the associating principle. Facts occurring last evening can, at the present time, be recalled with clearness and far more readily than those of many years' standing, from the fact that there is no perceptible loss in the strength of the connection by which the facts thus associated revive and restore each other. This view of the subject is in accordance with the common experience of mankind. But however far the associating principle can or may be affected by the lapse of

time, its original power must be imperishable, and all facts thus becoming a part of knowledge will live and be known beyond the bounds of change. 2. The lapse of five years may erase many truths from the memory of aged persons, while the *associated* facts of early life readily recall each other. This shows that the original power is not lost, but that it still lives; and when death is shaking down this clay tenement, the internal animating flame, long compressed, will burst forth from amid the ruins with imperishable powers, and with all its resources of knowledge. 3. The associating principle is influenced by the *original differences* in the natural inclinations or disposition. Some persons naturally love that which is grave or solemn, and associations of facts are formed corresponding to their natural disposition or feelings; others have only lively feelings; and a different class are attracted with the romantic, or that which possesses natural sublimity or beauty. So that facts become prominently associated corresponding to all the different inclinations or dispositions, together with even the times and circumstances.

SECTION III.

1. Associations can be *revived* and *recalled* when present objects are reported to the mind, through the medium of the senses, being the immediate objects of perception. There may be something in or connected with such objects which causes the recalling of truths and trains of facts which had not been thought of for many years. Often there is something in the sound, the taste, the odor, the appear-

ance, or touch, which revives some occurrence or fact of early life. 2. The *vividness* and *duration* in the reception and retention of realities which have been the objects of the senses and of perception, depends upon the strength or force and character of the action thus received. When an object affects directly and forcibly the organs of the senses, and is fully the object of perception and thought, accompanied with appropriate emotions, it can not be readily classed with fleeting objects of memory. It appears to have been impressed upon the mind in a durable way. 3. Mental associations may be under a *direct* volitive power and action. By voluntary action we can not create associations nor the facts entering into such combinations. And we can not will the existence of truths to be associated without first having some idea or perception of those things we wish to have exist; but we can will that facts or trains of thought may be present with and under the full inspection of the mind; and we have volitive power to retain them as objects of such inspection. And on the sudden perception of some unpleasant reality we can instantly divert the attention and refuse to contemplate it, or the facts which may be associated with it. 4. Associations can be and often are under *indirect* voluntary power. A volitive power may be regarded as incapable of creating, by direct action, either mental associations or the facts thus connected. But when we have perception of some truths, which appear to be of an association or chain of events, we can will to use them and contingent facts in arriving at, and in being able finally to contemplate and comprehend

other existences which are at the time unknown. When we stop such succession of mental states or action, or check the regular tendency or course of our thoughts, there will arise associations under the control of indirect voluntary action. In pursuing a train of thought or events we often arrive at something remarkable within itself; here the regular action of the mind is arrested, when, from the peculiar qualities or resemblance of such an existent, remote facts arise and new associations are formed. 5. In noticing the skill and design interwoven and connected with the works of nature they *lead* us to think of the great first Cause. Here we pause as though we would wish to comprehend the infinity of such a power or Being; yet the regular course of such thought is no sooner checked than the silvery trains of innumerable rolling worlds or orbs, which he has made, fly through the field of mental action and contemplation, ever burning with the glow of imperishable light.

SECTION IV.

1. The influence of association upon our ideas of *correct taste* is worthy of notice. Great care should be observed in receiving truths according to the rules of correct taste. Orators famed for wisdom, a ready and forcible delivery, often indulge in imperfections as to language, gestures, or manner of delivery, which would be regarded as revolting and disgusting but for the influence associated with the speaker. Though such defects are noticed at first without pleasure upon the part of admirers, yet in the course

of time such defects, being associated with the man and his zeal, are regarded as marks of great distinction. Hence, such defects are copied and imitated, while traits of true excellence pass unnoticed. 2. Our ideas of *fashion* vary with the influence of association. The odd insignia or the peculiarity of the escutcheon upon which is emblazoned the glory of some great warrior, however ludicrous they may appear within themselves, yet they are soon regarded as tasteful and glorious from their connection with such a personage. This is true, to some extent, in regard to almost every extravagance in dress. 3. *That* which would be *abhorred*, if introduced by common persons, can be introduced by others, and be extolled by almost universal consent, only from its association with such persons. When the multitude lay aside any extravagance, should any one perpetuate it they are regarded as being destitute of refinement. It would appear that any person ever conforming to the rules of a correct taste and fashion, independently of the varying influence of association, would be regarded as a wonder in the earth, being unworthy of imitation. 4. *Habit* gives efficiency to the power we have over our associations. It is constituted by the repetition of efforts in attending to associating operations, till we gain a facility and readiness in them and in regard to them. Trains of thought or associations, which have been long familiar to us, are attended to with ease and precision. The mind has a natural tendency to return or recur to the states of previous experience, in which associated truths or events receive and recall each other. The formation of habit is volun-

tary when we determine to repeat the efforts of attending to such mental operations. And it may be the result of indirect volitive power.

SECTION V.

1. The tendency and the effects of *improper associations* are worthy of notice. Associations may descend in degrees from those of simple error to those of vicious and malicious tendencies and results. Many descriptive writers associate with wicked tendencies, deeds, and events language full of imagery, exciting the feelings with sublimity, beauty, grandeur, and delight, till that which is sinful can be contemplated without any feelings of abhorrence, and the mind becomes inclined to crime. This course once entered, without almost a miraculous interposition of Divine power, the immortal soul is soon entangled and black with crimes, attracting the electricity of unending wrath under the just claims of infinite law. 2. We here close with the tendency and results of *correct associations*. That which is pure within itself becomes the object of pure mental action. A pure mind appears to be naturally so corelated to objects that if some of them were not of a high order of purity, yet the associations, if permitted to be formed, would be pure and harmless. 3. He who wishes to succeed in any branch of science must know that he has first *correctly* fixed the primary principles, and then associate with them those truths which are naturally adapted to and are connected with their existence, in order to arrive at, and to clearly comprehend cor-

rect results. We can not speak of all the endlessly-diversified applications of the associating principle, yet their existence is indispensable in the acquisition of knowledge.

Division Fifth.

CHAPTER I.

MENTAL STATES.

SECTION I.

1. A SIMPLE mental state may be regarded as only expressing the presence of one thought or object, which appears to be disconnected and indivisible. Such a state of mind seems to be natural; for a simple notion, feeling, or idea is indivisible; yet they can be the object or objects of mental states. 2. If two or more elements or existences, collected or connected together, enter into mental states, such states are not simple, but *complex*. 3. Though simple mental states *can not* be defined, yet, like axioms, they may be regarded as self-evident truths, always to be known as real entities within themselves. 4. Our *belief in* and *reliance* upon simple mental states as real may be with boundless confidence; for there can be no imaginary existent in a single idea, feeling, or fact abstracted and indivisible. Here is natural truth, in which we can trust without the fear of deception. 5. Simple mental states may be regarded as *preceding* those which are complex. A simple idea, feeling, or fact must first enter into mental states and be known, in order to the knowledge of the relationship of many truths in the existence of complex states. If compounds are made

up of simple elements or facts, so many complex states of mind exist, being affected with the presence of a plurality of realities capable of being disconnected or reduced to simple indivisible entities.

SECTION II.

1. The existence of *complex* mental states may be regarded as being affected with the presence of a collection, assemblage, or a complication of ideas, feelings, or realities. If we think of any external existence, as a tree, mountain, lake, or river, there are properties and qualities embraced in the action of the mind in relation to each or all of them. But inert elements have no self-power of uniting by penetration, and remain only in juxtaposition. There is a higher degree of blending and in the union of the elements and the inclinations or influences of the mind. 2. Our thoughts and feelings may arise from many objects or causes, but all *unite* in the soul under the immediate inspection of the mind, which can take into the account the oneness severally in their origin. 3. Our mental states are *complex* in contemplating external objects. We form an idea of the existence of ice from its properties, and we describe it only by giving those properties, weight, friability, color, and hardness. Similar complexity exists in regard to any other combination of properties. 4. Complex mental states may exist in relation to *that* which is connected with external objects, differing from abstract elements. In connection with qualities there may be presented to the mind tendencies, appearances, and influences. And we may

be ready to acknowledge an essence or foundation without being able to define it. The only way that we can study the existence and nature or essence of material compounds, is by their elements and inertness. And the only way that we can study the nature or essence of mind, is by its elements and action. From the peculiar impression existing elements often make upon the mind, it is natural for us to receive the idea of the existence of something, though its nature can not be defined. 5. Complex states of mind are often the result of *internal* influences or realities. As a lake receives from tributary streams, on every hand, so the mind may be regarded as the receptacle of knowledge, being affected by almost innumerable influences and impressions. We can judge of these as correctly as we can of those arising from external existences.

CHAPTER II.

ABSTRACTION.

SECTION I.

1. ABSTRACTION is the act or operation by which elements are separated from each other and are examined individually. The original power of such action, and by which it is known to exist, is in the mind. It may take place when the mind is occupied with separated facts, or when we contemplate some particular part or property of a compound, or of a complex object, as disconnected from other existences of such combinations. 2. By the mental *exercise* or the *acting* power of abstraction, we can examine many objects, selecting definite properties in which they agree and can be classified. And it can be still more comprehensive in selecting a property or fact which is common to an extensive collection of adhering or complex entities. 3. An abstract notion or thought may *arise* upon the ground of detected resemblance and difference in objects or properties, and in the special notice or attention given to them individually. In the presence of compounds we can have conceptions of density, form, or friability without the introduction of other properties. Properties may be so separated from the combination as to be the objects of abstract thought, and any element may be so contemplated in its separation as to be the object of special observation. If I say this

apple is red, the color only may be the object of abstract thought.

SECTION II.

1. Mental *operations* in separating facts, or in abstracting certain ideas, is worthy of a passing notice. The power of abstraction is in the mind. If the mind has the power of motion, and if it does act, we must admit that notions or ideas arise in connection with or in such action. In the origin of our ideas they may be simple, or may exist separated from each other. There appears to be a natural tendency uniting them, giving rise to complex mental states. If this union is formed of many simple ideas or truths, the power in the mind, or that is connected with mental operations, which is capable of separating these united facts, in whole or in part, may be called abstraction. The union of ideas forming complex mental states may be either intentional or involuntary; but the separating or abstracting of them appears to be voluntary. There must be an intentional action in the examination of any individual thought or idea in the mind by which it is separated or abstracted. 2. Abstraction can not be implied in the examination of *simple* elements or ideas unless they could be capable, in some way, of being decomposed, or are divisible within and of themselves. But abstraction will apply in the separating of the oneness of their existence from all other facts or realities existing in the mind. 3. Abstraction is *implied* in the examination of complex notions or ideas, when every simple element or idea involved in the compound or collection are analyzed

individually or separately. The act of distinctly separating the elementary parts of a compound or certain entities of a collection from each other is called abstraction, and this work can only be effected by abstraction. 4. We may be said to have *particular* abstract ideas on the presentation of an object to us having color, fragrance, form, density, and extension, when the mind is so entirely occupied with some one of these qualities as to be almost insensible to the existence of the others. The particular abstraction takes place when the action of the mind is limited to one quality. When any object or quality existing in a state of combination is separated by a mental process for inspection, the idea we form of it may be said to be of particular abstraction. This may take place in the mind either with or without a real separation of the combined entities.

SECTION III.

1. The *power* of abstraction and the *right* exercise of it is of essential importance in the acquisition of true knowledge. It is indispensable to a correct knowledge of material existences in analyzing the constituent elements or component parts, bringing them separately and consecutively under the test of the senses and the power of perception. It enters into the process of correct deductive and demonstrative argumentation or reasoning. It is involved in the mental operations of the exciting orator, the descriptive writer, and the efficient architecturalist in abstracting each form of beauty, elements of taste, and superior excellence, contributing to that

which is to be accomplished in true interest, sublimity, or grandeur. 2. *Abstract* notions or ideas may be said to be simple, complex, or general. Our ideas of objects which have many elements, parts, or qualities may be said to be complex; but general abstract ideas may exist in relation to classes of objects when they are contemplated separately—distinct from, or are abstractedly from those of other classes. The term man may be used to convey the idea of the existence of our race, while the term fish may apply to the existence of all in that department of creation. These classes can be contemplated by separating them from each other, or from any other class of existences, under the law of general abstraction. 3. *Primary* truths or principles may be classified and examined under the law of general abstraction. Such truths or facts may be combined in classes entering into trains of thought or reasoning in arriving at permanent conclusions or results in the general divisions or departments of knowledge. 4. *General* abstraction may apply to numerical science. General abstract propositions, though brief, may involve almost a world of meaning or reality. Though a series may arise, extending to innumerable powers, yet it can be represented by a general notion or term, which, in reality and effect, is the work of abstraction. General reasoning depends upon classification as a result of abstraction.

SECTION IV.

1. *General* abstraction may apply to classification when we examine one class of objects separate and

apart from other classes. Objects classified under the terms of genera and species, may be contemplated or examined under the law of general abstraction. When a variety of objects are before us, it is easy and almost natural for the properties or qualities of agreement and disagreement to be presented to the mind, giving rise to associations or classes. These classes of many objects may be represented by a single term, and any one of them become the object of mental action separate or abstracted from the others. 2. *General abstract ideas* will apply to almost innumerable classes of objects—the different orders or classes in zoology, ornithology, vegetation, and crystallization. 3. The *process* of abstraction is essential to a well-regulated mind. Without it we can not proceed correctly in analyzing the qualities or elements of objects; and we could not control the attention, concentrating the action of the mental powers in the examination of any one object separated from the thousands bestudding the field of vision, or that are present with and are contained in the mind. 4. It is *influenced* and affected by the power of disease, and can be so impaired or weakened, as disease increases, that all objects are in a state of confusion to the mind, and it naturally varies as to degrees of acuteness and power in different minds.

CHAPTER III. IMAGINATION.

SECTION I.

1. IMAGINATION is that power or faculty of the mind by the action or exercise of which we form new combinations within the mind, gathered from real elements, scenes, or facts. It is that which forms new associations of ideas from the truths which are the property of memory, being subject to its power. From the materials stored up in the memory it produces new combinations, on the one hand, more pleasing, more brilliant, or more sublime, or, on the other, more awful, more terrible, or more horrible. 2. Imagination has been regarded as an *ulterior* element of mind, or that it is a result of certain primary elements when in action. If its origin and existence wholly depends upon the action of certain primary elements, then when those elements are inactive the power and action of imagination would be annihilated; and if ever its being and action are recalled they would exist by the creative action of those primary elements. That any primary elements of mind have such creative power is absurd. The power and the action of imagination is wholly in the mind. Though it may be called an ulterior faculty, yet to define it to be an imaginary nothing is incorrect; if it is a real existence it is capable of being so defined. 3. Imagination is *closely con-*

nected with the power of the understanding and our conceptions and perceptions of objects and facts. Under its influence and action we are enabled to combine objects and qualities of which we have conceptions, and extend our thoughts to the contemplation of similar ones, or of other facts as real, though unknown to us before, and we can imagine such existences as being more pleasing or awful than any fact of real existence in nature. In some instances we can pursue and describe them to a greater degree of clearness, beauty, and grandeur than is contained in any similar fact or object of materiality. 4. Imagination may *extend* to the operations of apprehending and contemplating the arrangements, qualities, resemblances, or influences connected with objects of mental action, and the extension of our thoughts in the formation of new ideas beyond those which may be regarded as primary ones, together with the relative position and influence of the same to and upon each other, and to the original ideas. It recombines our ideas of the relative condition of things, and influences mental states in relation to the beautiful, grand, and sublime, which transcends the original ideas as our thoughts pass beyond them and ascend higher.

SECTION II.

1. Imagination *influences* mental states, in and by which the mind conceives and forms ideas within itself, and of real and imaginary external objects. It assembles images and paints them upon our minds and on the minds of others. By it we can go be-

yond all these in adding ideas and thoughts to those already in the mind, and in adding any image or reality necessary to fill or complete the scene or process of apprehending till the mind is satisfied, or there is a suspension of further action. Thus there is a pleasure realized as we advance to new facts and in the reception of every new idea. 2. Imagination is incapable of being *resolved into* any other element or combination of mental faculties, from the fact that no element of mind has self-power to create or aid in creating any other faculty, the office and action of which can be defined, and upon which other faculties are dependent. The origin, power, and action of imagination belongs to and is in the mind. Therefore, it is a power or faculty of the mind, though the ulterior process of its action may be regarded as of secondary relationship. The idea that this faculty is wholly created by some other faculty or faculties is absurd. 3. Imagination leads in *blending* elements of diverse existences. Those which belong to widely diversified scenes can be combined into one beautiful conception. It blends the ideas or the elements of thought in harmony, either with some real conception or the elements of it. And it blends diversified elements, presenting to the mind that which is beautiful, grand, or partakes of true sublimity.

SECTION III.

1. The operations or exercise of imagination may be said to be *involuntary*, when there is action without any volitive effort of the mind. And such

action can take place when we are not immediately conscious of the fact till some object or fact arrests our attention, and we recall beautiful combinations which have been the work of imagination. 2. *Intentional* imagination involves artificial combinations, by means of which the mind acting passes on, while extended thoughts and facts arise, forming new objects of contemplation. 3. *Fictitious* delineations are dependent upon imagination for transactions, scenes, and imaginary facts. Aided by this faculty the narrator or actor paints images and characters with any appropriate qualities or influences. 4. *Productions* of the imagination are chaste and of a high moral character in proportion to the moral principles, taste, and habits of the author. 5. The *combinations* of images, elements, or facts which are produced by the imagination being vile, demoralizing, and destructive in their nature and tendency, correspond with the bad motives, the corrupt principles, and the perverted habit of the author.

SECTION IV.

1. Imagination differs from *fancy* in forming new combinations from the materials stored up in the memory, graduating them from the beautiful to the sublime, or from the awful to the more terrible. Fancy is that by which the mind forms images or representations of facts or existences, while imagination is the power of combining and increasing, or of diminishing the interest of mental states. 2. Imagination differs from *admiration*; for the latter is no more than wonder mingled with emotions of love

or veneration, or of that which is novel or great. 3. It differs from *fictions* in the results of its action. Fictions can only be regarded as fictions; but imagination blends elements of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity into one grand conception, the elements of which can not be abstracted from true existences. The creations of the imagination are true to thought, and are objects of mental action. 4. There is a difference between the imagination and *bombast*. The former may command, combine, and blend elements into forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, while the latter consists in high-sounding words in an inflated style. In this way persons often use high-sounding terms, but without any connection of ideas or cogency of thought, and without a proper conception of that which they wish to express. A speaker, while enforcing the truthfulness and claims of his theme, had moved his audience with a general feeling of excitement under his thrilling eloquence, and closed with great applause and triumph in the following manner: "Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Rocky Mountains; thrusting my tongue into the thunder's mouth, I would proclaim these truths to the ends of the world." Subsequently a young speaker attempted to use the same while delivering a discourse in a loud tone of voice and with great confidence: "Now, my audience, if I had power I would plant one foot upon the Andes and the other upon the Rocky Mountains, and I would thrust my tongue into the thunder's mouth, and I'd, I'd, I'd howl like a wolf." Here is evidence that the action of the imagination was imperfect,

and that at first he had but a meager conception of what he wished to say. Bombast is without a correct blending of the beautiful, and without the proper presence and arrangement of ideas and of thoughts, and it is without a maturity of conception, all of which belong to or are connected with a vigorous and active imagination.

SECTION V.

1. Imagination differs very much in nature and action from that of *burlesque*. The solemn thoughtfulness or real nature of the latter is only feigned for the purpose of exciting amusement or laughter by ludicrous images or representations. It is the peculiar influence manifested in a contrast between the subject and the way in which it is treated, tending to excite laughter or ridicule, while the active imagination carries with it real interests, thrilling the soul with the liveliest emotions of the beautiful and sublime. 2. Imagination differs from *sarcasm*. The latter may abound with imagery or beautiful language, but at the same time there is an ironical signification or expression. Though there is a granting of the claims of any person or people, yet there may be a keen, reproachful expression or satirical remark, with an influence, expression, or feeling of scorn, while imagination must be regarded as free from such peculiarities. 3. Feelings of *sympathy* are not wholly dependent upon imagination, though they may be aided by it. Though sympathy can and does not originate with or from imagination, yet a quick, active, and powerful imagination can and

does combine images of suffering, gloom, and despair. A man whose moral sensibilities are still alive to action always has sympathy intuitively on the presentation of any object of suffering, if his attention is arrested by it. But his feelings are much increased when he begins to imagine himself in like condition. 4. The imagination can be exercised in works of fiction without injury *only* when such fiction is immediately connected with *truths* or *facts* in *nature*, and possessing the high moral character which infinite Wisdom has connected with all that he has made. 5. The *influence* of fictitious writings upon an active imagination and upon the mind is decidedly injurious. It weakens mental action in the examination of real and important truths, tends to fickleness and whimsicalness of mind, instability of character, and often leads to certain ruin. The divine Being has filled an infinite space with an eternal range of existences or facts, so that the immortal mind of man can dwell on real facts or truths without number, and to endless ages increasing in majesty and glory. When all these truths have been scanned till they have become dim with age and their glory exhausted, then, and only then, has an undying spirit time to breathe its energies out upon puffs of empty air, or excite its restless powers over the dreams of some drunken lord which were kindled by the exhalations of rum; or they may be the result of a perverted and vicious purpose of heart. 6. The *improvement* of the imagination, or the *injury* it receives from popular works of fiction, depends principally upon the purity of the author's motives and the manner in which the elements of

thought are combined. A chaste and spirited narration of facts, as they are mapped or arranged in the universe around us, tends to enliven the imagination in advancing and combining or blending of new forms of beauty or grandeur. A chain of real entities present *that* which can give rise to the creations of imagination and its rapid improvement.

SECTION VI.

1. The *utility* and *importance* of the imagination must be regarded as of no ordinary character. In neglecting the cultivation of this noble and important faculty of the mind, is to impede the power and action of the whole mind. 2. A *vigorous* and active imagination, in conveying our thoughts or in describing facts in writing, is of great importance. To present imagery, or to correctly delineate scenes, facts, or transactions, or to paint them in their combinations and qualities, is effected principally under the control and action of the imagination. 3. An active imagination is *essential* to true oratory. To conceive of a speaker's power to excite, move, and thrill an audience without the aid of imagination to assist him is utterly impossible. True, affecting, and exciting eloquence can never exist in connection with that mind which is destitute of an active imagination. Under its combinations and blendings, derived from the language of trope and metaphor, the orator may launch thunder-peals, startling the feelings or emotions of all around him. The electrifying power, drawn from imagery, illustrations, and resemblances, will ever stir with life and thrill

with joy or awe. 4. The combinations, blendings, descriptions, and painting of the poet are without any *pleasing interest* unless the action of the mind is pervaded by an active imagination. 5. The sculptor's chisel can not trace upon the marble the living and desired expression or features of a friend if he is destitute of the power or influence of imagination. It is this which enables him to render every form graceful and beautiful. And it is this faculty which causes others to admire the work when it is completed. 6. The simple tones or sounds in music, if abstracted, are *monotonous* if they do not cause confusion; but the relation of those sounds, when properly blended or harmonized, thrills the soul with the most pleasing emotions.

SECTION VII.

1. The *development* or *improvement* of the imagination can be secured by attending to the manner of its exercise or action, by continued or repeated efforts to extend its power and influence. It should not be exercised out of its proper sphere, but in the most natural way and upon its appropriate objects.
2. The influence of *disease* may affect the imagination; its action may be directed to an improper object or in a wrong channel.
3. It can lead us to *misperceptions* and improper action unless it is controlled by reason, motive, and virtue. We are apt to imagine that great warriors or statesmen, who have left the world, have died happy and are gone to heaven, when they have not, at any time, given one clear and conclusive evidence of such a result, as

is required by the Gospel law. 4. Imagination will lead to *deception*, if it is allowed to wander uncontrolled amid myriads of imaginary beings, or scenes of wealth and pleasure. It soon tends to abstract the mind from real existences, and causes it to dwell on the beautiful forms of imagination, which are false, and upon the most whimsical speculations. It ceases to contemplate real existences at hand as worthy attention. It soon withdraws from all objects of worth and dwells in a world of imagination. When the mind advances to this point it is midway from a rational state to that of insanity. 5. A continued *love* of and an *untiring pursuit* of *fiction* often diseases and sends out the entire desires of the mind upon the wing of imagination—feasting such desires with inaccessible enjoyments and perishable glory. Finally, the mind becomes wearied with the staleness of all demonstrable truths, and fictions appear as realities. The sympathies and affections of the heart become cold and die for the want of real accessible objects upon which they can act. Often false opinions and lies become the dreams of life, an additional gloom in death, and the bitterness of eternal remorse. It would be far better to suffer, if possible, a thousand temporal deaths, than for the immortal soul to perish with invoked madness. Never let the mind dwell too long upon only one and the same idea if you would be sane on all points.

Division Sixth.

CHAPTER I.

INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN AND INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN.

SECTION I.

1. THE powers of mind *arranged* under the preceding divisions of this work, or the greater number of them, have, by the common consent of many writers in time past, been arranged under the general heading of intellectual states of *external origin*, and the faculties, the defining of which we are now commencing, have been arranged under the heading of intellectual states of *internal origin*. In this arrangement there appears to be a distinction without a philosophical difference. There is a difference, but it is contrary to the meaning conveyed by the first heading referred to. 2. We object to the doctrine of intellectual states of *external origin*. Intellectual states may exist as results of external causes; but for intellectual states to arise in the external world, or out of or beyond the limits of the mind itself, is clearly incorrect, and this is a philosophical deduction from the heading referred to. 3. If it is impossible for *intellectual* states to have external origin, then it is more absurd to regard the faculties

or powers of the mind couched under such a heading, as having their origin externally or in the external world. There are external causes of mental states; but mental states and faculties can not have external origin till they arise out of the mind, which is impossible. 4. It is utterly impossible for us to conceive that *mind is matter*, or that *matter* can be mind. All the faculties of the mind belong to and exist in the mind. All the mental states of which we are capable have their origin and existence in the mind. Therefore, no state or faculty of the mind can have an external existence or origin unless such existence or origin takes place beyond the self-limits of mind, and, consequently, in the external world.

SECTION II.

1. If we should say that any element or power of mind was of *external origin*, as to either its existence or action, would it not convey the idea that the origin, or that the commencement of its being was in connection with some inert element or existences of the external world? But if we refer to the origin of its action, would it not imply that such action might commence with distant objects of matter, thence advance to the mind in order to be known?
2. If we say that any *mental state* is of external origin, would it not convey the idea that external physical elements have self-action, which action must first take place in order to affect the mind, which is at rest, creating new mental states? This would seem to indicate, that while the mind was at rest mental

action of the same mind could take place in connection with inert, distant objects, which finally affects the mind in creating new mental states. If such conclusions be true, we are not capable of so understanding them. 3. The action of some faculties of the mind may be regarded as more closely *related* to and connected with *external objects* than that of others, and their position and claims must be defined accordingly, which can not be done to any great extent by any general heading.

SECTION III.

1. There can be no impropriety in saying that there are intellectual states of *internal origin*; for, although external objects may affect the mind through the medium of the senses, yet the mental state which follows must be wholly of and within the mind. And this state, though it follows an external cause, can not of itself be said to be of external origin. While the cause may be external, yet the origin of the mental state, as such, is not the inert cause, nor the sensation received by contact with it, but is wholly of and within the mind. 2. The *origin* of all knowledge known to us, as such, is in the mind. The true study of psychology is of boundless importance. The undying soul may be said to contain within itself an eternity of meaning, being, and destiny. Through the medium of the senses we become acquainted with the realities, beauty, and grandeur of the external world; but by means of internal powers we can and do have knowledge independent of material entities, or of the

power and action of the senses. 3. The most *ulterior origin* of knowledge, in regard to external things, must begin with sensation. This knowledge can only embrace the fact that a sensation has been received, and that we have the presence of such an existent. This sensation in and of itself can never generate or impart to the mind thoughts and ideas, which are the true beginning of intellectual or rational knowledge. 4. The action of *sensation* affecting the mind is immediately followed by a new mental state, which is the result of a reviving influence or action of the internal power of the soul. By and in the action of this internal power, modified into certain mental states, arises the formation and existence of thought; and with the formation of thought commences intellectual or rational knowledge. 5. The existence of simple *thoughts* and *ideas* must arise by and within the action of the internal power of the soul. The advancing of these from simple to complex, and the blending of them into combinations, is real knowledge. Thinking, believing, hoping, and doubting have their origin wholly and only in the active internal power of the soul. They are not objects of the senses, nor of sensations, caused by external things. So we are forced to the conclusion that knowledge is of internal origin, and the power we have in knowing all truths or facts, whether they exist in the external world or within the imperishable soul, is an internal power, the test of all facts.

CHAPTER II.

SUGGESTION.

SECTION I.

1. SUGGESTION appears to be the *presentation* of an idea to the mind without the immediate aid of the senses. It has power within and by its own action to give rise to thoughts. We have notions, thoughts, and ideas which appear to be inspired, and arise from the internal action of the immaterial constitution, without the aid of combining and comparing ideas or facts. There are certain thoughts and ideas which arise and can be called natural suggestions. 2. *Simple* suggestions may be regarded as primary and natural. They have been regarded as a spontaneous result of intuitive power, or that they arise in the action of internal emotions or sensations. The action of these may suggest the idea of real existences which may become the objects of mental action. 3. The *internal action* of the mind, in and by which suggestions arise, may be regarded as the real or clearly-definable origin of their knowledge or known existence. In connection with these we have power to believe in their real existence. 4. From this internal action or states of the mind is suggested the notion of *self*, or of the mind as real, and the cause and reality of change. *That* which suggests the idea of our being, or the notion of duration, is independent of the power and action of

the senses or of sensation as to its origin. Such suggestions appear to arise from intuitive power and become the objects of consciousness; and such intimations appear to be essential to the nature of mind, and its power of primary action, which is the origin of all knowledge to us, capable of demonstration.

SECTION II.

1. The idea of *self-existence* can not be tested by the senses. We can not see, hear, taste, or smell such an idea or fact, neither can we feel to originate the same, but it arises from the mind itself. It is suggested spontaneously, from the very nature of the mind, as it is constituted by its sovereign Creator. It is so closely connected with the nature and existence of mind that it is impossible for us to define the time or the beginning of its origin. 2. *The origin* of the idea of mind, as an existent, can not commence with the senses; for the senses are properly affected by external things, and no idea of mind can result abstractly from the existence of materiality. The origin of the notion is suggested by and from the nature of the mind within itself. The beginning of our ideas of the primary elements of mind is suggested by the mind, though they may be matured by the feelings and action of the mind in various ways. 3. *The origin* of the notion or idea of personal identity is with the internal power of the mind. It can not arise from inert elements of the external world, neither can it arise from the sameness in qualities or nature of any mental existence beyond and distinct from self; but the beginning of

its being is suggested by the internal and intuitive power and nature of the mind. 4. The idea of our *real existence* must arise from the natural existence of the mind. We can not exist without having an idea of our existence. The beginning of such an idea is connected with the power of suggestion, and may be regarded as a simple idea, forever undefinable. But an idea or thought implies and is action; therefore, the self-acting power is of and within the mind itself.

SECTION III.

1. *Simple suggestion* may embrace certain states of mind which arise out of states previously experienced, when the relationship is not an object of memory or of present mental action. 2. *Simple ideas* arise from the internal power of the soul, and from the nature and origin of some of them we may come to the conclusion that there is such a thing as natural suggestion. Connected with such ideas is a belief that their existence is true. 3. Simple suggestion can apply to *past thought or events*. If we visit a natural curiosity, which we have formerly visited, in company with a friend, the different objects of former attraction and conversation will revive the thoughts and even the words used by us on that occasion. In passing the different objects of former conversation they often cause the former language and words to be revived by the power of suggestion. 4. This kind of suggestion extends not only to the action of the mind in regard to *past thoughts or facts*, but will apply to mental action in

regard to that which may become the object of mental action, though it may have never before been the object of any mental action. One idea often introduces another into the mind. The sight of a peculiar object may suggest others of the same class, but differing in certain facts or features, or may, and often does, give rise to certain trains of thought never before experienced.

SECTION IV.

1. Suggestion is *involuntary* when thoughts arise in connection with other thoughts which are not at the time the special objects of the attention or of mental action. And it is clearly involuntary when the thought or idea appears to arise in connection with or from the intuitive power of mental and moral action. 2. This power may be said to be *voluntary* when we, by intentional cogitation, use certain thoughts, feelings, or bearings of facts in order to trace out other or similar things of which we have had no clear perception before. The discovery of each new fact suggests the idea of something as real still beyond. 3. The *importance* of this faculty is incalculable. It is a revealer to us of the past; it enables us to contemplate the future, and upon it memory is dependent for much of its power in calling up past thoughts or facts. It is an original tendency of the mind to exist in certain states after certain other states. 4. In suggestion there is a tendency to *relative conceptions*. All ideas or objects so affinitated as to sustain a relation to each other may and often do suggest one another. These

relations are experienced, or are so perceived by the mental faculties, that in trying to comprehend them the power and majesty of the mind augments our conceptions of its limitless reality. 5. In suggestion there is also a tendency to relative perceptions, in which all facts or truths, sustaining a relation to each other, suggest similar facts or truths, which, without their presence with the mind, would have never been the objects of perception.

SECTION V.

1. The *origin of the idea* of material existences may be imparted to us through the medium of the senses, but we could not, from sight or touch alone, judge of the qualities or properties of a compound beyond the surface which is seen or felt. But *that* which is tested by contact with the senses can and does suggest an idea of those properties which exist within or beyond the outer surface. 2. Suggestion *involves our experience* in noticing successive mental states. This chain of successive events suggest other chains, and all the individual facts serve to suggest corresponding facts or truths. 3. We are principally dependent upon suggestion as to the origin of our *idea of motion*. We can test the abstract existence and qualities of objects which are in motion, but there is a difference between that which moves and motion itself. Our idea of that which changes the relative position or order of things must be suggested; for motion can not be regarded as a real object of the sense; hence the idea or notion of it can not arise from the power of the senses, but is

suggested in the change and relative position of things. 4. We are dependent, in an important sense, upon *suggestive power* for our notion or idea of the relation of effect to its cause. The character of an effect may suggest the cause, guided in part by the presence and action of the senses; but the origin of the idea of the cause is wholly of suggestion. If it requires strength to raise a small stone from the earth, the thought of lifting a larger one naturally suggests the idea of additional power; hence, the presence of the vast globe naturally suggests a first Cause, or the omnipotent power which caused the being or real existence of the globe or of the vast universe.

SECTION VI.

1. The *origin* of the *idea of time* is connected with the suggestive power. Time is duration measured by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. We can not have clear conceptions of duration existing in succession, though we can have of duration which can be measured. The events which take place in time, and the relative positions in the flight of the orbs which measure it, can not give us a satisfactory idea of time; hence, such an idea arises from an internal suggestive power. 2. If *duration measured* can be called time, then it would appear that duration without being measured, or being unfinished, may be called eternity. The succession of events, under the law of measurement, has a natural tendency to the suggestion of the idea of the permanency of duration unchecked by a succession of periods or

the flying returns of revolving worlds. 3. We can not recall the time when we first received an *idea of space*. It appears to have arisen spontaneously, or that it is a result of an intuitive suggestive power. There is no way to represent space to the senses; it is without form, figure, or bounds. It is not dependent upon the existence of any thing else, so far as we are capable of judging, and when we have conceptions of any existent, it is impossible for us to think of it out of or beyond the bounds of space. 4. *Resemblance* may be regarded as an ulterior law of suggestion. The primary power of suggestion is connected with the intuitive powers of the mind, as the previous argument will show. The mutual or reciprocal resemblance of objects often suggest each other, and is the occasion of recalling past existences by means of the suggestive power and its action. The house of a stranger may replace in the mind clear or vivid conceptions of the old homestead. The appearance of yonder grove, or the banks of that rolling river instantly revives the place of my childhood sports, and where my little brother and sister sleep peacefully waiting the sound of the last trump. The peculiar voice of a stranger may recall to my mind, as from the grave, that of my father. The peculiar state of mind affected by one object has a tendency to suggest other states or objects.

SECTION VII.

1. The *internal action* of the suggestive power is aided by the contrast involved in the nature and

existence of objects. The presence of the dead body of a celebrated warrior, statesman, or divine is almost instantly followed by their appearance when living and in their glory. 2. The *extremes of conditions*, in existences, suggest their opposites. In connection with the idea of a suffering beggar by the wayside is suggested the thought of prosperity and happiness. The prairie which has smiled under the rays of a thousand summer's suns only affects the mind by the introduction of the thought or idea of dark, silent groves, or of majestic forests waving in the living emerald of beauty and grandeur. The action of the mind in passing from one object to another is a wise arrangement of Deity, else all of earth would become monotonous and uninteresting. 3. In thinking of some one of *cotemporaneous existences* often others of the same epoch are suggested to us. If objects distinct from each other, yet united by an invariable connection, as the batteries at the extremities of a telegraphic wire, the thought of the one often suggests the other. 4. Without *lively suggestive powers* mental action would be confused. It appears to be indispensable in furnishing new materials, amplifying the thoughts of the writer or of the speaker; and in proportion to the activity of the suggestive power will be the readiness of language, cogency of thought and sentiment, and the force of appeal. 5. *Real entities* are the objects of suggestion, and when thus presented to the mind they become the objects of notice and reason. The great truths which lie at the foundation of that process of reasoning by which we are compelled to acknowledge the existence of God, together with our own

being and our obligations to him as the Father and donor of all good—they are the direct intimations and objects of the suggestive power of the mind.

SECTION VIII.

1. The *suggestive intellect* is capable of being strengthened and rendered lively and efficient by attentively directing the mind to those thoughts and feelings of our choice, and which will be most likely to suggest each other and in trying to retain them as distinctly and as long as we possibly can. Facts thus collected become as encamped or collected materials for the egressive action of the mind. 2. This *power* can be rendered *more vigorous* by attending to those truths which are most naturally affinitated, or are blended in a state of union. 3. It can be *aided* in attending to those facts which differ most abstractly from others, and produce sensations and feelings peculiar, or that differ in kind and nature so as to attract the greater attention. 4. This power can be *increased* by attending to that temperance, care, and economy necessary to secure the health of the bodily powers, contributing thereby to the natural capability and readiness of mental development, so far as mind is dependent upon physical organs. The mind can not be perfectly developed through either a diseased skull or brain. 5. The *activity* of the suggestive power of the mind depends much upon the *habit* or manner in which it is exercised. It should be tested and exerted with care and with repeated egressive efforts in presenting the mind with new and delightful truths or facts. In the con-

templating of these natural truths the mind rises, admiring the power and goodness of Him who reared the forest, commands the storm, rolls the ocean, and eliminated, as from the uncreated light of Lights, the planetary lamps which ever move in boundless space around us, outnumbering, if possible, an infinite flight of years.

CHAPTER III.

RELATIVE SUGGESTION.

SECTION I.

1. In contemplating objects the mind is capable of receiving impressions, or of being influenced in regard to *certain relations* which such objects mutually sustain to each other. *That* which awakens a feeling or a mental state in regard to the natural relationship of objects is called *relative* suggestion. Without doubt the mind is capable of such an influence, but it is difficult to clearly define its office, as it appears to be midway between the nature or character of simple suggestion and that of the judgment. Yet a suggestive power, in any way or to any degree of strength, is clearly distinct from that of the judgment. 2. The mind is capable of experiencing *certain influences*, which are affected by a peculiar relationship of objects of similar or dissimilar co-ordinate properties or qualities, which give rise to a new class of feelings and mental states. The presence of such objects appears to affect in the mind the process of comparing, so as to give rise to the cognizance of the first intimations or ideas in relation to them, in which we realize their relation in a certain way or respects. This is an original susceptibility of the mind, and is connected with the action of intuitive principles. The mind is not only capable of realizing or experiencing the pres-

ence and relations of objects, but of being affected by the condition or character of those things which are like or unlike, agreeing or disagreeing as to equality, time, or place. 3. *Influences of relation* may arise and be suggested, or experienced by the mind, in the notice or contemplation of a great variety of realities or facts. The degrees of difference which glow in the emerald hues of a summer forest, are the occasions of giving rise to the first apprehensions, or perceptions, of the different kinds of trees composing that forest and other relative facts. In the sound of the national band, one instrument is loud, and another soft; in the touching of frozen mercury and cotton, or in the tasting different kinds of fruit, there are natural differences, the relations of which affect or influence the mind in regard to them. The relation of any class of objects is different from the objects of, and within themselves. That which is involved in such relationship affects the mind in regard to the objects themselves, and also in respect to the degrees of the mutual contrast in the properties related. 4. *Terms of correlative character* may involve and express that which is intended to be explained. The mere mention of them involves the relation they sustain to other objects, which relation is the immediate occasion giving rise to mental influences, or states; while the object expressed by the use of the term was lost sight of. In the use of the terms father, mother, governor, or commander, the relations are the more direct causes of a full mental action.

SECTION II.

1. *Relative suggestion* does not depend upon the power of the *senses* for its existence, else brutes and birds would have it as fully developed as man; for they can see and hear as well as we can; but as to their power of suggestion, or their perception of relations being well developed is very doubtful. The idea of the tallness of a tree could not be conveyed to us by sight only; for if no tree of any kind existed save that one, it would, doubtless, appear to us neither tall nor short; but if we know that tall and short trees are before us, it is evidence that their relation has been suggested to the mind, and has been an object of mental action. 2. We are not dependent upon the *action of the senses* in recognizing, and in realizing the mutual relationship of hope and expectation, love and joy, or that joy and grief are opposites; yet these relations give rise to mental influences and new states of mind. The number of relations which affect or cause the action of the suggestive power, in consequence of which new mental states are experienced, or take place, are almost as the stars of heaven for number. What a limitless variety of objects and facts contribute to the action and resources of the mind! What must mind be contemplated in the perfection of its powers! What an eternity of duration, and infinity of feeling, memory, knowledge, action, and being within and of itself! Imperishable gem, assert the power of thy immortal faculties; for living thou shalt never cease to be. 3. *The extent* of this power, and the number of objects and facts involved

in its action, can not readily be defined. Its action is connected with relations of coexistence, resemblance, diversity, degree, and position. It may extend to the relation of cause and effect. But it is useless to dwell longer upon this subject. We will pass to the examination of the next topic, with increased humility, gratitude, and awe in contemplating the powers and the being of mind, and the goodness of that Creator who constituted it progressive to endless ages. With more than lightning speed it sends forth its pioneer thoughts upon the road of interminable duration, without ever arriving at the ulterior bounds of its dominion. 4. Who can define and contemplate the soul *perfected* in its departure from earth? Progressive flight! when millions of rising series in knowledge have been numbered, comprehended, and passed, still onward in its towering flight, knowing more, and still more, of the incomprehensible fullness, love, and goodness of that Being to whom it owes its existence!

CHAPTER IV. THE JUDGMENT.

SECTION I.

1. THE faculty of the human mind that is called *judgment* has often been acknowledged, while something else has been defined in lieu of it. Its existence can not but be acknowledged, for it is a real faculty, and as such it should be defined. 2. It is *that faculty* of the mind by which we are enabled to compare ideas or thoughts, and to determine upon the evidences as to preferences, or that which is right or wrong. By it we not only compare ideas and thoughts, but we advance to compare the relations of terms, of propositions, and of arguments; also to determine upon that which is correct. 3. It is *that* which may be called the determination of the mind, in which we become satisfied from the evidence and influence received in comparing the relations of ideas, thoughts, propositions, and arguments. 4. It is not only the act of judging, but it is the *power* by which such a process or action is concluded. And if it has power to examine the agreement or disagreement of things in order to arrive at the truth, it has power to determine or to decide upon that truth after it is found or defined. It not only has power to examine and to determine upon relations, and the correct stages of argumentation, but it is the concluding action of the mind in

regard to the determining of the truthfulness of objects or entities, and of determining the mind favorably to truths, whether casual or substantial. 5. The faculty of judgment is a particular *power within itself*; it is not to be taught in order to have being, and the power of its origin is connected with the existence and action of the primary elements of mind. It is not originated by education, but exists only to be exercised. If it is naturally deficient—and this appears to be true in some minds—there is no process of instruction that can supply the defect. The understanding may be naturally perfect, and the same may be true of suggestion, or other powers; but if the judgment is deficient, the mind generally acts hastily, and at the first intention. 6. The judgment has not only power to determine an action, or of concluding, or of finishing that which may be called a mental process satisfactorily, but it can *analyze, abstract, classify, and generalize*. By it we can class an individual existent under a general notion in the affirmation, as that is an animal of a certain kind, or that is a tree of a special kind, or from a certain mountain. The powers of the mind are in motion, uneasy, or restless till the object of its action is decided by the judgment. This decision once made, rest generally pervades the whole of the mental faculties.

SECTION II.

1. *A naturally-defective* faculty of judgment—and many there are who appear to be almost totally wanting in regard to a well-developed power of

judgment—is attended with great uncertainty, and much confusion, as to a proper discrimination and action in regard to what is right or wrong. Such minds may desire to do right, and to act conscientiously in all things, but there is plainly a want of proper and safe decisions. They should share of the charity of others rather than suffer severe penalties in case of wrong acts. An allowance should be made for their imprudence, while the purity or impurity of their motive, at the time of their error, should be the object of the judgment of others in acquitting or in condemning them. 2. The judgment *presupposes the understanding*. The latter may exist without the former, but the judgment can not exist with any special manifestation without the understanding. The latter furnishes the materials, or facts, upon which the former acts. It furnishes to the judgment that which is capable of being analyzed, abstracted, classified, or generalzied. With a well-developed understanding, we may have distinct and vivid conceptions of objects presented to the mind; but if the judgment is deficient, we can not properly discriminate between them in marking the features of difference, and in bringing such difference, or differences, into the decision, each one contributing to the final decision or conclusion. 3. The understanding only knows objects as they really exist, and as they are presented to the mind; but the *judgment must discriminate* by arranging them together, and by evolving those things which agree or disagree; and it depends upon this power to give a decision accordingly and correctly. 4. The judgment, then, must be *that* which has power to determ-

ine, or of decision ; but, in another point of light, its action, in connection with a mental apparition, is the recognition of facts, feelings, and differences in the relations of things presented to the mind, which are the objects of conception, or are made known to the understanding. By its action we are impressed with the relations of resemblance, and of dissimilarities which may, or does, exist between two objects, and can arrive at a conclusion in regard to them. 5. Judgment, properly exercised, is connected with the *various mental operations* guiding them to the discovery and knowledge of truth. It enables us to compare facts with facts, feelings with feelings, and truths with truths, weighing their bearings, relations, tendencies, and differences, and to give to each its proper importance, or influence, in the final conclusion: hence the importance of a fully-developed and well-regulated judgment. By it we can be rendered safe in life, can judge properly of men and things, and pass above and beyond the sorrow which so often rafterns the moral condition of earth with prison environs, and vails the spiritual sky with augmenting darkness; closing out true happiness from perishing thousands.

SECTION III.

1. The *action* of the faculty of judgment is so closely connected with reason, that a reference to the one may aid in explaining the other. Reason embraces the ground of an opinion, or the premises of an argument upon, and from which the argument is based, and carefully carried through to the con-

clusion. The judgment appears to inspect this process, and weighs the facts presented in the different objects so as to decide upon them, or the correctness of the conclusion of an argument, by deciding upon all the facts involved in the argument, even to the correctness of the premises, unless such premises be free from confusion or doubt, and then the judgment must approve of the same. That the judgment is really and only reason is absurd. Reason, unaided by judgment, does not appear to know any thing but the premises and conclusion, with the regular argument, or successive steps in going from the one to the other, while the judgment appears to decide upon the truthfulness and the amount of weight that should be attached to all the facts, together with the justness of the conclusion. 2. Under the *active power* of the judgment may be comprehended the relations of properties or qualities of entities by which they are distinguished and recognized. The geologist marks the differences of the earth's strata, containing the archives of its own periods and ages. In this way the lapidarian detects the agreement or disagreement of the properties and particles which are consolidated in the mountain cliffs and crags, which defy the wastings of time or the violence of storms. This is also true of the zoologist and ornithologist, in regard to certain characteristics of the different tribes, or divisions of those vast families of existences. 3. A *correct* development of the relations of resemblances, and a satisfactory knowledge of the same, depends very much on a *vivid* judgment. Here is the power of arranging the relations of resemblances, and of classifying prop-

erly, by discriminating the certain number of substances or properties necessary to class them together as one species. The correctness of all such arrangements, of individuals forming the genus or properties of the compound, or existences of classes, with the elements of differences, relations of resemblances, and analogy, embracing the points or degrees in which there is a difference, depends upon a well-developed and active judgment.

SECTION IV.

1. We may readily decompose a compound, but it requires the *presence of the judgment* in attending to the agreement or disagreement of the properties and the relations of resemblances—the natural adaptation and agreement of the parts to each other and to the whole. It is the work of the judgment to clearly discriminate these facts, and to so satisfy the mind in regard to them. Reason may connect or follow a chain of truths in arriving at conclusions, but it requires the exercise of judgment in satisfying the mind in relation to them, so as to produce uniformity of our belief, purpose, and action. 2. The *character* and relations involved in regard to cause and effect can only fully be recognized through the medium of the *judgment*. If the nature or qualities of a cause are known, then it requires the exercise, or an act of judgment in forming an opinion of the nature or character of the approaching effect or pending result. The exercise of this faculty is especially necessary to prevent confusion, in case of joint causes, followed by a

common effect, or, if there be joint effects, of a common cause. There may be sequences introduced to our notice, which will require us, from their character, or nature, or relations, to look for, and judge of, the true antecedents or causes, as well as the forming of an opinion of the character of the results. 3. The truthfulness of axioms, and the relations of angles and propositions, are *objects of the judgment*. If we say that all axioms which lie at the foundation of mathematical science are self-evident truths, and are incapable of either proof or disproof, it requires the exercise of the judgment in order to receive them as such free from doubt. Otherwise, doubt and confusion would pervade all our efforts in acquiring knowledge, and in relying on them as true. 4. The skill and success of a physician greatly depends upon *this faculty*, or mental power. He must be able to judge of the symptoms by which a disease may be known, though they may resemble those of other diseases, as well as the effect of certain remedies upon disease, and upon different physical constitutions. Without judgment we can not foretell the probable result of an action under particular circumstances, and on different kinds of objects; but in this way we are enabled to arrive at truth, and know it to be such from a careful discrimination of the facts which are evolved, and the approval of conscience.

SECTION V.

1. The *action* of the judgment is essential in regard to our knowledge of intellectual science. It

is the process or method of judging correctly of the facts evolved in argumentation, or events and relations, giving due weight to each one in the final result. The power of memory may call up an extensive array of facts, but judgment must form them into classes, genus, or combinations, or it must abstract them according to the various elements or points of difference connected with each or all of them. 2. Decisions may be true or false, in proportion to the clearness and distinctness with which we *judge* in weighing all the facts and influences connected with the premises, argument, and conclusion. He who arrives at conclusions upon slight, partial, or imperfect evidence, and is unwilling to admit of corrective facts, will be almost invariably wrong in his decisions. If, with pure motive, he attempts to regulate his own conduct, and is not guided by a proper judgment, he is liable to be led by the most hasty impressions or feelings, which will lead him to quick and rash conclusions, too often only to lament the want of proper and timely consideration; or, having formed his opinions, he is more tenacious and arbitrary in regard to them than the man of sound judgment; therefore, we should be careful to form our opinions with care, properly judging of all the facts which would naturally lead to sound results. 3. This *principle, or power*, appears to be of universal adaptation, whether it be applied to the investigation of scientific truths, or the affairs connected with every day's occurrences or events. It pre-eminently aids in deriving from all sources of facts that which is essential to correct motives, acts, and conclusions connected with our belief, and the

rule of right. When our conclusions are thus formed with care and deliberation, we should always be free to be influenced by new facts as correctives, yet we should first know them to be true within themselves.

SECTION VI.

1. A great *natural defect* in the judging power is incurable. There are some minds which are wanting in the power of reason, and are unskilled in the strict exercise of attention. Such minds are easily shaken in their conclusions; whenever new facts are urged, whether they are legitimately connected with the subject or not, they are ever changing. But by care and repeated efforts the want of attention may, in a great measure, be corrected, and the power of judging become more perfect. There are others whose judgment is so deficient that they hastily form an opinion from the first evidence, however imperfect or deceptions it may be, with a stubborn firmness; and then, with such, all arguments or facts, which may be brought as correctives, are to them not only worthless, but aggravating. If their motive be pure, they may escape, while their work is lost; but if their motive be uniformly impure, there is but little or no hope; for it is impossible to remedy a radical defect of judgment by any kind of training or education. 2. In order to *judge correctly*, all selfish motives and feelings should be buried a million of feet under ground; then all the facts connected with the case should be carefully and impartially considered, and due weight of each

and all should contribute to the final decision.. Decisions made in this way are worthy of confidence. 3. Connected with the power of judging is the *process of classification*, which embodies an idea not only of the power, but of the act of forming into classes, or of distributing into sets of classes. 4. This may take place in the mind, to some extent, *involuntarily*. When no special mental effort is put forth, the qualities of some contingent existent, under the law of resemblances, may give rise to a state of mind embracing realities as such.

SECTION VII.

1. In certain respects classification may be regarded as necessary, when it arises in connection with our conceptions of primary facts or self-evident truths; and if our attention is attracted by a tree, it exists in common with all trees: hence it requires the exercise of a *special power* to discriminate the differences, and to classify so that it may be distinctly an object of clear perception and thought, and that power is the judgment. Then qualities or properties may be the immediate work of classification, which can not be correctly arranged without the special discriminating action of the judgment.
2. In certain respects the work of abstraction is *connected* with the power of judging. The mind takes cognizance of the character of the qualities or elements of objects through the medium of the judgment, by which the properties are abstracted and arranged under the clear conceptions of their natural differences. Henceforth an abstract ele-

ment can be a special object of thought without involving the obscurity of the compound, or mass, whence it was evolved or eliminated. 3. Generalization is, in part, connected with the *power* and *action* of the judgment; for the power of correctly reducing particulars to generals, or to their genera, must be exercised with a due reference to those features, or qualities, which would designate them as naturally belonging to a certain class or combination. Such properties of differences, or of agreement, must be determined by the judgment. In this way we determine that a fact is general by finding it in each member of a certain class of existences, and we determine, in a similar way, that facts are not general when they are found only in certain members of different classes. 4. The act of judging may be *preceded* by perception. We may have perception of a variety or a mass of objects which, at first, are apprehended in a confused way, but by comparing the appearance, or qualities of properties, we are enabled to decide upon them without doubt: hence we arrive at general conclusions from their applicability to each and all of the entities of any one, or of each particular class, which are the immediate objects of mental action.

SECTION VIII.

1. The faculty or power of judging *differs* from *that* of the understanding. The understanding seems to know notions or objects as they appear, but it requires the exercise of judgment to abstract

or classify according to natural principles and differences, so we can have a clear and real knowledge of their existence. That which is the object of the understanding is that which is decided upon by a well-developed judgment. If the power of the understanding be vigorous and well developed, and that of the judgment radically deficient, the mind will have experienced the presence of many facts without the power of combining them, so as to have distinct and decisive use of them: hence the knowledge of many things, but the control of almost none of them to advantage. 2. The *power* of judging is closely connected with *that of suggestion*. The latter consists in the first intimation, or presentation, of a fact or ideas to the mind, but the former has decisive power in regard to them, which proceeds upon the notice of, and the influence or weight of all the differences compared and balanced. The action of the power of judging is clearly different and distinct from that of suggestion. 3. The power and action of *relative suggestion* is not one and the same with *that of judgment*. The former takes place when the mind experiences the first effects, or influences, which arise out of the certain relations that different objects mutually sustain to each other. The making known to the mind, merely, the first intimations of mutual relationship may be called relative suggestion, but it requires an act of judgment to decide upon the causes of these relations, and the importance that should be attached to each, or all the facts connected with them; and we can not have clear conceptions of them, and a distinctive command over them, only as it is given

by the correct exercise of judgment. That the judgment only acts under the controlling influence of suggestion, or that of relative suggestion, is absurd; but it has the natural right, and does act upon and in regard to all the facts or influences which are the objects of mental action, being embraced in the power of suggestion, or of relative suggestion. And it is clearly and unquestionably true that it differs from them both as to its nature and office in the mind. 4. The importance of a *well-developed and active judgment* is incalculable. The acquisition of knowledge, and a right use of it, in adding to our own happiness and to the happiness of others, depends upon it. If we are deficient in regard to the power of this faculty, we never can act with that degree of prudence and discretion that the laws of propriety and right require; but with a mature and well-regulated judgment we are furnished with facts from all sources, together with an unshaken belief in, and command of them, upon which we can depend with the utmost confidence, and can arrange either to hide from the dangers and storms of earth, or to triumph over and beyond their power.

Division Seventh.

CHAPTER I.

REASON.

SECTION I.

1. REASON is a faculty of the mind, having power to act, or of remaining at rest. It is connected with the intuitive elements of our being, and can be cultivated so as to increase its power of vividness in action, but it is impossible for its origin to be the result of education. It is that principle of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from error, and good from evil. In the exercise of this function of the mind other faculties appear to harmonize, and can be called into action as auxiliaries in the investigation of truth, and in distinguishing between that which is correct and that which is false. With the power, and the correct exercise of reason, the mind is capable of deducing inferences or results from facts or from propositions. 2. *This principle* enables us to allege or assert, with confidence, the ground or cause of opinion upon which is to be built the elements of argumentation, or facts leading from the cause to the conclusion. It aids in the selection and use of that kind of facts and positions in the argument which naturally support and justify the final conclusion or result. 3. *Ratiocination*

can not exist without a power competent to be the foundation of such action, or exercise of reason. It is this power which enables us to arrive at a knowledge of the process of demonstration, both as to the facts involved and the correctness of the process. The reception of, and our confidence in the facts as true within themselves, together with the results, depends upon the power and correct action of reason.

4. *Reason* appears to be the foundation upon, or in the power of which rests ideas or facts for the purpose of correct arrangements, and the right use of thoughts and arguments. It leads to the development of primary principles in nature, and the exploring of hidden fields of truth. It invests the mind with power to define, to some extent, the powers of our being, and rises by and through connected chains of facts, from nature up to a real belief in the existence and power of a sovereign Creator and Ruler of the universe.

SECTION II.

1. *Reason* is not only a power existing in the mind, but it is a power capable of action. It is a faculty capable of acting, and such action is reasoning when appropriate facts are involved as materials of argumentation, and influences and results are correctly deducted from the premises. Reason, as to its natural and real existence in the mind, is correct, and so we may regard it when in action; for we can not have conceptions of incorrect reasoning. The judgment will admit of degrees, but the moment reason is incorrect it ceases to be reason.

The chain of facts is broken, or the relation of effect to cause, or of cause to effect, is unjointed, and the action of reason being intercepted, ceases to be either reason or reasonable. 2. Reason, in another sense, is to *examine, discuss, or support by facts*, connected in argumentation. Nothing can be received by us as true which opposes the dictates of reason. It is utterly impossible for us, at one and the same time, to receive truth and error, or that of correct and false propositions; but certain truths and correct propositions, at first, may appear deceptions or false; yet often, when they are traced out in their proper connection, or chain of facts, in argumentative form, we become satisfied that they are correct. 3. *Reason differs from the understanding.* The latter is that which apprehends and embraces things presented to it, but reason proceeds, in the investigation, to the certain knowledge of their real existence and character. Notions may arise with, or be given by the understanding, but reason enables the mind to investigate the truthfulness of them, or to know that which is true and that which is false. The understanding can not blend those things which are presented, involving such things, or truths, in a certain connected train, in order to give a knowledge of the real results, as well as the correctness of the steps taken in arriving at such a conclusion; but reason can bring all into the account, and arrive at certain conclusions and a knowledge of them. 4. Our ideas of *right and wrong* are tested by reason, with the exception of axioms or self-evident truths, both in matter and mind. They are received by us as truths without reasons

either for or against them; for we are incapable of reasoning in regard to them; yet the intuitive, self-evident truths, which are the foundation of mind, receive self-evident truths as such, independent of proof in any way. All our ideas of other facts, or existences, are, or can be, tested by reason, and, by the same process, our knowledge of them be matured.

SECTION III.

1. The power of reason *exists in the mind*, and is connected with its intuitive faculties. Its origin is neither the result of habit nor of education, and the objects of its action can not be numbered. 2. There are certain *intuitive facts*, and self-evident truths, which can not be tested by reason. Such self-evident existences are in the mind, and lie at the foundation of reason; but their truthfulness can not be tested by reason. Reason in action advances from one fact, or degree, to another, founding the one upon the other, till we reach the conclusion. And in tracing the chain of connected facts from the conclusion backward, we will arrive at primary facts, or self-evident truths, both in the existence of mind and matter. All such truths can not be made known to us by any kind of reasoning or proof, for they are incapable of either. 3. Self-evident truths may be divided into *two classes*: (1.) Those truths which lie at the *foundation* of the philosophy of mind; and, (2.) Those truths which belong to, and are connected with, the *science* which appertains to *external* things. The axioms, or self-evident truths,

upon which the whole of mathematical science stands, or is based, are incapable of either proof or disproof; yet we are compelled to receive them, and to receive them as facts, independently of any power of reason; therefore, what power is capable of receiving the primary, self-evident facts which lie at the foundation of all external science or knowledge, but the intuitive, self-evident elements which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind?

4. *These intuitive principles* are the foundation and origin of all knowledge to us: hence intuitive internal facts, or elements, with our feelings and experience, are to be depended upon as true with more absolute certainty than the knowledge of all external things; for the latter are tested by and through the medium of the senses, which may deceive us by reason of their connection, often, with diseased physical nerves, while internal feelings, or facts, are objects of direct knowledge, without the interception of physical elements, which may be imperfect or diseased so as to deceive us.

5. All self-evident facts are not, and they are incapable of being, the *results* of reason in any way. They are received by us with a conviction of infallible certainty. Though incapable of either proof or disproof, yet they are received by us, and are known to be true. It is utterly impossible for any one to doubt their existence, or their truthfulness, and all men are guided by them in the acts of life. Such facts, or truths, are received as such by the intuitive powers of our existence, independently of all proof.

SECTION IV.

1. A knowledge of *our own existence* arises in connection with the power and action of the primary elements of the mind. Self-evident truths, which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind, have power to affirm and know our own existence; and in their existence and power we have knowledge of all other facts within the bounds of mental action. With them arises the conviction of our own existence; and being identified with their being and nature, it is utterly impossible for us to avoid the knowledge of our real entity. With the same powers arises the conviction as to the distinct nature of the mind from the body, and that the mind is capable of thinking and acting without the aid of the material organs. Knowledge implies a power capable of knowing, and objects capable of being known. Those elements which are capable of experiencing a conviction of their own existence, and that of other existences, may be regarded as primary, self-evident principles. 2. These truths are unchanging in their *essence* and *nature of action* within themselves. Our physical powers are continually changing, and the same may be said to be true, to some extent, of elements tested by the senses; but a knowledge of all these changes is realized by the unchanging intuitive powers of the mind. Facts tested in this way are of direct knowledge, and can not admit of either sophistry or doubt; therefore our knowledge of the existence of our own minds as certain, is more absolute in nature than the knowledge we can have of our material

being, or of any thing beyond that of self. 3. In these self-evident, primary elements of the mind is contained the *power of receiving* and of *knowing* self-evident truths, or axioms, in external things, or that lie at the foundation of all scientific demonstrations and knowledge beyond that of self. If we can not depend upon the internal being, convictions, feelings, and processes of the mind, it is utterly impossible for us to have real knowledge of any fact or existent beyond the self-bounds of the mind. 4. In the intuitive being and power of the mind *arises* the conviction and belief of our *personal identity*. Present mental states, or internal affections and feelings, are the occasion of the calling up of past mental states, or feelings, each or all existing in the same mind, and at the same time, imparting the idea of duration to the same sentient being, and the certainty of the sameness of that which was present, or was capable of commanding and retaining such knowledge. Change belongs to all physical entities, and the various acts of the mind; but amid every and all possible abbreviations, or changes, the sentient being experiences and retains a certain conviction that spiritual self does not, and can not change, but must ever be the same in essence; and, with this conviction and knowledge, all our notions of external things are regulated. 5. Connected with the power of reason *arises the notion that every result must have a cause*. It is natural for us to experience a conviction of cause from effect, and to have an idea of the character of the cause from the magnitude or nature of the result. The uniform and natural tendency is, that the same cause under

the same laws will have a similar or the same effect. If there were no uniformity in these things, we could have no confidence in the laws regulating external things; therefore, accident would be the only law regulating all objects of external knowledge. We have intuitively a conviction, confidence, and belief in the uniformity existing as to degrees, nature, and character involved in the relations of antecedents and sequences, of causes and effects; and to doubt these is contrary to nature and all experience, and is utterly impossible.

CHAPTER II.
REASON, CONTINUED.

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SECTION I.

1. In connection with the power of reason is our *confidence in the uniformity* of the laws of nature. The cognizance of the exactness, or uniform manner in the succession of phenomena, evolving the relations of sequences and antecedents, of effect and cause, gives rise to a conviction and notion of their order and obedience to law, all of which enters into our experience and knowledge. The origin of such a conviction is connected with intuitive power. Experience, guided by reason, enables us to apply it to the proper objects, or process, in successive events.
2. Our immediate confidence in the *uniformity of phenomena* gives origin to the notion of causation. The regular tendency of one event to follow another, becoming or affecting an abiding experience, gives rise to the conviction that the former is that of cause, and the latter is the result or effect. We then regard the cause as adequate to the effect. The next item is, to notice the character or nature of both cause and effect, and if these uniformly harmonize, we come to the conclusion that the same cause, under the same laws, will invariably produce the same effect. This uniformity must be thoroughly tested by experience, so as to prevent deception in regard to the various phenomena.
3. *Reason*

must be present in forming correct conclusions in regard to complicated, or complex and extensive natural tendencies, or operations. The first effort to contemplate such a mass of realities may be attended with confusion; but by extending the effort so as to embrace the entire mass, we are impressed with a uniform tendency. Yonder waves a beautiful forest. The different kinds and sizes of the trees, at first sight, present a confused scene of grandeur. Some individual trees will soon be taken away; but the idea of the forest growing continually, and that it can continue to exist in the future, can not be doubted, for this accords with reason and experience. The seasons, for some length of time, may vary, but our observation in relation to these changes, for several years, gives rise to the belief that, in the lapse of a still greater number of years, there will be conformity to a general law and a remarkable uniformity. It has been observed, with some degree of certainty, that from two to three cold winters succeed each other, then there will be about as many of milder temperature. The same has been thought to be true in regard to very hot or cool summers. Another opinion has been partially settled in regard to wet and dry years, that the weather graduates to the two extremes about every four years. Amid all these changes, there appears to be a conformity to something like general laws, a knowledge of which seems to have been based upon experience, and guided by reason. 4. When the *uniformity* of natural entities exist and conform to general laws, and a conviction of such facts enters into our experience, we are then enabled to detect

results which are contrary to regular laws. Such deviations can easily be made the objects of mental action, and such incidental or contingent causes, diminishing or interrupting the results, can be ascertained, and a reoccurrence prevented. In this way dangers can be detected, and even foreseen, reasoning from natural relations and tendencies; and often life, safety, and happiness are preserved in lieu of such dangers, or even temporal death. 5. There are *laws* regulating mind, but our knowledge of its conformity and uniformity thereto is attended with greater uncertainty than is our knowledge of the conformity and uniformity of matter to the laws by which it is regulated. Physical elements, existing without self-motive and self-action, can not evade or deprecate the force and authority of the laws by which they are governed; and, under all circumstances, such elements are subject to the investigating action of the mind. But sentient beings can evade and deceive, so as to render the true analysis of mental phenomena more obscure; yet mind and the laws under which it acts, are as true within themselves, and can be depended upon as such with as much certainty as any thing that appertains to the material world.

SECTION II.

1. *Self-evident truths*, either in mind or matter, which are the objects of belief and confidence, without being capable of either proof or disproof, are necessarily involved in all mental processes in guiding to correct conclusions; for it is impossible not to

believe them ; and an appeal to consciousness is all that is necessary in order to know that they are received by us as true. 2. The *power* of reason within itself can contain and command a certain number of truths, and as to their truthfulness no reason or evidence can be given, and none is required. And unless we admit that the intuitive elements of the mind contain power to receive self-evident truths as such, without proof, either in regard to mind or matter, it is utterly impossible for there to be any such thing as reason, reasoning, or knowledge in any or all created intelligences ; for if all truths could only be known, or made known to us by proof, then all knowledge would begin with proof ; and then proof would have to extend to infinity, which is impossible, as they are numerous, and, therefore, can not be infinities within themselves ; and the mind, being finite, could not use them in proof of ulterior facts. 3. The *conduct* of all persons shows their *belief* in the existence of primary truths, whether they acknowledge or deny such existences. No skeptical philosopher can proceed in the investigation of any fact without involving a reference, and clear evidence of his belief in their existence, though he may deny the same at every step or degree of his argument. If he is in quest of some primary truth, the absence of which would soon involve him in sufferings or death, it would be revolting to all his feelings to be informed that there was no such thing in existence ; and his dismay would be augmented if he should be reminded that to prove such an existent, is that he own his own existence to be utterly impossible.

How can he prove origin to self-knowledge, or the beginning in which he knows his own existence to be real? Without confidence in such settled facts, how could he contemplate *that* which, from the regular chain of such truths, will affect his interest or happiness in the future, or be certain that the pain he had received, in time past, was experienced by the same person, called by his name, and which he now thinks to be himself? 4. If he looks upon a beautifully-finished tower, it is natural for the mind to run back to the *beginning*, at the foundation, and to inquire as to the process of building, and also as to who the builder was. Notwithstanding he is assured by thousands that it exists without a cause, builder, or beginning, which would accord with his avowed faith, yet an internal, intuitive conviction would appeal to his understanding, and thunder the perpetual lie to such defective assertions. In all cases, those who labor to deny first truths are wholly dependent upon them for facts by which they are rendered capable of doubting or of denying the very truths which are the foundation of all the knowledge their minds are capable of.

SECTION III.

1. There is a difference between the *process of argumentation* and the mere *action* of the reasoning power, in arriving at primary truths. The mind, which is capable of correct argumentation, has power to evolve facts by basing one upon another, or by connecting them in a correct chain from the first to the final result. This requires natural ac-

tivity and cogent habits of mental discipline. These gifts and acquirements are possessed only by few persons; but the action of reason, in connection with our reception and belief of first truths, is natural, and common to all rational minds; and it is impossible for them to doubt their intuitive convictions in regard to them. It is natural and easy for us to believe that an effect must have an adequate cause. When we look on the trembling fires of yonder heavens, we believe in a great First Cause, and see the power and design of Deity as written in the existing flower, rustling leaf, burning sun, or flying orbs. 2. *Reason differs from consciousness*, the latter being the knowledge of mental operations and of sensations, or that act of the mind which makes known internal objects or feelings. The former evolves and connects facts in arriving at results, and apprehends truths necessary, absolute, and universal. 3. Its *power differs* from that of the senses. The latter may be regarded as the medium through which sensations make their appeal to the mind; but the former commands the energies of the mind in amplifying its research, and in extending its knowledge. 4. *It differs* from the judgment. It appertains to the latter to discriminate, combine, and decide upon the truthfulness of that which is used in argumentation, and also the relations of facts and the correctness of that state, and each position of the argument; but it requires the presence and action of reason to properly connect this chain, and in forming a correct process and conclusion. The origin of such action is found in intuition. 5. *Reason differs*, also, from the under-

standing. The latter apprehends the real state of that which is presented to it, or is the power of believing; while the former leads to a satisfactory result, or a certain knowledge.

SECTION IV.

1. In connection with the power of reason arises *convictions* in relation to *right* and *wrong*. The mind is capable of being influenced, and has intuitive power to act in reference to, and in distinguishing between good or bad, right or wrong. An intuitive influence affects the mind favorably in regard to right, and deters it in relation to evil. It has power, also, not only to be influenced, but to act in exploring or in demonstrating that which is right or wrong. This introduces us into the process of reasoning. 2. We soon know, from *experience*, that when we perform certain acts, we have the approval of conscience, and are entitled to a peaceful reward; and in the performance of other acts, our consciences are disturbed, and we can only expect punishment. When that which is good is involved in the action of reason, there will be a corresponding result; and when that which is bad or impure fills the steps or degrees of argumentation, there will be a corresponding bad result. 3. *This intuitive conviction, influence, and self-affirming power of the mind, in regard to right and wrong, is universal.* All rational intelligences are endowed with it, whether they are under the light of Christianity, or are under the cloud of heathenism. In every soul conscience exists, and intuitions arise and act in

reference to that which is good and evil. Such is our nature as ordered and wisely arranged by the great First Cause. All men are endowed with power to adhere to this light, and, through the assistance of Divine grace, to be saved in heaven; and none are under an absolute necessity of being doomed to irresistible and irretrievable sorrow. 4. In connection with the power of reason, we may experience, or have, to some extent, ideas of that which is *beautiful or sublime*. Many objects of the same class may differ in degree of beauty: that in each one which approaches nearest the most perfect one, or to our conceptions of a perfect model, requires the presence and action of reason, in arriving to a correct equilibrium, or balancing of them, and to just conclusions. The descriptions of an orator may surpass the perfections of that which forms the object of his descriptions. The painter may surpass the natural beauties of the landscape, or the graphic sublimity of some occurrence or reality. The arrangement and regularity of these must require the presence and action of reason. When defects exist with the beautiful in any object, or that which agrees or disagrees with a perfect model, we must be aided with the power of reason in giving each its legitimate place and weight, or the whole would be contemplated with confusion.

CHAPTER III.

REASONING.

SECTION I.

1. REASONING is the power of reason in action. It is, then, the act or process of exercising the faculty of reason, in and by which new or unknown propositions or facts are deduced from previous ones, and previous facts are established from the relation and character of their results or effects. 2. *The correct exercise* of reason is destructive to *atheism*, or the *foundation of infidelity*. We know that an effect can not exist without a cause, and we can not believe in a cause that is inadequate to the effect which follows it. Universal existences all around us confirm our belief in the existence of a great First Cause; and the idea of such a cause, or Being, is a first truth of reason. 3. *Two modes* of argumentation will settle and confirm our belief. The *first* evidence or proofs are drawn from the *necessity* that such a being must exist independently of the evidences which are every-where written upon his works. The *second* embraces proofs or evidences of his being and perfections as given in his works. We now proceed to examine these two modes of argumentation.

SECTION II.

1. If there be *no one being* in infinite space but such as might possibly not have had a being, it would follow that there might possibly have never been any existent: hence the possibility that such an entity might have arisen from nonentity. This is impossible. Then it is impossible that there might have been no existence in any way; therefore, an impossibility of not existing must be true, and there must have been a being whose non-existence is impossible, otherwise the truthfulness of all reason and knowledge would be reversed. 2. All the *essence* and *attributes* of an unoriginated being must be unoriginated, and necessarily self-existent. Such an essence, or being, can not give origin to its own attributes, unless it had power to act before it existed, which would be impossible. Such a being must be real, absolute, self-existing, and eternal; for any thing finite, or contingent, must have a cause which would be anterior, and show that such a finity, or contingent, could not be causation nor eternal. 3. *The attributes* of an unoriginated being must be absolute and limitless, otherwise they would be imperfect or limited, and that would involve a modifying cause; but no such cause can be acknowledged, as such a cause would be imperfect. But the cause of which we speak, being perfect, lies back of all things, and may be styled the cause of causes, being infinite or eternal. No modifying cause can be allowed, as such a one could not be absolute in perfection, and could not be eternal; and all imperfect attributes, or any attribute which

is not infinitely perfect within itself, is finite to some degree, and must be capable of greater perfection by improvement, exercise, and experience. This would prove imperfection in an unoriginated being, and that he was perfecting his attributes and existence by self-action, experience, and a further acquaintance with his own works. His being, and each attribute, must be perfect and unoriginated.

4. Such an unoriginated and infinite being *must exist every-where*, in the same way and manner he does any where, otherwise there must be a cause by which his existence and presence is limited. But there is and can be no cause limiting the existence, action, or presence of Deity; for there can not be but one first cause, which cause, from necessity, must be unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and eternal. It is utterly impossible for us to have conception of more than one infinite space, and beyond this thought can not travel; neither can we have any idea of any out border, or limitation to the innumerable worlds which are the result of a cause lying still back of their origin and motion. Then if there is only one infinite space, it can contain only one infinite series of points in that limitless space; therefore, that reality which is capable of filling each point in infinite space must be indivisible, one, and infinite. As two or more infinite beings can not occupy one and the same infinite space, filled with only one series of infinite points, without being one and the same being, therefore there is one, and only one unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and eternal cause and Governor of the universe.

SECTION III.

1. *This unoriginated being* must be a reality, precisely the same in every place, not consisting of parts, as they would naturally exist independently; nor of whole, for that would imply a combination of parts; nor of degree, as that would signify imperfection and quantity with comparison; therefore, this being is one and omnipresent, without any thing like degrees, comparison, or limitation. He exists, and can be, and is to every one an object of belief and knowledge, naturally resulting from an intuitive conviction within us so effectually, and ever making its internal appeals to conscience, reason, and judgment, that it is naturally impossible to indulge a conscientious doubt. 2. Such a being can not be *materiality*, for this would come under the laws which govern it, and would have density, divisibility, form with limitation. Non-entity can not give origin to matter; and matter which is limited can not give origin to matter, for it contains no power of self-action; much less could it produce an existent with self-cogitative power, being within and of itself unthinking. That which is naturally inert, and utterly incapable of self-action, can not produce itself or any other inert element; and if a portion of matter was eternal, it could not originate other inert elements, much less give origin to self-acting and cogitative intelligences. 3. If *matter* and *motion* were both eternal, and could be connected together, yet they never could produce a cogitative mind. Matter and motion, though changed or varied in any possible way, yet

the particles could only meet, impel, and resist each other; and they have no power to do more. It is impossible for matter to originate any thing, being inert. Then, if nothing were eternal, matter could never have had origin, as it could not result from nothing. If matter without motion were eternal, then motion could never have a beginning; for matter has no self-motion, and inertness is essential to its nature and being. If only matter and motion are eternal, then thought or intellectual action could never have a being; for matter, either at rest or in motion, can not originate, within and of itself, self-action, cogitation, and knowledge; neither is it capable, abstractly, within and of itself, to act and feel joy, pleasure, or grief. These differ from any properties or qualities of matter, and are superior to them. Then the first being must be infinite, and must have self-power to act, think, foresee, and arrange the beginning and real existence of all finite things; and that which is first of all things must really possess, of necessity, absolute perfections, as nothing which is essential to such an existent could ever be added; for that which was added would be finite, and in this respect imperfect, and would be created. 4. Such a being must possess *wisdom* and *power* without limitation, and all other *attributes* must be, within themselves, absolutely perfect. Real or natural attributes are considered as belonging to the essence or nature of a being, and are essential to the nature of such an existent. There are no attributes of Deity ideal, casual, or contingent. All his attributes are unlimited and eternal: hence nothing can exist without his knowledge, or

be sustained without his omnipotent power. For an atheist to have ever lived without conscious misgivings as to the soundness of his doctrine, is utterly impossible.

SECTION IV.

1. The *existence of more than one* unoriginated being in the universe, or the same infinite space, is utterly impossible. Such a being is possessed of infinite attributes, and must, of necessity, be present in every point in infinity. A second unoriginated being must be equal to the first in every respect, as both must, necessarily, be eternal, from the fact that they are unoriginated; therefore, as there can be only one infinity to be occupied or filled by them, that infinity can be no more than perfectly filled; and those two unoriginated and infinite beings must, necessarily, be the same in essence or nature, everywhere present, incapable of any distinction or dissimilarity, and, of absolute necessity, they would have to be one and the same. To suppose the existence of any but one such infinite and eternal Being is absurd, and to try to contemplate a second or third, is only contemplating, as far as is possible for us, the existence and attributes of one and the same being. 2. *All inferior or subordinate existences*, in any respect, or degree, have their existence curtailed by finity, and their origin must, necessarily, take place within the compass of duration; and, as such, they are all wholly dependent upon the great First Cause for their existence. There can only be one unoriginated essence or being in

the universe, or in infinite space. 3. *All finite existences*, becoming entities within the bounds of duration, or aside and apart from that which is eternal, implies a cause of their existence. It is impossible for them to originate themselves, not being self-existent; and that which is self-existent is eternal, and that which is eternal is unoriginated, one and the same. All finite existences owe their being to the great First Cause, which Cause, so far as we can understand, was under no possible obligations to constitute them real entities. 4. The *absolute*, or *omnipotent power* of Deity, does not make his acts either *arbitrary* or of *necessity*. They are free in their nature and power, and are with effort, otherwise such acts would be of necessity, which necessity would be the cause, and not the free power of absolute perfections in unison. What he willeth he can do, yet nothing is done by him only that which is right. He is too wise to err, and too good to be unkind.

SECTION V.

1. His omnipotence does not *necessitate* his knowledge; yet he knows all things, and there is nothing hid from him. Necessity would imply something that was, or is yet to be explored by him; whereas, if there is any thing which he would not choose to know, as contingent or otherwise, it would imply that he must first know what that is before he would choose not to know it. 2. He has power to act, and such action must be according to *liberty* or *perfect freedom*. As all his perfections are infinite, none

of his acts can be originated by contingent or outward causes: hence, the oneness in the harmony of his limitless attributes, and the infinity of his goodness and absolute holiness, can not be connected with action contrary to his infinite power, wisdom, purity, and truth. 3. He has *infinite wisdom* in the exercise of his knowledge and power, and infinite goodness in the perfection of all his acts. 4. *From reason* we may infer that the object of man's existence was to share of the endless goodness of God; his duty was to glorify his Creator; and that the performance of this duty wholly depends upon volition; therefore, he must be created free to serve and glorify God. If such service was of necessity, or by requisition, then such requisition would be the agent in rendering glory, while man would be passive: hence, the object of our being would have been cut off by law, and, of course, our existence would have been impossible. Then, if we are at liberty to hold a merciful relation to our Creator, a perversion of the same liberty will deprive us of happiness.

CHAPTER IV.
REASONING, CONTINUED.

SECTION I.

1. WE now proceed to the *second mode of reasoning*, which is to establish or to prove the existence of Deity, by arguing from *effect to cause*. This process exemplifies the power and action of reason, and tends to strengthen our confidence in the correctness of argumentation, and also leads us to a confirmed belief in the conclusions made, and in the facts established, from incontestable evidences or proof. 2. Our conceptions of a being of *infinite power* and *wisdom* would naturally lead us to suppose such power and wisdom would be evidenced in the variety, multiplicity, agreement, dependence, mystery, and design which exist in, and in connection with all his works. That which we can comprehend, and those things which we can not comprehend, are alike characteristic of his power and wisdom, and are evidences of his being. 3. If the divine Being is an *unoriginated and infinite Spirit*, he can not be made known to us as such through the medium of the senses only, and that abstractly, or without any aid or evidence from material existences. Spirit may be manifested to spirit, but spirit can not be manifested to spirit through the medium of our senses, and without any aid or evidence contained in materiality. The great unoriginated Spirit

manifests himself to us through the medium of our senses by material existences. Spirit and matter might exist independently of each other, so far as we can determine; but material elements, or existences, the objects of our senses, may be used as evidences proving the existence of spirit. The existence of inert matter as a result is evidence of a competent self-acting cause. 4. There is evidence of the *wisdom and power* of Deity in the different systems of innumerable orbs which glow in the heavens. The order, distances, velocity, gravitation, and centripetal forces; the diurnal and orbicular motions, all of these are conclusive evidences of the wisdom, power, and existence of God; for these things are neither of self-origin nor accidental. 5. *The earth* contains, in its own structure, *evidences* of the presence and power of an infinite Creator. Its internal structure contains the archives of its own periods and ages. Vegetation upon its surface is mysteriously promoted by the circulation of nutritious properties elevated by capillary influences, forming liginous fibers, or is consolidated in trunks, boughs, and leaves. The delicate fibers and glowing tints of almost an endless variety of flowers, can only be regarded as so many evidences of the wisdom and goodness of the great Creator. 6. The *laws of inert matter*, or elements, could never arrange and preserve the orders of genera and species, without which the world would be confusion. All these are so many marks of infinite skill, wisdom, and goodness.

SECTION II.

1. There is evidence of the existence of Deity in the *order of providence*, which meets the demands of all animated or self-moving beings—the regular return of the seasons, the descending rain, and warming sun, each year yielding a sufficiency, and not too much. These things are out of the common onward course of nature, and, to a certain extent, they are miraculous, as there is no law contained in matter that can originate them or govern them without settled uniformity. 2. *Life, sleep, vision, and muscular action* are evidences, and furnish positive proof of the *existence* of Deity. It is utterly impossible for any finite existence or influence to originate, and keep in regular action, the expansion and contraction of the intercostal nerves, by which, in part, the lungs are enabled to inhale the atmospheric air, receive the oxygen, and throw off the carbon from the blood. We have no self-power to keep up this process, yet it goes on whether we sleep or wake. Reason, together with the facts in the case, teaches us to know this truth, that this process is arranged and continued by the wisdom and constant presence of a merciful Creator, and the very moment the influence of his presence is withdrawn from these nerves our breath is paused forever. 3. Another source of evidence may be found in connection with the *circulation of the blood*. It is stated that in health the heart, in one minute of time, makes eighty pulsations, and a little over two ounces of blood are expelled into the aorta at each pulsation—about nine thousand six hundred ounces every hour, and about

one thousand four hundred and forty pounds per day! It is also stated, by those who have experimented in, and have tested these things, that each pulsation of the heart propels the blood eight inches, making fifty feet in one minute! The average quantity of blood in each human body is about thirty pounds, and it is said to pass through the heart twenty-three times in one hour. In calculating the velocity, and the force necessary to effect action to the remotest extremities of the arteries, or where their anastomosis with the veins take place, and the mysterious counteraction of the blood in the veins to the heart again, would require the heart, in its legitimate office and action, to possess the astonishing power of four hundred pounds. Who is prepared to acknowledge that these realities and processes of action are the result of inert materiality, or of chance or accident? They are conclusive evidence that the cause by which they are arranged is possessed of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness.

SECTION III.

1. But how are we to account for the irregular, yet continuous, *expansion and contraction* of the muscles and cords of the heart, which gives motion to the blood, upon which depends the perpetuity of life? These muscles and cords, being matter, have no self-power to move or act, and the suspension of such action is death. Human knowledge has never attempted to solve the mystery, and account for it, but in one way that had the least appearance of reason; that is, that the pulsations of the heart are

caused by the stimulating nature of the blood. 2. This has been *disproved* by the following experiments: (1.) If we apply a stimulus to the muscles of the heart of an animal after it is emptied, it will dilate and contract as if it were full. (2.) If all the large vessels of the heart be entirely emptied, the dilations and contractions will continue for some time, in the entire absence of the blood, and it will be discovered that the dilations are as forcible as are the contractions. 3. The continued and *unwearied action* of the heart is evidence of the infinite wisdom and presence of its Creator. That which exhausts all the other muscles of the body increases the power and action of the heart. This action is wholly involuntary, and the muscles and delicate cords of the heart, unlike any other physical powers, may act incessantly, and *without weariness*, for a hundred years. Natural laws can never explain this. 4. *The existence and action of the heart* is created and arranged by an all-wise Being, and its action is given, sustained, and perpetuated by the power and continued presence of the same. Matter has no self-power to either originate or continue action; but the heart continues its motion in our waking hours, and in the deep slumbers of the night. Having no self-power in either state to continue its motion, should we lie down in slumber with enmity toward God, how easily, in our unconscious state, could he withdraw from those tender muscles and cords of the heart, and their action would be suspended, the wheels of life paused, and the spirit fled forever! As such action is irregular, and contradictory to the nature and principles of all

self-power of action and material laws, it is only sustained by an abiding presence of the great Creator.

SECTION IV.

1. Reason may be regarded, in a certain sense, to be the *power*, and *reasoning* the *action*, or *process*, of deducing conclusions from premises. This process adds a second step to that which has been used, and a third to the second, and so on to the last, or the conclusion. In other words, it may be regarded as that process of action which connects a chain of facts, or a train of reasoning, involving them as a whole, and, in their legitimate order, or appropriate fitness, as parts most naturally adapted to the nature of the premises or proposition. Reasoning is the continued exercise of reason, in the demonstration or investigation of subjects, or series of facts, tracing their relations, arriving at and establishing legitimate conclusions. 2. Reasoning applies to the *investigation* of propositions in science, or existing wholly in the mind. We reason in regard to external things through the medium of the senses, but mental or moral reasoning may take place in the mind. 3. *The value* of the reasoning power is all-important in the investigation of truth, and in selecting it as that which is to us of inestimable value. The various objects of our knowledge, however diversified, can be the immediate objects of reason. It tends to prevent a too hasty action or belief, till the whole matter is examined and tested with proper caution and deliberation. That which

is mysterious in nature, science, or art, must be unraveled by reason, if it becomes to us knowledge known to be true. The strength of mental action, in the investigation and the proper understanding of truths, is matured by a constant exercise of reasoning, first in relation to simple ideas or truths, till strength is acquired to command and to comprehend complicated propositions and events. 4. Reasoning is a *source of specific and certain knowledge*, giving the mind a controlling power over the different steps, degrees, or relations of things, or realities, which would be too complicated and obscure to be known to us in any other way. Those things which require intermediate steps, or propositions, in order to be directly understood, can be controlled only by the reasoning power. It enables the mind to penetrate the unexplored mysteries of nature, and its action is the occasion of the origin of new ideas and new series of interwoven facts, or chains of propositions. 5. The *proper exercise* of this power is the occasion, or is attended with such vivid discrimination, that we can select those truths, propositions, events, or arrangements which are best adapted to our views and feelings. This involves a reference to consciousness; as reasoning progresses those facts or propositions which are most naturally adapted to the desired issue, or exploration of that which is presented to the mind, will claim our feelings or preference; and we will love to reason on and in relation to those things which are congenial to intuitive influences. Perception, suggestion, and judgment can not do the work of reason. It is the latter that must build with facts the argu-

ment, connecting the process, and exploring the way to the final result, revealing all the contingent truths.

CHAPTER V. REASONING, CONTINUED.

SECTION I.

1. WHEN *effect* is the object of a reasoning process, its cause is implied; for such an object, first known to us as a result, or effect, would involve reasons as to why it is thus characterized, and an investigation would employ the power of reason in tracing backward each step to a cause, and such a cause as would be adequate to the effect, and corresponding in nature or qualities. 2. The cause of an effect may be *assumed*, and upon a correct process of reasoning, we may and can proceed to bring to light the proper cause. 3. The final conclusion of propositions may be *assumed*, and a process of reasoning be brought to action, involving the relations of intermediate facts and propositions, till we arrive at the legitimate conclusion; yet propositions which are known to us need not the aid of reasoning to secure the same knowledge. 4. If a *process of reasoning* takes place in connection with or from intuitive articles of belief, revealing facts or truths to our knowledge, various combinations of facts, or objects, involving a diversity of mental processes, a strict adherence to reason and reasoning is our only guide in using that which is naturally adapted to the origin, process, and conclusion. 5. The *power* and *action* of reason is involved in selecting appro-

priate facts relating to that which is to be tested by reasoning, and to employ nothing in the deduction which is not properly added to each position or step that has preceded it. All the series in this process must be connected by a correct adaptation. If the premises be incorrect the conclusion will be absurd ; if the premises be correct, and the process of reasoning false, the conclusion will be wrong ; but if the premises be correct, and the process of reasoning is also correct, the conclusion will certainly be correct.

SECTION II.

1. Reasoning *a priori* deduces consequences or results from definitions formed, or facts assumed, or infers effects from causes previously known ; and it is that process, or kind of reasoning, by which an effect or result is proved from a cause. From the nature and relation of combined facts, or propositions, we can readily assume results corresponding to the legitimate tendency of such antecedents or causes. That general adaptation or fitness, blending and harmonizing existences, naturally leads us to infer or believe in other corresponding realities. This kind of reasoning is common, whether in the mind abstractly, or carried on in relation to external things through the medium of the senses. The correctness of both turns upon the testing power of intuition in regard to the reception of self-evident truths as such, without which argument could not be relied on as true. The statement of terms, definitions, and propositions, which are known, or are

given, involves the idea of other corresponding existences, and such known definitions or propositions evolving other truths or existences by comparisons and inductions. Mathematical calculations are based upon primary axioms or definitions ; and demonstrations commence with these ; and, if correctly pursued, the result is inevitable, and invariably correct. 2. Reasoning *a posteriori* is drawn or proceeds from effect, facts, or results. We might say that reasoning *a priori* is from cause to effect ; but reasoning *a posteriori* is from effect to cause ; yet both methods can be varied in accordance with different varieties of facts or propositions. A process of reasoning may commence with an effect or result, and extend back to a cause, or to something of anterior existence. 3. *Processes of reasoning* must be found upon truths or facts, and proceed from them. It involves the natural adaptation of facts and propositions, with such correlative qualities as will render the progressive steps of the argument true in forcing a correct result. 4. We proceed, in reasoning or argumentation, by *using or involving* a sufficient amount of facts or combinations in the argument. This process brings to our knowledge new truths ; but, to a great extent, it requires the presence and action of the judgment in clearly discriminating and in deciding upon that which should be used in arriving at a correct result ; otherwise, unadapted facts might be involved and used in haste, rendering the conclusion uncertain in regard to truth.

SECTION III.

1. *Reasoning* requires that the *attention* be directed to the truths of each step in the argument. We must know that these facts correctly correspond to the premises. We must know that the premises can not but be true, and arranged accordingly, so that the process of argumentation may be conducted correctly in the truthfulness of the progressive degrees or steps, and that these are connected to the conclusion, or force a conclusion corresponding to the argument. 2. We must also know that *such a series of facts* are so related and arranged as to bring out a new fact, or an intelligent result; otherwise, they may lead to confusion. But in this way the mind may become capable of bringing to light, or of disclosing new truths, and of forcing new and important conclusions. 3. In every correct process of reasoning there are *three things*, as will be given in the following section, which must claim our attention.

SECTION IV.

1. We must *know the premises* to be correct or true. If not, we can not proceed correctly; and if there is any doubt in regard to this, we should prove the premises true, if susceptible of proof. 2. The truthfulness of the premises being established, the chain of reasoning, it may be, consisting of numerous distinct facts, arguments, propositions, or steps, must *all be true within themselves*, and correspond in respect to the same premises, and so connected

that one step in the argument becomes an essential part of the premises of the subsequent one, till the entire argument is completed. All the intermediate steps, from the premises to the conclusion, must be carefully examined and known to be correct. 3. With *caution* in the preceding steps, the *conclusion or result* will be easy and natural; but we must know that such conclusion is a legitimate result of the preceding argument, corresponding to the correct force, natural existence, condition, or influence of the truths which have compelled such a result or conclusion. 4. The reasoning power *differs or varies* in the minds of different persons. Some have great difficulty in connecting their thoughts, and more trouble in connecting realities in a process of reasoning, or in argumentation. We will now notice the origin or manner in which some of these differences or variations arise.

SECTION V.

1. *They may arise* from the pressure or inactivity of the physical organs, in connection with which the mind holds intercourse with the things of the external world. The mind, with all its faculties, is affected by the pressure or imperfect organization of the corporeal powers. Doubtless there is not so much difference in the natural power of different minds, as there is in the physical mediums through which they are developed, or are manifested; but we will speak of this in another place. 2. *Much depends upon the manner of information* stored away in the mind. Knowledge is not only power,

but the acquisition of it implies, first, mental strength or ability to receive it; and, secondly, that there has been much exercise and discipline of the intellectual powers in order to acquire knowledge; therefore, the mind is capable of greater cogency and correctness in argumentation. 3. The power of correct reasoning *depends very much upon attention and the judgment.* Progressive reasoning evolves new facts, attention places them under the inspection of the mind. The judgment discriminates and decides upon their appropriateness and truthfulness.

SECTION VI.

1. *Mathematical reasoning* has been regarded as being superior to mental reasoning, from the fact that there are fewer intermingling or connected contingencies, and we have not so many things to assume. This, in part, is true; but we are not prepared to admit that mathematical propositions, or demonstrations, are worthy of as much confidence or belief as those which are mental or moral. 2. *If, in numerical reasoning,* nothing is assumed or taken for granted, in regard to the truthfulness and existence of premises, upon which the reasoning is founded; and if all necessary assumptions are few, contingent, and easily freed from intricacy, yet the *power* of knowing and of receiving these as true realities, is found connected with and in the intuitive power of the mind. We know nothing of mathematical facts, or reasoning, only as the power connected with, and existing in the intuitive elements

of the mind receives, or introduces us to them, and thereby they are known to us as realities. 3. *No fact, tested by the power, or received through the medium of the senses, can be known as real and true only as the internal, intuitive power of the primary elements of the mind enables us to receive and to know them to be such.* It is this power alone which enables us to know that the axioms which are the foundation of all mathematical calculations and demonstrations, are self-evident truths; for no reason can be offered proving them to be either true or false; yet the superior, intuitive power can receive them as true independently of all proof. 4. *Internal mental or moral reasoning* can not be said to be of remote origin, and received, in whole or in part, through intercepting mediums; but our knowledge of such is direct, present, and experimental. We may be deceived in testing external truths through the medium of the senses; for the correctness of the sensations thus experienced by the mind depends upon the health and activity of the physical nerves, or organs, which come in contact with such external things. Diseased nerves often are the means of deception in regard to correct mental states. A diseased optic nerve often gives origin to the perception of something which is only a spectral illusion. He who depends with more confidence upon the truthfulness of that which is made known to him through the medium of the senses, than he does upon intuitive power and action, by which the senses are made efficient, and are regulated and corrected, should either study to know himself more perfectly, or be consistent, and

deny the existence of all things. It is far more reasonable to deny the existence of all external things, the knowledge of which we receive through the medium of the senses, the physical organs of which, being diseased, often deceive us, than it is to doubt the *action or operations* of the internal, intuitive power of the mind, forming a part of conscious experience and present knowledge.

SECTION VII.

1. Our confidence in the *power and accuracy* of mental reasoning will be increased by our confidence in mathematical reasoning, knowing the superiority of the former over the latter. In mathematical arguments, or reasoning, if we have any doubt as to the process, or conclusion, we have only to turn back to the premises, and build the argument again, guarding against any improper step, and divesting the same of all obscurity and doubt; and if there is any doubt of a proposition which is assumed as the result of preceding steps, a review of those steps, in the demonstration, or argument, will enable us to detect any thing that is wrong, and to approve of it when corrected. 2. When we see that *all the terms used are clearly defined*, and all doubt being removed from them, we regard the conclusion as inevitably correct. 3. If the true objects of numerical argumentation or demonstration be *quantity and its relations*, it is certain that an acute attention and precision, in regard to the correctness of each step in the whole process, will render doubt in regard to its correctness impossible. In defining, or

in determining the correctness of the various steps or facts used, or to be involved in any process of reasoning, requires the presence and action of the judgment. We are guided and progress by the power of reason, under the inspection and decisions of the judgment, in regard to that which is adapted in nature or qualities.

SECTION VIII.

1. *Demonstrative reasoning* is that kind of reasoning which is used to probably a greater extent among the masses of intellectual beings than any other, progressing from cause to effect, or from premises to the conclusion, showing, or proving, by clear and certain evidence, the result. It is a power demonstrating or connecting the truths of a process, rendering or forcing a correct conclusion with clearness and certainty. 2. *Investigative reasoning* is that kind of disquisition which involves the idea of vivid, keen, and penetrating mental powers and action; and it is that kind of progressive mental action which forces its way into hidden fields of realities. It searches minutely, bringing to light new facts, which may evolve others connecting, or adding them into appropriate incursive chains, rendering such dormant treasures the conquest of research and imperishable knowledge. 3. *False investigative reasoning* may take place or exist when the acknowledged primary facts are untrue, either in whole or in part, or in their conditioned combination or relation. The inductions, or processes of arguments, may be incorrect in some way, and the

conclusions may not be legitimate or natural results. False reasoning may take place as noted in the order of the following section.

SECTION IX.

1. *False reasoning* may take place by assuming premises or propositions which are incorrect within themselves, or which are not naturally adapted to the conclusion desired. 2. *By assuming a proposition* asserted to be a conclusion of some previous process of reasoning, without examining such former process, or knowing it to have existed, and to be true or correct. 3. *By confusing the distinctiveness* of each step in the connected links or chain of reasoning, thoroughly rendering a change in position possible, and without detection. 4. *By commencing the argument* at some point far removed from the premises. 5. *By petitio principii*, or begging the question in assuming a principle which amounts to the same thing to be proved, or which may vary slightly in some almost imperceptible way. 6. *By assuming a principle, and then wandering off*, reasoning on many contingent things, till they can be combined together, from which the reasoning commences, without any connection with the first assumed principle; or by reasoning in a circle, in assuming a principle, and employing it to establish some other reality or facts, which fact or facts are used to prove the first assumed principle.

SECTION X.

1. *False reasoning* may arise by means of the sophistical use of terms and analogies in principles assumed, all of which can be corrected by careful examination. 2. *Reasoning* may be rendered *more efficient* and more capable of performing its work with increased exactness, by attending to the repeated efforts in pursuing arguments, and guarding against all contingencies which should not be connected with the chain, or process of its immediate action. 3. *Reasoning* may be influenced improperly by an impure motive. This will so bias the efforts of the mind as to cause more than a due proportion of attention to be bestowed upon those things most intimately connected with some conclusion designed or desired, while real facts, naturally adapted to the argument, receive such a slight proportion of attention as to be finally lost from the argument, or have no special influence. 4. *Prejudice* will affect reasoning so as to distract or destroy its accuracy; for in this way opinions are formed before the subject has been investigated or examined. Such previously-formed opinions will often bias the process of our reasoning when we are unconscious of the fact. Before we are fully aware of what is passing in the mind, our reasoning power may be in search of facts to establish the truthfulness of those previously-formed opinions, and the correct process of argumentation lost sight of, or that has been departed from; but the principal ground of departure is that of a willing and malicious choice; and when we determine to pursue

a wrong course, though our consciences may revolt at it for a long time, yet perseverance will finally lead to uncertainty, and a bewildered stupor and inactivity, from which a return and recovery is almost impossible. Reader, if you would start right, and remain or continue in a right course, never pre-judge the subject of your inquiries, and never dare to act according to or with an improper or vitiated motive! Let motive be pure forever.

Division Eighty.

CHAPTER I. DREAMING.

SECTION I.

1. DREAMING is having thoughts, notions, or ideas in or during sleep. They may arise in connection with only one subject, or we may experience a series of thoughts or moral impressions. Under the above heading we shall define that which may be called mental dreaming; and, in another place, we will define moral dreaming, as there are two kinds clearly distinct in nature. 2. It may be regarded as *wholly involuntary*; for we often experience impressions, or ideas, which arise in the mind, of an unpleasant nature, or those which are revolting to us, but have no power to divert our notice of them, though we experience an effort to effect such a change. At times the effort made in resisting unpleasant impressions, and the apprehensions of approaching fear, are such that we are aroused from slumber; but the mind retains a vivid knowledge of what was passing, or had been the object or objects of its anxiety and action. 3. We not only experience the presence of impressions and ideas or thoughts, but they *associate*, or are *combined*, to a certain degree, and often they succeed each other in

regular trains of thought, and we have seemingly no control over them. 4. That the mind is *impressed or affected* by dreams, or visions, in this way, and that it experiences the presence of real thoughts, and ideas of real entities and events, is beyond the possibility of doubt. A great variety of different trains of impressions or ideas occur, and some of them are so indelibly impressed on the mind as to be remembered for years. 5. Dreaming is *common* to all persons; yet some dream much more frequently than others. But very few have ever asserted that they have never experienced any thing of the kind. Those who think they have never dreamed may have dreamed, and the mind be unable to recall them in their waking hours. The natural inclination of the mental powers to be in motion always, and independently of the co-operation of the physical system, shows the superiority of mind over matter, and strongly argues its imperishability.

SECTION II.

1. *Mental dreaming*, as a general rule, arises in the mind, or is one of those states which take place in sleep, immediately following and corresponding with those facts, or subjects, which were the objects of mental action previous to the slumber in which such ideas arise; but the manner in which trains of ideas arise is mysterious. Recent occurrences and recent mental states may be connected, or have some relation to that which is passing through the mind, or is impressed upon it in the hours of sleep.

The hearing of some sad news, or the witnessing of some horrible event, are often followed by dreams, in which the different items, as they were made known, or were witnessed by us, reappear to the mind; but not often without some change, or the absence of some thing, and the addition of others.

2. They are not always *immediately successive* to preceding events or facts. Under the influence of dreams we may be impressed with realities, or have ideas revived, which took place years before, and even of things which had been forgotten; and, in our waking hours, we can often recall the perceptions which the mind had in dreams of facts or events which are to come, of which we have never had knowledge before; yet the real occurrence of such things can not be regarded as certainly coming to pass, from the fact that we had such dreams; they may or may not occur.

3. *Mental states of mind*, which take place under the influence of dreams, are not to be depended upon as true preludes of things to come. They are mere circumstantial or casual states, which can not be regarded as positive evidence that those things made known in dreams will ever occur, or that their opposites will come true. They are worthy, perhaps, of no more confidence than the notions which arise in a flighty mind, under the influence of delirium, caused by an intense or high fever; but impressions of moral dreaming, or visions, are worthy of confidence, and are to be depended upon as being intended for our instruction in some way.

4. Perhaps the principal or most important truth we derive from the existence or occurrence of mental dream-

ing is, that the mind is *active within itself and independently of the body*; and if it can act while the body is inactive under the power of sleep, which is typical of temporal death, we are left to infer that, as it thus acts, and is ever acting, it can act on or continue to act when the body is silent in death.

SECTION III.

1. Dreaming may, in some degree, be *caused* by physical debilitation. On careful observation it has been ascertained that dreams are pleasant or revolting in proportion to the strength and health of the body. In good health, the occurrences which are experienced in the mind, while under the influence of slumber, are apt to be of an agreeable or pleasant character; and if we are verging to an attack, or the influence and power of disease, we are apt to rest imperfectly in sleep, and our dreams are oppressive and generally of a disagreeable character. 2. *The character* of dreams often vary with the laws of anatomical departments, or localities, which are affected by disease; and they may vary with the kind of disease. The different ways in which the nervous system is affected has some corresponding influence upon the mind, and this may be connected to those mental states which occur in sleep. When the physical system is reduced by dyspepsia, the mind is apt to be filled with gloom, so that its action, whether we are awake or sleeping, is of a melancholy character. If the nerves are excited by fever, the action, whether in dreams or in waking hours, will be quick, with an uneasy influence, or

unpleasant sensations. 3. *Bodily sensations*, which have been once experienced in such a way as to make a lasting impression upon the mind, may be recalled, in part, if an object of similar qualities, or properties, be brought in contact with the physical nerves, during slumber, that affect them in giving rise to the first sensations experienced. If the body in slumber becomes chilled with cold, we often dream of winter, or of the sufferings of others, or of self with cold. If burning with fever, the mind is apt to dream of sufferings from a hot sun or room. If we experience an acute pain while sleeping, we are apt to dream of similar sufferings as endured by others or ourselves. 4. When *realities or events* are presented to the mind under the influence of dreaming, they appear directly opposite to what they are, in fact, but corresponding with the natural inclinations or desires of the soul in waking hours. The poor man dreams of receiving a vast amount of wealth; he who can not compose, dreams of writing poetry or a book; the man who can not express his thoughts, dreams of speaking with great fluency; but an orator seldom ever dreams of delivering a discourse with freedom. The eloquent extemporeaneous speaker generally dreams of being embarrassed in addressing an assembly; so there is no general rule or uniformity in the order or character of dreams.

SECTION IV.

1. There is no *fixed law of conformity or of agreement* in relation to dreams; for there is great

disagreement and contradiction in dreams. Such thoughts are often disconnected and desultory. These irregularities are not corrected by reason, judgment, and the exercise of the senses, in regard to definite truths and settled laws in external things; and those mental powers which have a correcting control over the mind, are partially suspended. 2. Though the power of the senses is *suspended*, and the principal faculties of the mind appear to be *inactive*, in many respects, yet our conception of realities, or events, while under the influence of sleep, appears to be vivid and strong. The power of suggestion and comparison appears to be also in lively exercise. No sensations affect the mind through the medium of the senses: hence, the mind attends to the objects of conception. This may account for the tenacity of the mind in recalling that which appears to be real in our dreams. 3. *Old associations* and facts that have been forgotten, are often called up or revived in dreams, so that they become the objects of thought again in our waking hours. It is utterly impossible to account for their origin, or reoccurring upon any fixed principle or definite law. That such things have and do take place is experimental knowledge, but to assign any certain cause is impossible. 4. We are now prepared to go still further, and say that we may have facts revealed to us in dreams of which we *have never had any conclusive knowledge*. Students have been known to work till late at night at propositions in mathematics, and have retired to rest without solving the difficulties in regard to them; but when under the power of sleep the whole difficulty, or difficulties,

have been clearly solved in a dream, and, on waking, with joy they have placed all the work down on paper correctly, and without any trouble.

SECTION V.

1. Our conceptions of the *length of time* occupied in dreaming appears to be of very long duration, when, in fact, it can only extend to but a few minutes. A chain of events may pass through the mind in one dream which would require many days in reviewing them, but on waking we discover that it has been the work of a few minutes; yet our dreaming conception of it would appear to have continued months. Such conceptions appear to be present as real; and our successive thoughts, actions, or that which is noticed or experienced in our dreams, appear to employ very much time and deliberation, when, on being suddenly wakened, we ascertain that we have been slumbering only a few minutes. This is evidence that the mind can and does act in sleep, and that such action is, in reality, far more rapid than it is in our waking hours; for that which is experienced, or passes through the mind, at certain times, within ten minutes, would require a whole day to review in our waking hours, or state. If the action of the mind, without the immediate use of the senses, is increased, we may infer that its capacity and power of action, when freed from the inertness connected with the nature of the physical system, will far transcend all comprehension and thought in regard to such action.
2. Mere mental dreaming is often regarded as *true*

when some feature or fact thus experienced happens to come to pass by casual, or even by natural causes. When we dream of events taking place, of great variety, and for a long continuance of time, it is not unlikely for something to occur corresponding to some event, or fact, of which we had conceptions in a dream. The mere occurrence of such a fact, or facts, will recall that part of our dream, the remembrance of which tends to strengthen our confidence in the truthfulness of them. These mental states may be affected, or may be the result of disease or of some kind of physical debilitation ; but that which occurs corresponding to something realized in dreaming, becomes the object of special mental action, while perhaps a thousand other facts, or events, contained in dreams, pass unnoticed in our waking hours, not being recalled by facts corresponding to them.

3. *Dreams vary* with different individuals. Some persons never dream of objects they have never seen, while the reverse is true with others. There is another class who never dream of tastes, smells, or sounds, only as the presence of these to the slumberer are the occasion, or are, in part, the cause of such corresponding dreams ; but there are others again whose experience differs. Some persons, after the loss of their sight, never dream of seeing objects ; so that there appears to be retained in the mind, while under the influence of sleep, at least a partial sense of defects which may exist in connection with the senses, in apprehending or in knowing realities or facts of the external world.

4. *Dreaming conceptions* are not confined to old conceptions. Under the influence of slumber, poets

have composed parts of poems, and, in their waking hours, have written out the same. The logician has unraveled mysterious things, and concluded his argument correctly; the mathematician has concluded his demonstration; and the linguist has seen how to translate a difficult passage.

SECTION VI.

1. *Dreams* may have existed in the mind, of which there is no recollection in our waking hours. Persons often talk in sleep without being conscious of any thing of the kind in their waking hours. It is clearly evident that such conversation is the result of dreaming, yet it can not be recalled. This may account for the opinion of many persons, who think they never dream. They may dream, but not be able to recall them in their waking hours. 2. The *loss of power*, in dreaming over the succession of our thoughts, is probably the most striking peculiarity connected with the phenomena of such mental influences or states. We may dream of trying to rehearse some facts, or chain of facts, connected with some general principle or subject, and lose the connection, or wander away from the desired course. While the chain of facts, or ideas, are passing through the mind, it is not unlikely that the general subject, or some important truth came up, when the thoughts wandered, in the absence of power to control them, and that, too, while there is an internal conviction or impression that the regular process of investigation, or of examination, proceeds undisturbed; yet we can discover that we have some

power at times, and by an effort, to check our thoughts to some extent, and to direct them again to the desired object, though this power is not apt to be of long duration. 3. It is useless to try to define the *causes of dreams*. The best we can do is to regard them as varying with the many and mysterious influences connected with the phenomena of mind. Each person can best determine the cause of such mental influences, or states, by carefully attending to his own experience in regard to them. All the facts connected with the phenomena of dreaming are evidences that mind is ever active and imperishable.

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CHAPTER II.

CLAIRVOYANCE.

SECTION I.

1. CLAIRVOYANCE does not properly belong to this work, and should not receive this brief notice, were it not for the fact that it has been regarded, by many, as being an essential part of the phenomena of mind. 2. It is the *clear-sightedness* of the mind in perceiving, or in apprehending facts or events, without the aid of the senses, as a medium, in whole or in part, in arriving at a knowledge of such facts, or events. This is, in reality, closely connected with dreaming, though it appears to take place further removed from any internal controlling power governing it. This ulterior process appears to occur when we are under the deepest influence of Somnus, and when the senses are entirely inactive to external affecting causes, so far as can be determined. 3. It is a power *attributed to persons in a mesmeric state*, of perceiving, or of discriminating objects or realities not present with, nor objects of the action of the senses. To define such a power and its action, or to give bounds to it, we regard as a work more properly belonging to beings more perfect in knowledge, and cogent in thought, than we are, or ever expect to be in this world. 4. Such a power does not appear to be *common or naturally connected*

with earthly intelligences, in the proper existence and relationship which characterizes them. However natural it may be to the action of spirit within itself, or abstracted from the inertness of bodily organs, yet such action is not common to the masses of intelligences, or, if so, we are unable to recall such action in our waking hours.

SECTION II.

1. If such a power does really exist in *connection with some minds* when it is unknown to others, or to the great majority of persons, we can not account for its existence as an essential element of spirit, or any thing superadded to one that is withheld from another; therefore, the only rational way we have of meeting the subject is, that such differences depend upon some peculiarity in the physical or nervous constitution, which is connected with the mind's developments and action. The nerves are connected with the brain, and are so inseparably connected with the sensations experienced in and by the mind, that mental states may be affected by them; and we know not how far such states may vary or correspond to the peculiar sensitiveness, condition, or influence of the nervous system. 2. *How far or to what extent* the doctrine of clairvoyance is true, we shall not determine; but we shall claim the privilege to say that too much faith or belief in such things is deceptive and dangerous, and it adds no essential truths to knowledge. For the mind, with confidence, to dwell long in such a field, and to become all absorbed in exploring what

seems, in its imagination, to be therein contained, is to advance midway from a world of reason to that of insanity. 3. That a *simple state* of clairvoyance may be experienced by some minds connected with a peculiar nervous constitution, or system, is neither unnatural, nor a new reality or truth, in the existence and bounds of scientific research. Such persons are so naturally constituted that they can be affected by mesmerism, anxiety of mind, fatigue, or disease, so as to have some kind of stupor over the action of the senses, and, at the same time, they experience some kind of perception of things which can be the objects of mental action. This is no new theory, either in reality or the investigations of science. It is as old as this kind of peculiar nervous constitutions. It is natural with the nervous sensitiveness of some persons, though the perverted use that is often made of it, in the necromancy and feats performed in the world, is deceptious, tending to absurdities and ruin. 4. So far as any person has a natural disposition and tendency to such mental states as may be included under the meaning of clairvoyance, it is *innocent*; but when an intentional perversion takes place, it becomes wickedly absurd or sinful. No one can be so operated on by another as to reveal facts of the spirit-world beyond the limits of its personal identity, or mental resources and action.

CHAPTER III. SOMNAMBULISM.

SECTION I.

1. *This is the act or practice of walking in sleep.* In dreaming the mind acts, but the somnambulist walks abroad, or has power voluntarily to move from place to place while under the influence of sleep. This singular affection differs from dreaming. Simple dreaming involves only the action of the mind, while somnambulism includes the affection and action of the physical powers in connection with mental inclinations and action. 2. *It differs from dreaming as to the exercise of the mind.* The mind may be fixed upon its own impressions, or ideas, which are passing under its inspection, but there appears to be less power in recalling such an exercise in our waking hours than there is to recall the substance of dreams. There are but few if any somnambulists who can ever recall the fact of walking in sleep. As a general thing they never have the slightest knowledge, in their waking hours, that ever such an occurrence took place, or was the result of their own action. 3. The same appears to be true in regard to *talking in sleep.* There is, perhaps, not one case out of a thousand where persons who are in the habit of talking in sleep, ever have the slightest knowledge of such a fact from any

action of their own minds, though it is highly probable they are dreaming, or the mind is acting in some way all the time. 4. The *first degree* of somnambulism, with some persons, is an inclination to talk in sleep, though others are not known to talk. The former often rehearse what is passing in the mind, and frequently that which was not intended to be known. If this propensity increases, we may expect them to walk during sleep. A friend of mine intentionally lodged in the same room with a man who was in the habit of walking during sleep, intending to follow him. About midnight the somnambulist arose, walked down stairs, passed out at the door, took a path across the field, crossed a water course on a high log, not touching the hand-pole, and without either stooping or pausing. In this way he could not pass over in his waking hours by daylight, yet he passed on without any difficulty; then turning into a dark valley, he ascended and seated himself upon drift wood. In a few moments he returned, by the same way, to his room and bed, and knew nothing of the occurrence on the next morning.

SECTION II.

1. Somnambulism differs from dreaming, in the *power which the action of the mind has over the muscles* and the nervous system, whether such mental action or volitions can, in any way, be recalled in our waking hours or not. Dreams appear to be real in the mind of any one, and the same appears to be true in regard to that which is passing in the

mind of the somnambulist. The additional power is added in, and by which he can and does put his physical powers in motion. A servant in the south, during sleep at night, often responds to his master's call, on his return home, takes his horse, waters him, puts him in the stable, feeds him, and fastens the door, returns to bed, and knows nothing of the transaction on the next morning. He has often, under the influence of sleep, gone to mill, then returned to his bed, and had no knowledge of it in his waking hours. 2. Another peculiarity is, that in sleep the *senses and muscles* appear to be powerless and inactive; but in somnambulism the *latter* is active, while the *former* is inactive. This can not be defined unless it exists in connection with that peculiar sensitive class of nerves connected with the muscles, and not with the senses, being affected in some way, and in such a manner as to invoke or induce an effort of the muscular powers under the influence of mental volitions. In this way the senses may be powerless, while muscular action is a natural result; and persons often perform hard labor, or travel a long distance, without having experienced perceptions of any thing which they can afterward recall. 3. The *absence of fear* is another peculiarity connected with somnambulism. The somnambulist can go where he could not in his waking state without fear or loss of life. They have been known to pass out of windows and climb up on the tops of houses, and, in an erect posture, walk narrow joists or beams of timber from twenty to forty feet above the ground. 4. The strength of the *investigative power* seems to be more vigorous under the influence of somnambu-

lism than in waking hours. While under its influence students have finished tasks which they had given up in despair on going to sleep. Some have composed poetry which they failed to accomplish before; others have solved propositions which they could not do in their waking state.

SECTION III.

1. A very singular phenomenon is sometimes witnessed in the presence of *paroxysms*, which come on in the daytime as well as at night. At times they are preluded by a singular sensation or noise in the head, but frequently they are experienced without any warning. The mind seems to be abstracted from external impressions, yet there is no apparent difficulty in conversing about that which is passing through the mind at the time of such conversation, so that they could narrate correctly events which they could give but an imperfect account of when freed from such paroxysms. 2. Some persons are *totally unconscious* of any external thing; others can hear and answer questions. There have been instances given where persons have, while under the paroxysm, conversed readily in Latin, which they could not do at other times. 3. A contingent feature of this affection has been referred to as being produced by an attack of somnolency. In recovering from one attack, persons have lost all literary knowledge; but in recovering from the second attack, all the lost attainments have been restored, and thus alternating for years. 4. It would almost appear that, under such paroxysms, the mind or

spirit has some kind of *sight and perception* independently of the senses. Philosophers have given instances of persons who have had their eyes closed while under the paroxysm, and bandaged with many thicknesses of black silk; yet they could read and answer questions in regard to distinct objects correctly, and in regard to some things which they had never seen before. We know of no way to explain this, unless in proportion as the soul is abstracted from the bodily organs, the more perfectly its powers are developed, and the more correctly is its action.

5. Whatever there may be that is strange or novel in the preceding part of this chapter, yet it should be borne in mind that all these facts go to show that *mind can act* without the body, from which it is reasonable to believe in its superiority, and to infer its imperishable nature or its eternal duration.

CHAPTER IV. MESMERISM.

SECTION I.

1. By *mesmerism* we understand animal magnetism, or the existence of a peculiar kind of sleep, in which the mind is active, though the mesmerized person appears to be unconscious of external objects. The mind is active within itself, or in regard to something specially passing within itself, while all external things are lost sight of or are precluded.

2. The act of mesmerizing is that of *affecting the body* in different ways, so as to produce a species or kind of sleep, while the mind retains its activity and power. This is no new discovery in scientific research and knowledge. Long has it been known, and it has and does exist, in reality, in the very natural constitution of some persons.

3. A *constitution* which is capable of being mesmerized is almost the same as those which come under the influence of somnambulism. It is natural to some constitutions, and all such may be mesmerized; but a differently-constituted person can not be mesmerized. The mesmeric susceptibility is connected with a peculiar condition or nature of the nervous system, and never can be imparted to one who has it not; yet the influence or power of disease might effect such a change, or condition of the nerves, as to

render a person capable of being mesmerized who had no natural disposition to it. This constitutional or natural affinity to mesmeric affection, or influence, can be affected or produced by external agencies or causes, which are neither marvelous nor uncommon; but there is a mystery in the nature of such a constitution, which, like many other things, can only be fully comprehended in the future world.

4. There are *but very few persons*, if any, who are in the habit of talking or walking in sleep, while in health, but what can be mesmerized; yet this can not be done contrary to the will or permission of the subject. 5. Some subjects, under the influence of mesmerism, are *wholly unconscious* of external things, while others are not, but have not immediate power to break the influence. Mesmerizers claim that the former class can be operated upon by will, in commanding them to do as they please, while the latter class can resist only in part. It may be that persons, being mesmerized, go into that state with the mind almost entirely directed to the operator, and when a stupor comes over the power of the senses, the mind still having liberty to act, and the operator being the object of the mind, he may have more controlling power over it than any other person, and more than would seem natural; but there is far more contained in the assertions of such agents than there is in the facts as they are.

SECTION II.

1. In this way it has been maintained that the *truthfulness* of phrenology has been established by

the action of the mesmerized person, corresponding to the nature of the organ touched by the operator; but this is no proof, if what the mesmerizer claims is true, that subjects can be operated upon by will; for he knows what organ he intends touching, and what kind of action he expects. This being fixed in his mind would be that which he would will: hence, the action of the subject would correspond to the will of the operator. With all the obscurity and doubt of the correctness of this conclusion, yet that spirit can thus operate upon spirit is far more reasonable than to believe a mere physical organ of the head can possess within itself spiritual rationality sufficient to act. If spirit can act as spirit, why may it not act without involving the inert existence and medium of the skull. The truthfulness of phrenology can not be established by mesmerism while mind and matter are dissimilar and divisible. 2. If the somnambulist becomes lost to every thing but that upon which his mind is intently fixed, and if he has power to walk abroad in obedience to any internal inclination, may not a person, on being mesmerized, become unconscious of every thing in regard to the action of the senses, yet be *controlled* by the thoughts of the mind, which still cluster around the existence and will of the operator, so as to be thus influenced in some way? But deceptions in regard to these things are far more probable than conjectures in favor of such mysteries. We mention them only to induce investigative thought, while the student is left to form his own conclusions. 3. There are persons who, under mesmeric influences, are *partially sensible* of what is passing, but

are unable to move from any position they may be placed in, though they may try to do so. By a well-tried effort, some of them have succeeded in breaking the influence, as they have testified. 4. There is *another class* which appears to be unconscious of every thing, yet they will respond to questions, or walk, if ordered to do so. This may be accounted for upon the same principle that a person continues to converse with another in sleep. When some individuals begin to talk in sleep, they will answer almost any question asked. In this way confidential truths have been revealed. But to fully explain such phenomena must be the work of each one who thinks upon the subject. 5. Though this *constitutional or natural tendency* to, or susceptibility of mesmeric states, can not be defined, yet we can but believe, to some extent, in its mysterious existence; but, when properly viewed, it contains no more mystery than dreaming or somnambulism. This far we may go in safety; but the idea that men may send the spirits of others to distant worlds, or have the facts of the spirit-world revealed by them, is not only absurd, but tends to ruin. Finity has no such power.

CHAPTER V. PHRENOLOGY.

SECTION I.

1. PHRENOLOGY proceeds upon the supposition that the brain is the organ of thought and passion; that the science of the human mind is inseparably connected with this supposed organ; and that the different powers of the mind may be determined principally by the size and shape of the head, together with the undulations of the skull, embracing the position and condition of such undulations. As to the general features, or outline of phrenology, we would file no very special objections; but when we come to define and settle the divisions of the organ, we are plunged into darkness and confusion. 2. *The size and the general appearance* of the head, together with the expression of the eye and the countenance, are important in forming a correct judgment in regard to the mind. Doubtless more is indicated by physiognomy than is by phrenology. The expression of the countenance, as a general thing, is more important in deciding upon the strength and character of the mind, than all that can be gathered from the different sections in craniology. 3. There are several important *points to be settled*, and to be acknowledged as true, before the philosophy of mind, with its well-tried chain of

truths, can be supplanted by it. We do not regard the doctrine of phrenology as being sufficiently interwoven with mental science to require an extensive analysis: hence, we shall refer briefly to only a few facts in connection with it.

SECTION II.

1. The *truths* which support the doctrine of phrenology must be sufficiently clear and strong to show that it is, in fact, a science; but no two writers have entirely agreed, in every respect, in regard to the localities of the different organs, as indicated by the peculiar shape of the skull, which, according to phrenology, is essential to the existence of such a theory or doctrine. 2. It must be *demonstrated without a doubt*, that the brain is, and is wholly, the organ of the mind, otherwise the cranium might deceive us; and as all the nervous matter in the entire system is of the very same properties as that of the brain, and is, to some extent, and in some way, connected with it, there might be some difficulty involved in locating the organ of the mind. 3. Phrenologists should first prove that the *brain is the organ* of the mind, and then they must agree in locating the different powers or faculties of the mind according to the exterior surface of the skull, and especially those locations should be made and be defined without doubt, which have so long been the objects of doubt and contention among different writers. An intelligent world will expect these questions of doubt to be settled before they will consent to regard such a system, as a whole, con-

sistent with reason, or that it is true science. 4. It must be *clearly shown* how the skull bone, which is inert within itself, is better adapted to the development of the various influences and powers of an immaterial nature, than such a nature would be to develop its own powers and action. 5. If we adhere to the exactness of phrenological claims, it must be *demonstrated*, according to general uniformity, that each undulation on the external surface of the skull has a concavity corresponding to it on the inner surface of the skull, answering to the different lobes of the brain, which lobes have been assumed as being the basis respectively from which the action of the various powers of the mind are eliminated; but this is impossible. 6. There should be a clear showing, or proof, that the brain does really contain *lobes, or protuberances*, as has been assumed, and just a sufficient number to correspond with the different powers and affections of the mind; but the almost imperceptible waves of the brain can not be called lobes, as is set forth in the doctrine of phrenology.

SECTION III.

1. Should such *lobes exist* as organs of the different powers of the mind, it would appear that they would have to exist in immediate contact with the skull, so that the external surface would indicate the size and strength of such organs thus manifested; therefore, no vacuum, or space, could exist between the brain and the skull without confusing the definite location and action of the various mental pow-

ers. But there is a vacuum, or space, between the brain and skull which severs the connection between the two, and renders it impossible to trace the connection between the external surface of the skull and the brain at any time, without taking into the account the changes under different circumstances.

2. Philosophers agree that the *brain* may be regarded as the organ of the mind by reason of the wise order in the arrangement of infinite wisdom, and not that it is or can be the organ of the mind from its peculiar essence, or natural qualities; for in this case the whole nervous system would be the organ of the mind, as it is connected with the brain, and contains precisely the same essence, or properties, when analyzed. 3. The idea that the mind is *wholly dependent* upon the nature and condition of the physical organs, in order to be manifested, or for the character of its action, is absurd; for we have already seen that the mind can act without the bodily organs, and when the senses are locked up, or their power is suspended by sleep. 4. The *doctrine* of phrenology, when not sufficiently guarded, often misleads the mind. In some instances it has given origin to tendencies which have resulted in the worst forms of infidelity, by and in which it has been assumed that all the sufferings of both body and mind are the results of imperfect physical organization, and that the fall of man affects only the physical powers, by and through which the mind acts. If this be true, and it is possible for us to have any consciousness of guilt or sin, then *that* which tests this fact must be matter, and when the body dies all our consciousness of guilt must perish.

with it. This would result in the doctrine or idea of annihilation, which is false.

SECTION IV.

1. The physical organs, being *inert* within and of themselves, they have no power to comprehend the knowledge of suffering, and report the same to the mind, in order that it may be known. Matter can never originate intuitive mental convictions and feelings of our lost estate; for it is by the existence, presence, and self-action of innate mental elements that we can have any knowledge of the capability of the body to suffer, or that it ever has experienced pain. 2. While the reasonableness and truthfulness of the *outlines* of phrenology are acknowledged, yet we are unable to admit the more peculiar specific doctrines connected with it, and all we can do is to receive that which is correct, and reject the incorrect, or that which is false. The same cause will not affect every person in the same way. 3. *Injuries* received upon the head often affect some power of the mind, and an injury received upon a certain organ affects one mind very differently from the result the same cause would produce upon another mind. The same organ in kind may be affected on different heads, and the results are not similar; but, in most instances, they are very different. The same organ in the same head may be affected by a blow, at different times, without producing similar effects upon the mind; therefore, it is impossible to locate the different organs from the similarity in the effects realized. 4. *Different portions* of the brain

may be diseased without affecting the mind corresponding to the office, nature, and action of the organs thus affected. A lady has been mentioned, one half of whose brain was completely paralyzed by disease, yet the faculties of her mind were perfect, notwithstanding the destruction of one half of the cerebral organs. A man has been mentioned, who retained the right use of all his faculties up to the moment of his sudden death, and on opening his head it was discovered that suppuration had destroyed the whole right hemisphere of his brain. Though one half of his cerebral organs were destroyed, yet his mind was not affected. Operators testify that they have removed, in a similar way, as much as a half pound of matter found in the brain, when the mind did not appear to have been affected up to the time of death.

SECTION V.

1. We learn, from different *experiments*, that large portions of the brain have been often removed without destroying the exercise of the mental faculties. A man has been mentioned, whose head had been so injured that a large portion of the right wing of the *os frontis* was removed, suppuration had taken place, while at each dressing, for over two months, the matter discharged brought with it large quantities of the brain; yet he retained the right use of all his faculties to the time of his death. 2. Instances have been given, in cases of *fracture* of the skull, when large portions of the brain have been removed without the slightest injury to the minds

of the persons thus suffering. These facts are conclusive evidences that different organs in the brain can be entirely destroyed without marring the correct action of the mind. 3. How can this be accounted for upon the *principles of phrenology*? There is only one way of escape, so far as can be determined at present; that is, when the organs on one side of the head are destroyed, we have to assume that there are double organs, and those on the other side correspond to those lost. But this is only assumption, as it can not be based upon any primary principle of phrenology. 4. While the *general principles* of phrenology may be regarded as true, yet we are unprepared to adopt it in lieu of mental philosophy, as the latter has been long established upon true principles, attested by almost any amount of experiments and facts known to be true.

Division Ninth.

CHAPTER I. REFLECTION.

SECTION I.

1. REFLECTION is the act or operation of the mind by which it turns its views, or thoughts, back upon itself or its operations. Memory is the power by which past thoughts or events are retained, commanded, or recalled; but reflection is the power by which the thoughts are turned back upon themselves, or upon past events or facts. 2. *By this power* our thoughts may be thrown back upon the past, or upon that which is absent. In this way the field of past events can be entered, and diligent search instituted, in regard to facts which are desired to be used by the mind in forming combinations, or in tracing relations and associations of truths. 3. Reflection is *involuntary*, when it takes place without any willing or intentional effort; and the prominence of some truth or fact, under its action, may, in its relation to other things, give rise to repeated action in many different ways, while there is an internal desire or inclination to direct the mind to some other object, or in some other way. 4. It is *voluntary* when we pause the action of the mental powers, and throw back our thoughts in search of

some express object, or for some special purpose; and in connection with this is the exercise of the judgment, and the presence of reason. 5. It is connected with the power of reason, but more intimately is it connected with the power of *remembering* past perceptions, and past mental acts or processes, so that they can be compared with present facts, feelings, and inclinations as experienced by the same sentient being. It traces the laws by which the processes of mental action are governed, regulated, and known.

SECTION II.

1. While the mind, by the power of *reflection*, is canvassing and considering past events or realities, there is called into action the power of memory, comparison, and judgment, which give rise to new states of mind, and new trains of thought. 2. In connection with these, there *arises certain internal convictions*, and the exercise of an intuitive belief in the existence of external and internal realities. They are embraced by, or are objects of the understanding, without being connected in any chain of reasoning. Here the action of the mind rests upon facts or elements which are original, or enter into our natural constitution. These primary truths are prominent when we are under the influence of careful reflection. 3. Under the *process of reflecting*, we are confident that we experience an internal conviction and belief that we are real existences, and that we possess cogitative minds, with powers superior to materiality. 4. While the action of the mind

is paused to give place to *mature and deliberate reflection*, there arises, in connection with the mind's intuitions, a conviction of the truthfulness of the report of the senses, and the power to believe in the reality of external things. 5. *The importance* of reflection is invaluable. It leads to the safest and most effectual preventives of evil, and enables us to take, in due time, the necessary steps to avoid danger and ruin.

CHAPTER II.

CONNECTION AND INFLUENCE OF THE BODY UPON
THE MIND.—
SECTION I.

1. The *mysterious union* of mind with matter can never be defined in this life so as to leave no doubt in regard to the subject; but the fact that such a union exists is knowledge which can not be doubted. The soul is the life of the body, and the body without the soul is inactive and lifeless, or dead. 2. Temporal death has *power* over and terminates the life of the body; but it has no annihilating power over any of its essential elements, as we have no evidence that any thing of either matter or mind can or will ever cease to be. 3. The effect which temporal death has upon us, so far as we can understand, goes no further than to *destroy the ties of affection* which unite the two natures in one, decomposing and scattering the elements of our physical nature, while the soul has, in one sense, experienced freedom from the inertness of earthly organs. 4. Temporal death can have *no power* over the soul's being, or in limiting its power of action in any possible way. 5. It can have no *destructive power* over either intuitive or acquired knowledge. True knowledge will ever live in the imperishable soul, and flourish in immortality.

SECTION II.

1. *Intellectual action* can be rendered imperfect by the disorders, frailties, and imperfections of the human body. All these affect the developments of mind, and give origin or influence to mental states contrary to its ordinary principles, and in violation to the laws of its natural constitutional organization or existence. 2. We can not have conceptions of mind within, and of itself, as being capable of ever *deviating* from correctness, in all its processes, attended with uniform harmony: hence, all its volitions of uniformity in action are wholly attributed to the effect or influence of the physical organs upon them. We are not to conclude that, because the strong-minded young man becomes forgetful, blind, and deaf in old age, his soul or mind is dying, or is becoming powerless on its journey to annihilation. Speak of the occurrences of early life, and they are fresh in his memory. Apply the optic to his eye, and he can see; with the ear-trumpet he can hear. All these facts are evidences that the internal power is not lost, but is trammeled by increasing bodily infirmities. 3. It is impossible for us to believe that an *idiot* will be lost in the future world, for he is incapable of doing an intentional wrong from knowledge; and it is equally impossible that an idiot should exist an idiot in heaven, for as such he could not answer any wise purpose or design of his Creator; but it is reasonable to believe that when his deformed body suffers the paralyzing touch of death his soul will be free, and possessed of rational powers, in the right use of which he will ever love and

adore the Author of unending bliss. 4. The mind, in some instances, under the influence of bodily infirmities, *revolts* from its natural uniformity of action, and violates the laws by which its processes have been regulated. In seeking for the causes of this, we need go no farther back than the diseases and deformities of the body. It is impossible to describe the variety of ways in which the bodily organs are affected by disease, or to trace from a cause a corresponding effect upon the mind; but that the mind can be, and is affected by such things, is too plain to admit of any doubt.

SECTION III.

1. The physical system, when advanced in years, or is under the infirmities of age, does not affect the *internal operations* of the mind as it does the mediums by and through which it holds intercourse with external things. The internal mental states and processes can take place, or be carried on, without any special reference to the external world, and consequently they are not dependent upon the external senses. The physical organs may be so diseased that the external senses become incapable of proper discrimination or action, but the internal elements and operations of the mind remain vigorous and active, though the earthly house of this tabernacle is being dissolved. 2. The *influence of disease* will and does affect the action or operations of the mind, whether the individual thus affected be advanced in life or be possessed of the vigors of youth. Many persons, on recovering from violent attacks of fever,

or other diseases, lose their memory so that they can not recall past events. Others can not calculate, and some individuals can not recognize their nearest friends. These influences generally pass away in a short time with young persons of vigorous constitutions, while some older persons never recover entirely. 3. The mind may be affected or excited by affecting influences upon the *nervous system*. That which produces acute pain, as is experienced in amputating a limb, or in piercing the nerve of a tooth, will arouse the mind to its utmost capability of action. More soothing effects are produced by the application of gases, or other strong stimulants. These show the connection of mind with matter, and the influence which matter has upon mind. 4. *Intense excitement* of the mind has a very great influence upon the body. Sudden fright or imminent danger will often shake the whole nervous system, and in some instances death has ensued. Cases have been mentioned, where persons suddenly exposed to danger have been so affected that the hair of the head has become white in a short time; others fall sick immediately, and often go deranged, or sink into the embrace of death.

SECTION IV.

1. *Excited imagination and conceptions* often exist in connection with hypochondria. Instances are referred to where persons assert that they have real conceptions of fearful-looking beings, and of awful calamities just about to take place; others imagine that they are sick with some special disease, or that

they have become deformed. A man has been mentioned, who imagined that his nose had become so enlarged that it filled his bedroom, and that there was not room for the door to open in order to admit any person to render him assistance without afflicting his nose, and causing insupportable pain. He was relieved by a man blowing through the keyhole for the purpose of driving away the inflammation. On opening the door gradually, he pretended to reduce the inflammation by an application of ointment till he advanced to the bed. Then he succeeded in persuading him that his nose was cured, upon which the invalid rose and walked about. 2. Another man has been referred to, who *imagined* that he had two small black dogs in his stomach. His physician failing to correct his supposition, proposed vomiting as an effectual cure. When the invalid raised to vomit the second time, the physician, before laying him back to rest, disclosed two small black dogs, exclaiming, "Here they are!" It is stated that the sick man, on seeing them, lifted his languid eyes, thanking Heaven that he was freed from them. 3. An instance is recorded of a man, who imagined himself to be *really dead*. His physician, finding it impossible to change his mind, proposed burying him. He was placed in a coffin, and sentinels were stationed along the road to make unpleasant remarks. As the procession moved on, the first sentinel cried out, "Who have you got there?" On being answered, he continued, "O, happy thing he is gone!" This seemed to have some effect upon the invalid. The second cried out, "Who have you there?" On being informed, he

continued to say, "We are all glad he is dead; he was a great scoundrel; pity he had not died years ago." At that the invalid mutteringly remarked, "If I was not dead I would pay you for that." The third cried out, "Who is dead?" On hearing the name, he responded, "Good! I have no doubt but that he is gone to destruction; the devil has his own at last." At this the dead man bounded from his coffin, and pursued the sentinel through the streets. These only show how the mind can be affected by its connection with a diseased body. The mind within itself is rational.

CHAPTER III. APPARITIONS.

SECTION I.

1. APPARITIONS are only another source of evidence, showing the connection and influence which physical organs have over mental states. Such appearances, or visibilities, are mere appearances, and are opposed to realiy. Persons often speak of seeing angels, or individuals who are absent from them. Others suppose they see ghosts or spirits of departed friends. That angels can and have been seen, in ages past, we do not doubt; and we know of no well-grounded reason why spirits may not reveal themselves to us in this age of the world; yet such things never were common or frequent events, and we have no well-grounded reasons why they should appear now. It is much easier for us to be deceived in regard to such things than it is to be not deceived; but by repeated efforts the mind may become possessed with excited conceptions, and it become common for us to speak of seeing spirits, or persons who are distant, with the utmost confidence, when there is no reality in regard to such things, and we are laboring under a delusion. 2. These may be *caused* by the effect and influence of disease upon the *eye*. All that enters into the composition of the *eye* is more or less affected by disease. The transparent

properties are liable to change, so as to present the appearance of objects which do not exist. It can be discovered that a change in the appearance of the outer divisions of the eye have taken place while the person is under the influence of severe disease, or after their recovery. 3. *Disease* often affects the nerves and delicate cords by which the eyeball is directed, or is moved, so as to cause a quick or an irregular motion, presenting objects which, at the time can not be accounted for.

SECTION II.

1. The effect produced upon the *retina, or optic nerve*, is the greatest cause of deception, giving rise to perceptions of objects as real, which do not exist at the time the perception is experienced by the mind. Violent attacks of fever, or some other disease, often produce a morbid sensibility of the retina, or optic nerve. This fact can be arrived at with safety from that which is experienced by persons under the influence of disease. The organ of the visual sense is far more perfect in health than it is when diseased, and it is not a difficult task to mark the variations of its power passing under the influence of different kinds of disease. 2. If disease has power to *change* the form or condition of the eye, or diminish its power in any way, this may cause a change in the direction of the rays of light upon the optic nerve, and cause appearances as real where they do not exist. 3. *Internal mental excitement* may have power to change, in some way, the retina, or optic nerve, in whole or in part, so as to

give origin to perceptions of existences which have no present or real being. This would suppose self-power with nervous constitutions to affect the optic nerve, by sudden alarm or excitement, so as to give origin to the notion of entities where they do not exist; and as such changes belong to the physical system, and as such perceptions, through the medium of the visual sense, are not intentional or voluntary, that which is seen and thought to be real, which, in fact, has no existence, is at first received with the utmost confidence, and often requires a strict exercise of reason in correcting the perceptions arising in this way.

CHAPTER IV. SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS.

SECTION I.

1. SPECTRAL *illusions* may be regarded as being of more importance than is proper or right. Those who are accustomed to such illusions have, as a general thing, the utmost confidence that the beings they see are real, and that they themselves can not indulge any doubt in regard to such things as being true. A man of our acquaintance, who gives evidence of being a good man, and truthful in all things, has given accounts of frequently seeing angels and the spirits of his departed friends, and of his conversation to them, with as much solemnity and confidence as he has in believing in his own existence; yet he never could succeed in getting any answer to his inquiries from them. 2. An instance has been recorded of a man who was advanced in life, possessed of a good or sound mind, and having enjoyed good health, in the latter years of his life he had almost *daily visitations* from spectral forms. These forms or figures generally appeared as human beings. The forms often varied, but the countenances appeared to be the same. He could see them at different times, and with his eyes either opened or closed. By pressure on his eyes, they disappeared; yet, when they were present, their

appearance was pleasant, and their features were clear and distinct. Any stimulant or excitement increased the number of those visitors. By examining this history, we have no difficulty in accounting for these spectral beings, as any thing which excited him produced the presence of those existences. His constitution was so easily affected, that the optic nerve was influenced by the same, and forms appeared which had no existence. 3. *Irregular and sudden dreams* may lead to the same kind of deception. It is not unfrequently the case, that persons studying intensely on some subject, or after the mind becomes weary in pursuing some train of thought, suddenly to fall asleep for a moment, without being sensible of the fact, the mind uninterruptedly perceives its succession of thoughts. Some persons, or figures, appear in a dream; the person starts suddenly, with the impression that what he saw was real, and, losing sight of the intermediate state of slumber, he believes that that which has been seen is real. It is frequently the case, that when persons thus suddenly dream of some alarming appearance, on waking they will realize, for some time, a view of the same thing, and in probably the same place they dreamed it was. This may be caused by excited conceptions in connection with the influence the startled mind has in affecting the optic nerve. 4. Some feeble constitutions, when in solitude, with the busy world closed out from the mind, and the existence of external things seemingly separated from the senses, experience such *intense mental impressions and conceptions* that, after a brief space of time, such

conceptions of things, or of forms, have been so vivid that, under the action of memory, they are called up as real, and they become objects of belief, and are finally reported as real occurrences. A case is recorded of a man, who had heard of the sudden death of an intimate friend, which caused great agony of mind. At night that friend appeared before him. All the particular peculiarities of his features and dress were distinctly presented to his view, and on advancing toward him, he appeared to melt away in the air. This may be accounted for by the visual organ being affected or influenced by the excitement of the mind on that subject. There are natural causes for all these things, if carefully examined, or, at least, such as will be satisfactory to the mind; yet it is impossible to explain away all the mysteries connected with the most simple existence in nature. But the idea of specters and phantoms can create more excitement in the world than the mysteries connected with real existences. To say that angels or disembodied spirits can not, under any circumstances, be seen by earthly intelligences, is only to make an assertion without either reason, evidence, or facts in science to support it; but that which we are contending for is, that no one should place any confidence in the real truthfulness of phantoms and specters which can be so easily accounted for on natural principles, or from that which may be styled natural causes.

SECTION II.

1. *Images or persons*, which seem to appear to individuals influenced out of the ordinary way, either physically, or by the effect of excited minds upon physical organs, seldom speak or answer any questions; but, in some instances, they are reported as having conversed. There is a case recorded, where a man, mourning over the loss of his wife, who had been the victim of sudden death, realized, as he thought, while in deep study, the door of his room open. The form of his wife reappeared, and informed him that she had entered into rest, and desired him to prepare for the same happiness in the future. The specter could have been the result of a change in the visual organs, while the language he thought she spoke might have originated in a dream of which he was not sensible, the mind being intensely exercised at the time. 2. There is further proof that spectral illusions will arise in connection with *intense mental excitement*. A case of this kind has been mentioned, in regard to a man who, at one time, thought he was about to be wrecked at sea. He maintained that he distinctly saw, during the greatest danger, his family in the same perilous condition, though they were distant. Men who have fallen from buildings say that almost the entire prominent scenes and events of their lives rushed through their minds ere they reached the ground. 3. Though the *majority of spectral illusions* can be accounted for in some way, yet no reasonable mind will deny but that there are cases recorded, if they be true, which no philosophical argument or research

can account for in a clear and satisfactory manner. A case has been given, and attested as true, of a man who was seated in a worshiping congregation, who suddenly shrieked out with great intrepidity, rising to his feet, steadily looking toward the stand, and exclaimed, "Do you not see the minister clothed in a shroud?" In a few minutes the minister, who had not yet arrived, came, entered the stand, and preached. Before the next Sabbath he was dead, and in his grave. If this be true, what rule in metaphysics can solve the mystery? 4. The *use of anodynes and opiates* is often the occasion of giving rise to spectral illusions. Instances have been known where persons have taken opium, and, while under its influence, without having fallen under the influence of sleep, and perfectly conscious of all that was passing, the form of some friend, about whose safety they had great concern, appeared to their visual organ of sense, and, though knowing at the time that it was only a mere phantom, yet they could not banish it away. We can but conclude that spectral illusions have their origin in connection with the condition of the physical organs.

SECTION III.

1. *Nyctalopia*, in its various forms, exerts no annihilating power over the mental elements, but exhibits a peculiar acuteness and power of the visual organ, by which the sensibility of the optic nerve must be very much increased. This is only another evidence that the optic nerve is capable of various changes, and that the presence of spectral illusions

depends upon certain influences affecting the retina, or optic nerve. If the eye was perfect in all its parts, and free from the power of disease, it would be free from the presence of phantoms, or specters. 2. The *brain* can be easily affected by erroneous impressions while the body is under the influence of disease. Errors which at one time have been received as real, are apt to return in affliction and excite the mind. The disease, in connection with these mental emotions, tending toward the brain, increases the confusion and sight, and at times the hearing becomes influenced or changed in some way so as to deceive us. 3. Those who are approaching *epileptic* fits, often are troubled with the appearing of phantoms or specters. The evidence of a man has been recorded, who says that the prelude to the paroxysm with him was, the appearing of a peculiar, looking human being, who struck him on the head; then the paroxysm commenced. This specter was, no doubt, caused by the effect the approaching attack had upon the brain and eyes. 4. The influence of *febrile diseases* upon the peculiar sensitiveness of some constitutions, may be regarded as occasions of the origin of spectral illusions. A case has been given, where a man thus affected, while under the influence of a violent pain in the head, distinctly saw his family in the room, who were, at that time, three thousand miles distant. A lady has been mentioned, who, under the influence of severe illness, saw her father, at different times, come into her room, and speak in his natural tone of voice, though he had not been there at any time. The records of the past contain any number of

cases, varying in some respects ; but they establish the fact that diseased physical organs have an influence over the mind. 5. *A too highly-excited imagination* may lead to a belief in existences as real when they are not. An excitable mind, when aroused, will and can imagine fearful sounds, or the footsteps of an enemy approaching. They see something in the distance, which appears to draw near; and as it appears to come, it enlarges with more perfect form, till the beholder is so terrified as to be awed or overcome with fear. 6. The *sense of sight* is not the only one of the senses which can be affected by disease. All the senses can be so influenced as to lead to deception. The ear can be so affected that we can have conceptions of sounds as real which never existed. Taste may lead to deception. The sense of smelling may deceive us, and the same is true of feeling. 7. *All these facts* show that our knowledge, which we receive through the medium of the senses, can be rendered uncertain, as these organs can be so easily affected by disease; but our internal knowledge of the existence of self can not be doubted, as we do not depend upon any physical elements in arriving at the certainty of such knowledge, or in knowing that we do really exist.

CHAPTER V.

SPIRIT-RAPPING.

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SECTION I.

1. NECROMANCY, though not intimately or closely connected with mental science, yet it has been involved with mental phenomena, for the purpose of adding importance to the office of modern teachers, or those who would be gifted in enchantment or conjuring. It is styled, or called, the art of revealing future facts or events. There is a pretended medium, or means of communication, with the dead, or with minds disembodied. Philosophy knows no rule, or way, by or in which finite and disembodied spirits can convey words or ideas to us, only through the medium of the senses. This would require that such spiritual agencies should be tangible, and if tangible why not visible? 2. *Spirit-rapping* may be called a delusion. That some peculiar nervous constitutions may be affected in a way mysterious to the individuals themselves, and to others, is perfectly correct; but that such physical constitutions are, or can be, the medium of other finite spirits in communicating facts to us from the spirit-world, is contrary to the laws of both mind and matter, and must be absurd. 3. Persons who style themselves *mediums* may be sincere in not understanding why the physical organs have an involuntary action, and often contrary

to their wish. The delusion is not in the fact that such action takes place, but it exists in the fact that their excited minds refer the cause of such action to spirits, when it is natural to their peculiar nervous constitutions. The difficulty is that they do not understand the peculiar sensitiveness which is natural to the frailty of their own physical systems, where the *cause* of motion, by which mediums write or convey their messages, exists. That palsied man can not tell why he shakes contrary to his will; yet he knows that it is even so. He might attribute such action to spirits with as much propriety as a medium can refer to them—the motion by which his hand writes. The mere turning of the mind of a nervous person to the thought that they are moved by spirits, will startle them, and cause involuntary action. If they can keep their own excited spirits from rapping out thoughts by accidental marks, or their own intentional thoughts, they will not be likely to ever be troubled by the spirits of others.

4. If it is *right* for finite spirits to communicate future events to us after they have left the world, why is it done in such an obscure way, and with so much doubt or imperfection? It is reasonable to suppose that such knowledge is perfect, and that it should be conveyed correctly; then why should they move a nervous arm to write it out with irregular or accidental motions? If it is right that they should send important messages to earth, it has always been so; then why have the spirits of dear departed friends been so idle and careless in this respect, during the past ages of the world?

SECTION II.

1. That *disembodied spirits* can reveal facts, or ideas to us, must be either true or false. If false, further argument would be useless; but if true, then those privileges and communications must be either right or wrong. If right, they are not only permitted, but take place according to the will and purposes of Deity. If these things are ordered of Heaven, they must be right in his sight, and arranged for the good and happiness of this world's inhabitants. All means employed by infinite Wisdom for the happiness of this world's inhabitants, are adapted to all ages and all circumstances connected with our race; therefore, such messages would not have been delayed for the discoveries of modern mediums, and without any special regard to the moral character of such agents. 2. If these things be *ordered and sent by* the divine Being, the object must be pure and holy, and all connected influences and operations must correspond in purity and holiness. Then, none but holy beings can reveal such messages, or be mediums for pure spirits. None but good messages can be sent, and such as are calculated to do good to man, and cause him to glorify God. 3. Therefore, according to all our *ideas* of infinite purity, and the holiness of good spirits, it would be utterly impossible for such spirits to communicate to any on earth but pure and holy mediums. 4. The *character* of all such messages must not only be pure, but they must correspond with truth as it is evidenced in the works of nature; and they must agree with the volume of revelation, and in no case deviate from its truths.

SECTION III.

1. But if the tidings thus revealed be *impure, or contrary* to these sources of truth, we have a right to suspect that the medium is bad, or is vile in heart; and if this be true, the spirit which moves or influences such an unholy medium, must be vile or wicked within itself. 2. If such a *spirit* is from Satan, or from under his influence, we have a right to question its declarations, as Satan would not have any truth published to us, as that would thwart his own interests and purposes. Then, if such tidings be from an evil source, and calculated to lead to delusion and misery, the less we have of such news the better it will be for the world. We have a right to doubt the correctness and truthfulness of such things, as we have no evidence that the Lord ever intended to instruct the world in this way. 3. This view of the subject would compel us to believe in, and to be much influenced by what has been called *demonology*. This would comport with the intimations of some of the alchemists of England, who profess to have borrowed much of their skill, in turning common metals into silver and gold, from Satan. We know not what or how much power Satan may have over wicked men, in regard to such things, but one thing appears to be certain, that tidings calculated to do good, and from a pure source, never could come from an unholy medium. If spirit-rappings be true, we have no evidence that they could be either ordered or blessed of Heaven. 4. As *these things* have been improperly connected with mental phenomena by many writers, we can only add that

the philosophy of mind knows no principle or action of the mind, abstracted from the peculiar sensitiveness of physical organs, which is capable of forming a basis for such spiritual revelations.

CHAPTER VI.

EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY.

SECTION I.

1. WE understand by *excited conceptions* those conceptions which arise, or take place, in connection with an excited nervous system and vivid or highly-wrought mental states. An unnatural excitement of mind depends very much upon the proper organization and health of the physical powers. A defective organized physical nature often impedes the development of mind, in certain respects, and is the occasion of the mind acting too powerfully in other ways or through other organs more perfect. This leads to extraordinary developments of mind in certain respects, or in regard to certain degrees of strength, while there is almost a total deficiency in regard to other qualities or powers. A mind blessed with an extraordinary memory is apt to be deficient in judgment. Often when strong or certain extraordinary gifts or powers are pressed a little too hard, or with severe efforts, the physical organs, through which such action is made, give way, or become paralyzed, so that a state of insanity, or of partial insanity, is the result. 2. A mind with *unusual power of action*, connected with a frail, nervous system, which is gradually sinking by disease, may overpower the strength of

the physical organs, with which its action is connected, and become bewildered with excited conceptions till the system becomes paralyzed, and the mind either inactive or incapable of rational life. 3. *The strong physical constitution* may retain its strength, while some organ essential to the right use of reason may become diseased or prostrated by some extraordinary mental effort, leaving the mind to wander amid the wilderness of excited conceptions, and the imaginations of things that exist only in phantom. 4. *General debility*, caused by disease, often produces excited conceptions, or a wildness of thought, which disqualifies the mind for usefulness; yet general debility, caused by disease, seldom affects or exists in connection with all the organs of sense in the same way, or to the same degree. An important law in regard to disease is, its sympathetic tendency to the weakest physical organ. Those physical organs connected with the more powerful influence or action of the mind, are apt to become fatigued or weakened; then, in a low state of health, they are the concentrated objects of disease. This tends to affect the mind, producing excited conceptions, wildness of thought, stupor, or delirium.

SECTION II.

1. We can not conceive that the mind, abstractly, or within and of itself, *is capable of either excited conceptions or of delirium*; for these affections can exist only in its connection with the body, otherwise delirium or idiocy might exist on forever, which is absurd. 2. Excited conceptions, connected with the

sense of sight, may vary in degrees of strength, in different minds, without any perceptible variation caused by disease. The ardor of the mind, in connection with a vigorous imagination, may give rise to excited conceptions of things and events as real.

3. Such *conceptions* may arise in connection with some emotion of spirit or mental excitement. Great anxiety of mind in regard to some approaching event, or the arrival of a dear friend, who has been long absent, may bias the mind. With what fondness the eye traces the road till the track is lost in the distance! Ever and anon we imagine we see an object approaching, and if some one should appear, we can imagine the features of our friend, till the shortened distance checks our hope with disappointment.

4. The excitement of *great joy* often gives rise to excited conceptions, and we see things very differently, for a short length of time, from what we do ordinarily; and it is frequently the case that we have conceptions of things which were not present at the time, and we are deceived in regard to magnitude, qualities, and form.

5. The effect produced by *grief or despair* appears to so affect the mind as to almost hang the earth in mourning. Under such influences we have conceptions only of scenes or facts, like those we have just witnessed; and as the thoughts pioneer the road of misfortune, we have vivid conceptions of series of calamities, which become the principal objects of mental action.

SECTION III.

1. Though the principal cause of excited concep-

tions of sight may be found in the effect and influence which disease exerts upon the *visual organ and the brain*, an instance is recorded of a man, whose physical organs were so affected, that for months, in his waking hours, he saw passing through the field of vision the forms of men, women, animals, and birds. Under all such exciting influences, the mind is only advancing to a midway condition between a rational state and that of insanity. Too much excitement has a destructive influence upon a well-balanced mind, and much more destructive upon those not so well guarded. 2. The mind is capable of excited conceptions, in connection with *sound*. These take place in connection with great mental excitement. Many cases are given where persons, having conceptions of human forms, have, in connection with them, conceptions of sound, as they not only hear them speak, but rehearse that which they say; yet excited conceptions of sound are common with some persons, when there is nothing of the kind takes place in relation to the sight. When the mind is abstracted from the world at large, and pursuing some train of thought, or is in silent meditation, it is apt to be suddenly startled by some singular sound, as that of music, the hum of a wheel, or that of a voice speaking or calling. The peculiar excitement of the moment increases the vividness of the excited conception, and that which seemed to be heard becomes an object, or objects, of belief. 3. Many instances are given in history, where men, on the eve of some great event or daring expedition, have their minds so intensely excited that they suddenly rouse and cry out, "Who

called me?" We know not why excitement may not affect the auditory nerve as well as the optic nerve. Disease which affects the head can, and often does, give rise to excited conceptions of sound. These are evidences that internal operations of the mind are more to be depended upon as true than the certainty of that which is reported to the mind through the medium of the senses. 4. It is remarkable how acute the hearing of persons becomes under the influence of a severe fever. They are often troubled with conceptions of what was said; and when they appear to be delirious for an hour or two, yet they can recollect, in moments of relief, a part, if not all that was said, when it was thought by those who spoke that they were not conscious of what was passing. Often, in conversing so low in the room of sick persons that the parties themselves can barely understand each other, the sick can hear and understand all that is said. May we not infer from this that, though disease and death may affect the body, yet the soul remains vigorous in power of action evermore?

SECTION IV.

1. *Excited conceptions*, in connection with the sense of touch, are not so common or important as those which have been already noticed; yet, under the influence of disease, it is not uncommon for conceptions to be experienced in regard to the cause, location, and character of such afflictions, which are deceptive. A certain individual, under a lingering disease, became established in the belief that he

could feel the motions of a snake living in his stomach. Another man said that there were small snakes in his veins, and that the veins would expand as they coursed their onward way. It is frequently the case that afflicted persons have conceptions of others laying their head upon them, or touching them, so as to often cause pain or unpleasant sensations. 2. Similar *variations* exist in regard to the *other senses*, which can be supplied at the discretion of the reader. The cases already referred to may readily lead the mind to call up clearer and stronger cases, in which there is evidence of influences which give rise to excited conceptions, uneasiness, and wildness of thought. All such instances are evidence of the departure of the mind from its true balance and correct action. There is great danger of delirium or insanity, to some extent, if the mind is permitted to take up one idea, or subject, and dwell upon it exclusively. If the mind does not tire in dwelling on one subject for a long period of time, but rather loses all relish for all things else quickening in its action, insanity, to some extent, is almost certain. Never dwell too long on any one subject, if you would preserve a healthy mental action and avoid insanity. 3. Excited conceptions may be caused by the influence of disease upon the *whole nervous system*, under which the mind becomes unusually excited, immediately followed by indications of a bewildered wildness. It can be caused by a highly-aggravated spinal affection. The sensitive connection existing between the part affected and the brain, often causes an irregular mental action, while the countenance and expression

of the eye will indicate an improper change. 4. It may be caused by *inflammation or other diseases of the brain.* A fracture of the skull, or a removal of a part of the brain, are apt to affect the exercise of the mental powers. Any thing like nervous prostration, or severe attacks of fever, affecting the cerebral substance, will affect or influence, to some extent, the correct or right use of the mental processes; and when this takes place, there is connected with it excited conceptions or wild notions of imagination. 5. The last general cause we shall notice is, that which exists in *febrile influences* upon the physical organs. This influence is not only general upon the system, but the exciting effect it produces upon the nervous system, and the brain in particular, causes singular and strange excited irregularities in the action of the mental powers.

CHAPTER VII.

PARTIAL INSANITY.

SECTION I.

1. THE mind, under the influence of *partial insanity*, is disqualified for healthy action; though the mind, thus affected, may appear perfectly sane or correct on some subjects, yet it is the reverse on other topics. Often, when such a mind is employed on subjects foreign from those upon which it is wild, all appears to be right and reasonable; but when we speak of any thing which has a relevancy or connection with that upon which its action is imperfect, there is an immediate change in the excitability of the mental state or action, and from this the chain of thoughts begin to disconnect, and the mind wanders, till the old theme is brought up with all the vigor of which the mind is capable. There is an instance recorded, where a man was charged with insanity, when, on being brought before the court for examination, he gave no evidence of insanity, though thoroughly tested. When the case was about to be dismissed, an intimate friend proposed that he be asked when he was going to judge the world. He was instantly excited, and assumed the character of the judge of the universe 2. The mind may be called *partially insane* when it gives evidence of wildness upon certain topics only peri-

odically. There are such persons who, at times, and in their deliberate moments, appear to be reasonable and mild in their feelings or disposition; but, at other times, they can not control the action of their mental powers. With care and proper treatment, some of this class of persons can be restored. 3. Another class of individuals appear to be *sane* on all the events or occurrences of their early life, but can not converse, in a connected way, upon recent facts or events. This change is clearly the effect of physical debility by the influence or power of disease. If the difficulty existed wholly in the mind, past events would be forgotten as readily as those of recent occurrence, and the imperfect action of the mind would apply to the one as well as the other. 4. *This affection* may exist in the unhealthy state or defective action of one or more of the mental faculties, though the mind may act correctly, with the exception of the affected element or department. Though such a defect is difficult to define, the only way in which we can form any thing like a correct idea is, in watching the character of mental action, or the defects in the manifestation of mental powers corresponding to the office of certain elements, and the change that has taken place in regard to such action.

SECTION II.

1. The *influence of insanity* can exist in connection with the judgment. When there is no healthy action of this power, if the mind loses the correct power of perceiving relations, and of rightly dis-

criminating differences, it can not confidently decide upon the same, or in relation to them; and when decisions are thus made, they are as likely to be absurd as correct, or they are almost certain to be wrong in some way. And where the decisions of the mind are wrong, or if right, it is so by mere accident, and to which the mind does not seem inclined to abide or adhere only for the moment, we have clear evidence of partial insanity. The mind appears to arrive at conclusions accidentally, and to abandon them at pleasure, so that its action is like a log floating upon the waves of the sea, and its decisions can not be depended upon. 2. Partial insanity may be connected with the *imperfect action of original suggestion*. The ideas and convictions which arise in connection with this power of the mind, must be objects of belief or unwavering confidence. We must believe that we exist, and that we have personal identity, and that the objects of belief remain unchanged; for without this belief we can not be sane. The facts which arise by and in connection with this faculty, must be realized on; and if this function is alienated, or ceases correct action, we, in proportion, cease to be sane. 3. The power of *association* may act so imperfectly that the decisions of the mind can not be regarded as correct. When the power of associating ideas or facts is defective, there is evidence of great recklessness in the arrangement of facts. The thoughts appear to fly in every direction, and words are apt to be used without number, and without any special force, unless they be to weary those to whom they are addressed. Minds of this character seldom ever retain

the objects of conversation for any length of time. All that the mind dwells upon seems to be visionary and like the morning cloud or early dew. Such minds can not be depended upon; for every thing appears to be uncertain and confusion. Arguments will not be listened to; reason is of no consideration; the erratic motions of the mind, sweeping a thousand different things, exhausts the power of speech, yet nothing definite is accomplished. 4. The power of reason may be *defective* as to correct action. Facts can only be received as abstract truths, as there is no power of reason in connecting facts together, or of forcing a conclusion from the premises. There appears to be no power of tracing effects to cause, or of reasoning from cause to effect. All chains of thought are disconnected. But the worst feature is that where the premises are not recognized, and conclusions are made without either premises or correct argument. It consists in asserting a thing to be so, and will not be moved from the same by any possible fact or timely consideration. These minds are far removed from any probable correction. 5. There is another class who evidence *insanity* by the celerity of the reasoning power in hasty deductions or quick conclusions. There is a quick, shrewd cunning, and by either watching the movements or appearance, they can suspect the conclusion without waiting to scan the intermediate steps. If any special design is indulged in regard to them, such as placing them in confinement, they are apt to suspect something of the kind from mere observation.

SECTION III.

1. The *physical organs* connected with the senses, or the action of the senses, may, under the influence of disease, cause the deception in the character of sensations experienced, and a state of partial insanity ensue. This brings us to the general cause of insanity, the effect of material organs upon the action of the mind, which are imperfect within themselves, or are paralyzed in some way by disease. 2. *Partial insanity* may exist in connection with the power of perception. Perceptions of internal processes of the mind can not be connected with insanity only as it is affected by the physical nature, either directly or indirectly, as we can have no conceptions of mind aside and apart from the body in its fallen state, as being any thing but sane within and of itself; but perceptions of external things are more apt to deceive us, or to become so influenced as to bring the mind under partial insanity. This reference of the internal mental state to the outward cause may be trammeled or improperly influenced. All such influences have their effect upon the correct action of the mind. If sensation corresponds in any way to the external cause, then perception, which is an immediate sequence, must agree with the internal mental state, and both sensation and perception are dependent upon the healthy state and action of the physical organs; otherwise, it would appear evident that there could be no deception involving any thing like insanity. But, from the true state of the case, insanity may exist, in part, in connection with or under the influence of disease. 3. *Partial insanity*

often exists in connection with the power exercised in accrediting testimony. Such minds never find any thing too hard to believe. If that which is narrated is unreasonably extravagant, it is believed with the same degree of confidence that exists in believing truth: hence, all that is heard, if real or true, and though such information be right, the reverse of that which has just been presented, yet both are often regarded as true. In this way things which conflict with each other, whether in classes or otherwise, are objects of belief. The great difficulty appears to exist in the fact that the mind is incapable of comparing contraries together, and of discovering the difference between truth and falsehood.

4. *Another trait of insanity* exists in connection with a loss of confidence in every thing. The mind is disposed to doubt every thing, and the more we try to relieve such a mind, by presenting truths or facts for its action and consideration, the more disinclined it is to believe. No doubt but that many false notions and doctrines are imbibed and taught by partially-insane persons; and such persons should be adjudged of guilt or crime in proportion to the healthy action of the mental powers. Nevertheless, this should never be pleaded in the defense of criminals, in order to clear them; for if they are so insane as to be guilty of horrible crimes, molesting the peace and happiness of society, they should be cared for, and placed, as a merciful act, where they could not have the privilege of committing such injuries; and if they commit such offenses without being insane, they should never be cleared upon the ground of insanity, though they may feign insanity, or it

may be pleaded for them. 5. *Indolent habits* have a tendency to mental alienation. Such habits increase as age advances. The vigor of youth will serve as a stimulant, counteracting such influences, till the individual is passing into confirmed adult years. Then this vivacity begins to diminish, while indolence increases; and with the increase of such habits of indolence, the bodily energies and organs become affected or weakened by the power of disease, which follows, though it be barely perceptible. The mind ceases to act correctly, and it is plainly evident that dotage has set in, and the mental powers have been rendered imperfect in action.

SECTION IV.

1. Partial insanity may be induced, or it may have its origin in connection with *too great physical efforts*. The physical constitution is capable of performing a certain amount of service, under which it will preserve the greatest amount of health and activity; and to pass beyond that is abuse, and tends to destroy the health of the body and the correct activity of the mind. 2. It sometimes results from a *too high-wrought zeal of soul, or too great a degree of mental excitement*. In proportion as the mind becomes excited beyond the bounds of propriety, is there danger of the physical organs being overpowered and paralyzed, so that mental action, in some way, will be defective. A certain young man, with a well-educated mind, stepped into a shop to try on his wedding coat, and while there, a messenger came in haste to tell him that his intended was then

on the floor being married to another man. The excitement in regard to such an unexpected occurrence overpowered him, and in fifteen minutes he was said to be mentally deranged, from which he never recovered, though he lived some forty years after the event of his derangement. 3. *Any unnatural excitement* will, at times, affect the mind unfavorably in some way. All fits of anger should be avoided as deadly poison. Revenge should be expelled from every heart, and should be regarded as one of the worst foes to our race in the effect which it produces upon the development and regularity of mental action. Perhaps the first effect produced by such influences will be fits of stupor and peevishness, then self-chagrin, with loathful melancholy. These will be followed by a decline of health, or the inactivity of some organ upon which the mind is dependent, and influenced in its action. 4. *Repeated mental excitement* affects mental action in some way when it does not amount to insanity. Public speakers, who draw heavily upon their powers repeatedly and under great excitement, suffer, at some periods, uninvoked mental influences, which border on insanity, and give them much trouble. It is often a source of trouble to ministers who speak often and under great excitement. Such heavy draws upon the nervous system, and especially the brain, which is regarded as the organ of the mind, have a tendency to affect, in some way, the action of the mind. Though their minds may remain clear, firm, and decisive in action for many years, yet, at some unexpected hour, they may change in regard to their views on many subjects. Such persons are not to be regarded as

having intentionally and maliciously changed in their views, nor are they to be held so strictly accountable as earlier years would require. Though unwilling to acknowledge it, yet the truth is the nerves and cerebral mass have been so heated and taxed with repeated excitement and efforts, that the mind becomes flighty, erratic, or changed in regard to many things. These changes should be regarded as a misfortune and as a result of partially-paralyzed organs more than intentional crime. The purity or impurity of motive should be the object of applause or censure more than that which is connected with the judgment, which, under the circumstances, is defective.

CHAPTER VIII. TOTAL INSANITY.

SECTION I.

1. We understand by *insanity* a deranged mind or intellect; that the mind is without reason or is delirious. We now come to that state of delirium which is a total disorganization of mind, or of correct mental action. The power of reasoning is wholly in ruins. All the mental states are total confusion, and all mental acts are conflicting wildness. This kind of insanity presents the mind unnatural and in ruins. Perhaps any rational mind would prefer death rather than to be plunged into a state of total insanity. 2. Insanity destroys the *healthy action of the mind and the power it has over its own mental states*, of connecting and of directing the chains of its thoughts, fixing the attention to internal realities, or upon those of the external world. The continuation it has of attending to one, or a class of objects, ceasing to think of them, or of changing to certain relations and analogies, running them out in a thousand directions, till millions of facts are brought into the account; but all these operations are destroyed by delirium. 3. *The power of mental action may cease* in regard to all subjects only in a wild and utterly-confused manner. There may be an indistinct apprehending

of things, but without any rational conception of order, classification, or of law. 4. The mind may be *influenced by only one impression*, without any power of varying from it, or of dismissing it from the most intense excitement. There is an instance recorded of a man who became insane, yet he always moved as though he was in great haste. The only answer he ever gave to any inquiry was, "I am going home," though it could not be discovered that any thing had the slightest degree of his attention. The melancholy case of a young minister has been recorded, who, by a fall, was deranged, while on his way to be married. Never afterward was he known to pay attention to any thing; and never was he known to speak of any thing but his expected marriage. All other thoughts seemed to have been forever banished; and that which he did say appeared to be abstracted from every thing else. 5. The mind may be *absorbed* in a certain chain of impressions which are limited, having no connection with other things, by mental action, and over which the mind has no control in any way. Such impressions appear to be believed as having a real existence, whether they be true or not. If false, there is no healthy action of the mental powers by which any correction can take place.

SECTION II.

1. *Mania* may be regarded as *varying in degree* of mental range or action from certain limited abstract impressions to a wild, amplified view of imaginary realities. Though such a mind may glance

at real truths, yet there can be no exercise of reason in relation to them. Under this kind of mania persons are most apt to suppose themselves as possessing great power and authority to control; and when they think of their privilege and authority, they become instantly excited in exercising their great power. They are apt to fancy themselves to be kings with great power, and that they are surrounded with splendor and glory, which error the mind has no power to correct. 2. *The hallucinations of a maniac* can not be corrected, as the disordered action of the principal mental faculties is so extensive that there is no way or means of correcting that which is wrong. Though the physical organs connected with the power of the senses may appear perfect in action, yet there is no way to restore the power of reason by reason or arguments. The maniac will continue to fancy himself a king or ruler of this world, having a right to command and to force obedience to his authority. Though such persons may be of the lowest degree of obscurity, still they appear to have conceptions of great honor and glory, and that all the world contributes to their glory. The presentations of any kind of adverse circumstances which may surround them, have no power to gain their attention so as to produce any salutary effect upon their mental states. 3. *A common characteristic of maniacs* is evidenced in the fact that some impression or idea has taken possession of the mind, and upon the oneness of the theme the mind acts, without being corrected by truths, which would produce an equilibrium of the intensity of mental action, and relieve wrong im-

pressions. Whenever the mind is permitted to act upon some one idea, excluding all other facts which would be examined in connection with it, such action will become intense, and the longer we dwell upon one thought the more excited the concentrated action of the mind will become, and the tendency of the mind to lose all power of reason or control in relation to the existence of real facts will be increased. 4. *In total insanity* the mind is incapable of correct reasoning on either correct or false premises. The connection of thoughts or facts in argumentation are broken and so confused that no correct steps can be taken in pursuing any subject; all is confusion and uncertainty. It is incapable of assuming even false data, and of reasoning upon it. If it is capable of assuming data in any degree, that which is assumed is more likely to be false than true; and if false, the mind is incapable of making any corresponding deductions; and if that which is assumed is true within itself, there is no power to connect the steps or truths in order to arrive at any thing like correct deductions. The powers of such a mind may be said to be in ruins.

SECTION III.

1. In connection with some *degrees of insanity* there is a remarkable *activity* of mental action. This peculiar vividness of mental action may be accounted for, in part, from the fact that the mind is withdrawn from all subjects except that which is embraced in its present notice, irrespective of all other truths which should be examined in connec-

tion with it; therefore, it seizes rapidly upon parts of connected events, or facts, without any apparent perception of relations in return, or of those which arise in the order of time. The memory may appear to be strong and more active than in health, in regard to some things, yet those things called up are only parts of facts, and they are in disorder and confusion. The mind has no power to use them; the vigorous efforts to connect them are instantly broken, while all the thoughts are suspended, and some other impression appears to affect the mind; but ere it is brought forward the mental effort is in ruins. In some instances, the memory appears to call up facts, events, and associations which had been forgotten in the healthy action of the mind. This is in accordance with the statements of persons who have recovered from short or brief attacks of insanity. Many things which they had long forgotten became the objects of recollection. 2. There is *great readiness and vividness* of thought possessed by some minds as they are verging on to total insanity. Such maniacs give evidence of great acuteness and ingenuity in a peculiar way. They may have some indications of remaining power to reason, from the rapidity of the mind in sketching isolated facts, and, in selecting partial relations, mingled with other things which may be true or they may be false. But, without doubt, it is utterly impossible for an insane person to argue correctly on any subject. If they arrive at the truth, it is wholly accidental. 3. It appears that *the greatest peculiarity* connected with either partial or total insanity is, that a certain idea or impression be-

comes the object of undivided mental action; all other existences or influences appear to be excluded, and that which is the object of consideration may be true or it may be wholly visionary. If true, the deduction, if any is attempted, is always wrong, unless it should be true accidentally; and those things which become the objects of belief, with them are apt to be entirely absurd. 4. Another peculiarity connected with maniacs is, the *indisposition to change their belief, which arises in connection with certain impressions*, whether such impressions be true or false. The subject which appears to have control of the mental powers, has been known to continue with some maniacs for a number of years. The hallucination of others has been known to change from one object to another in the space of a few years. The former may argue an unchanging influence of disease upon the physical organs, through which the mind acts; and the latter may be accounted for upon the ground that the power of disease upon the physical organs, through which mind is manifested in action, has changed to some other organ, or that the nature of the disease has changed in some way. These facts only lead to the confirmation of the opinion that mind is never insane only in connection with a deformed or a diseased physical system in some way.

SECTION IV.

1. *Mental hallucinations* may suspend or dismiss the impressions which have been of abiding experience, and, after a long interval, they may be sud-

denly revived, which can not be accounted for unless it is attributable to some change in the physical constitution, either in regard to increased degrees of maturity, or in the diminishing power of disease, so that the mind can be more vigorously exerted. Instances are given of persons who were employed in doing a certain piece of work, when they were suddenly struck with insanity; and, after the lapse of years, on being restored, the first thing of their inquiries was, in regard to the work in which they were employed when they went into insanity, while all the time and events which had intervened were entirely lost. It has been stated that persons who are addicted to periodical paroxysms of delirium, have been known to resume the conversation on their recovery precisely at the place where they left off when the paroxysm came on, without any knowledge of what transpired in the interim; and it has been stated that some of these persons, when the paroxysm reappeared, commenced with that part or subject of their hallucination precisely where they left off when reason returned; but, as a general thing, there is not such a uniformity in connection with insanity. It is more generally characterized by a fearful erratic wildness. 2. The *extremes and modulations* which characterize the feelings, and the deportment or acts, of maniacs, may be accounted for, in part, as corresponding to the different temperaments connected with each constitution; and they may arise, in part, from the uncultivated viciousness of the one, and the guarded mildness of the other. They may vary again with the mind that had been under religious influence,

contrasted with the mind which had always been vicious and revengeful. When insanity becomes the lot of such persons, it is natural to expect that they will be influenced by these things in some way.

3. *Insanity*, as it exists in the case of the maniac, is apt to be of a restless and turbulent character. Great excitement generally prevails over, and is connected with the entire mental powers. There appears to be a constant disposition to keep moving or to be traveling from place to place. This is not the kind of derangement, under the influence of which the person loathes life, and seeks death; for persons under the influence of this kind of derangement are always suspecting danger, and are flying from it with feelings of appalling frenzy or dread. 4. *The general character* of mental derangement is that which has connected with it a fearful apprehension of danger or death; and such persons are always trying to escape from harm. Such persons are generally harmless, and have no disposition to inflict injuries upon their fellow-beings, though the care of such is attended with great trouble. 5. There is another class of insane persons, who are *malicious* in feelings, and are always seeking revenge. It is not unfrequently the case that they imagine that they are expressly ordered to take the life of some fellow-being; and, as a general thing, those who are selected by them to be tortured, or put to death, are the nearest and dearest friends.

CHAPTER IX.

INSANITY—MELANCHOLIA.

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SECTION I.

1. THAT kind of *mental depression called melancholia* may be regarded as a result of some kind of disease upon the physical constitution, or it may have its origin with, or in connection with, repeated and powerful mental exertion, prostrating the power, in part, of the organs through which mind acts, or is manifested. There is a difference between real mania and that of melancholia. The former is connected with the presence of hallucination, under the influence of which the individual appears to be carried away with his excited conceptions of his condition in life, and does not appear to be under any sense of want, or that such a state of things could be possible. The latter condition is connected with those who are depressed in feeling, which may arise from the influence of lingering disease, or it may arise with trouble of mind, which prostrates the bodily powers, rendering them subject to disease. This gloomy or melancholy state of mind may increase till maniacal excitement takes place; but melancholia generally continues in a state of mental depression. Such a state may arise from different causes. The same, or similar causes, may produce mania with one person, and that of melancholia

with another. These dissimilaritous results appear to arise from constitutional differences. 2. *A very peculiar difference* between melancholia and mania is, that a person under the influence of the former has power to reason more accurately, and the mind evinces stronger features of the action of the power of reason than in the latter state; yet, the impressions of such a mind can be changed with far greater difficulty than those of the maniac. The impressions of the mind, under a melancholy influence, can be acted upon with greater deliberation, and generally with a greater degree of unwavering intention, than those of the maniac. 3. *Melancholia differs in a peculiar manner from mania*, in the tendency of minds, under such an influence, to commit suicide. Real maniacal insanity seldom ever gives rise to any feeling or inclination which would lead to such an act or horrible result. It is very common, when suicide is committed, to say that the person was totally insane, or was devoid of all reason; but there is no instance recorded of totally-deranged persons, or one devoid of all reason, ever being guilty of suicide. Such persons are devoid of all such feelings or inclinations; for, under such a state of mind, they have run back to the mental inefficiency of children, while all their intentions and feelings, under such influences, are harmless. 4. *A raving maniac* has never been known to commit suicide. All their feelings and manifested inclinations are averse to any thing of the kind. When they possess any traits of reason, or conscientious thought, they evince the utmost degree of excitement and horror in regard to any thing like danger

or death; and they are ever flying from their own apprehensions of danger in seeking for safety.

SECTION II.

1. *It is depression or melancholia which leads to suicide, and that, too, before reason has entirely banished, or has left the mind.* We are forced to the gloomy acknowledgment that all persons who commit this horrible act have a sufficient amount of reason remaining to know what they are about to do when they use the weapons of death; otherwise, the act could not and would not be perpetrated. 2. All persons who *commit suicide* do so of *their own individual and voluntary choice*. It is impossible for any who are totally deranged to have the control of their mental states, or thoughts, long enough to carry such an intention into effect. By the most accurate examination, no feeling or tendency to suicide can be discovered to exist in the minds of persons who are devoid of reason. They abhor every thing of the kind, and all their inclinations lead them to act in flying in haste from every thing like danger or death. 3. He who takes his own life has the *right use of reason, to a sufficient extent*, to know what poisonous drug, or weapon of death, will effect the work; also, the amount necessary to be taken, or the way for, or manner of, applying the deadly weapon, require some degree of rationality and judgment. All such facts show that the person is not totally insane. 4. Another proof that such persons are not totally insane is manifested in their conduct. With what tenacity they keep such inten-

tions or conclusions from being known to others! See their shrewd, artful cunning and management in avoiding detection in the obtaining of that which will take life, often securing it under false pretense! How carefully they select a time and place suitable to avoid all detection, so their design and plans may be carried into effect! All these facts show that such persons are not totally deranged. 5. We are compelled to the conclusion, that all persons who deliberately commit suicide have a sufficient amount of reason *to know* what they are going to do, and how they are going to effect the work; also, what the result will be, otherwise they would not have presence and control of mind to determine upon such a course; and if they had, the mind would lose sight of such an arrangement before they could arrive at the final result. It is perfectly contrary to all facts, as well as to the nature and effect of total insanity upon the mind. To say that persons destroy their lives because they are totally deranged, and have no knowledge as to what they are doing, is contrary to all the facts in such cases. If a person must be totally devoid of all reason, in order to commit suicide, then he would have no inclination to do so; for a child, before it has the right exercise of reason, never manifests any inclination to destroy its own existence. The same fact is true in relation to idiots. If persons could commit suicide who were totally ignorant of what they were doing, then they would be innocent; but if they know what they are doing, in laying violent hands on their own lives, they are guilty of sin, and will be held accountable for such offenses.

SECTION III.

1. *The hallucination* which takes place under the influence of melancholia, or depression, becomes the only object of mental action. All other impressions, or facts, naturally connected, which would correct any excited perception in regard to supposed realities, can not become the object of attention or of mental action. All mental power to change the action of the mind to many facts, or of examining them in connection with erroneous impressions, appears to be lost. There is also a loss of power in correcting internal mental states by comparing them with external truths. The mind becomes bewildered and overwhelmed with hopeless misery, and, being unable to contemplate any future relief, the whole soul appears to be plunged into a cloud of augmented gloom. Many persons, under such circumstances are apt to begin to imagine that all their friends have forsaken them, and then they begin to lose confidence in every person. The very appearance of nature is gloomy and mournful. They begin to feel that life is a burden, and commence forming conclusions to leave the world. When such resolutions are once formed, then the mind acts upon them exclusively, by connecting with such purposes the most effectual way to accomplish the dreadful act; which act becomes more harmless, in their opinion, as the mind, under great excitement, dwells upon it.

2. *Such purposes can be and have been abandoned* when the mind has been suddenly arrested by some new and alarming object of thought. A man has been mentioned, who left home at night for the

purpose of drowning himself; but, on being suddenly attacked by robbers, he fled for refuge, where he soon realized that all intimation to suicide was gone. Other cases have been referred to, which resulted in a change of purpose after the individuals had determined upon their own destruction; when, on going to the place selected, their attention has been suddenly arrested by some accident, calamity, or danger, which have changed their thoughts from the one object to the other facts, causing all their inclinations to suicide to be dissipated. 3. *There is an impression of insanity*, connected with the idea of suicide, which the mind appears to possess while there is the least manifestation of reason remaining; and it is certainly true, that when the mind is totally lost to all reason, it is incapable of determining upon suicide, or of remaining in the same state long enough to effect such a result, if it could form such a determination. This sense, or impression of criminality, does not correct the mind so as to deter from the act of suicide. It is a common occurrence for another idea to arise in connection with this, which is, that such persons conclude that they justly deserve to die, and that in taking their existence away they are only dying according to justice, and in this way the crime will only be slightly imputed to them. 4. *Another hallucination* often arises in connection with the impression of the criminality of suicide. Persons have been known, in the history of the past, to commit murder for the sole purpose of rendering their lives up to the requirements of the just law of the land, and thereby die by the requirements of justice. This they seem to have

supposed frees them from the sin of suicide. Many persons have avowed their intention of murdering some one, without having the first improper feeling toward them; and often such selections were made of some one whom they loved more than any other. They have confessed, on some occasions, that they only wished to commit murder in order that they themselves might die by the just sentence of the law; and they have been known to go still farther, by selecting a child, which they believed would be happy after death, and console themselves that it would be no special injury to the child to take its life, and then they could themselves die by the hand of justice. The right exercise of reason is lost with such persons, and it would appear that their long-cherished desire to die had always been checked by their connection with the exceeding sinfulness of suicide: hence, the resolve on the death of some innocent person was favorably entertained from the thought that such persons would be happy after death, and it would give themselves the opportunity of dying according to justice.

CHAPTER X.
INSANITY.

SECTION I.

1. *THERE are degrees of insanity.* The mind which borders on total insanity, or has passed into that state which is called total insanity, clearly indicates its extreme alienation. We have no hesitancy in deciding upon such cases with confidence, or with full assurance that they are entirely deranged. 2. No one should *hastily decide upon slight mental alienation* without the clearest proof that such is true; for in this way persons have been declared deranged when they were only bordering upon insanity; and such indications seldom ever become the objects of thought or remark, only when the individual was under some mental excitement. 3. *The principal cause of insanity,* doubtless, has its origin in connection with imperfect organized physical organs, or with the power and influence of disease on those physical organs, upon which the mind is dependent in its action, both as it relates to its intercourse with external facts, or in revealing its internal states or thoughts to other intelligences or beings. It is utterly impossible for us to have conceptions of minds that are insane when they are separated from the body; and to believe that an all-wise Being would create a spirit to exist in a

state of insanity in the future world, is contrary to all facts, and is absurd. Insanity is either directly or indirectly the effect of sin. Its influence upon the physical organs, connected with the manifestations or the action of the mind, renders them imperfect in some way, and often to such a degree as to produce mental alienation ; but to clearly define such a connection or process is impossible. 4. *Ambition*, as it exists in the minds of some persons, may give origin to insanity. Such minds are very excitable, and are capable of great efforts in trying to attain some desirable object or eminence in this world's fame. These efforts can not be strictly said to destroy or paralyze any of the mental faculties, as they exist in essence abstracted from the body ; but such efforts may be too powerful for the physical organs, and such repeated mental efforts may, and often do, paralyze the physical organs, or produce disease, which so paralyzes them as to impair the correct action of the mind in some way.

SECTION II.

1. In like manner will the *states and action* of the mind affect the *condition and health* of the body when it suffers from disappointed hope or affections, or from a fearful sense in regard to the soul's safety in the future world. All intense and fearful mental excitement will affect the strength and health of the bodily powers in some way ; and often, on the sudden reception of an overwhelming mental shock, some individuals fall sick, and, in some cases, the mind is ever afterward deranged. 2. With a cer-

tain class of persons there appears to be a *constitutional tendency to insanity*; but we can not say that such a tendency exists solely or only in the nature or essence of the elements of mind, aside and apart from any connection it may have with physical organs; for if we do, we assert that which we can never prove, and we will be forced to acknowledge that the soul may or may not be sane in the future world; and even if it should enter that immortal state perfectly sane, those elements of its being may, somewhere in the unbounded future, become deranged, if such immortal elements contain any thing like insanity within and of their own essence and being. But it is utterly impossible for us to have any conception of mind of and within itself as possessing any natural tendency to insanity; therefore, what we understand by such tendencies must exist in the physical constitution, as evidence will abundantly show. 3. Under the influence of *high fevers*, some minds often *become insane*, and remain so till the fever subsides. We dare not say that the mind only is sick, or that it is abstractly, in whole or in part, the object of fever influence; for the fever preys only upon the physical organs or constitution. Then the delirium did not arise from the debility of the mind, but from the debility which affected the body. When this excitement leaves the body the mind is right again; but we have no evidence that if the mind could be excited without affecting the physical powers, any thing like delirium could or would take place. 4. A sane man may be rendered insane by a *slight injury upon his skull*. It was not the mind that was bruised or in-

jured by contact with some dense object, but it was the physical nature, or organs through which mind is manifested or acts, thereby rendering such action confused or imperfect. But if this injury could be properly healed, the mind is often restored to reason. It would be worse than heterodoxical to say that, in applying remedies to heal the fracture or injury of the skull, such remedies were applied only to the mind. The truth is, we can have no conceptions, founded upon facts, of mental debility, or paralysis, only as it is affected by defects in the physical constitution, or the effect of disease upon it.

SECTION III.

1. *A hereditary predisposition to insanity* may have its origin with the way in and by which the mind is influenced in connection with the constitution or condition of the physical existence. Reasons can be assigned favoring this position, when it is impossible to give reasons in favor of the hereditary mental alienation, aside and apart from any influence derived from the physical constitution favoring such a result. If the mind can, wholly of itself, continue for years perfectly sane, and then, entirely independent of any influence from the physical powers, change to a state of insanity, we might readily conclude that it may change to insanity at any period in the infinity of its future being; but we can not believe that any mind, abstractly, can, by a hereditary disposition, or in any other way, become insane, only in connection with the body, and in being influenced by it favorably to

such a result in some way. We have positive proof that bodily deformities, injuries, and diseases can and do produce insanity; but we have no proof that the mind, wholly within and of itself, ever has, or ever can become insane. 2. *This tendency to insanity* may, in part, be attributed to an *intense and vigorous action of the mind*, which becomes a habit incapable of being suspended till the physical organs are overpowered in some way. A paralysis of some of them, produced in this way, or that of an intense nervous excitability, may render the action of mind ever afterward imperfect. This character of intense mental habit may be of hereditary origin, as well as the weakness or defects of the physical organs, connected with mental action. 3. This sad state of mental alienation may commence by permitting the mind *too vigorously to dwell on one and the same topic*, or in allowing the mind to be wrought into ecstasies of excitement upon continued scenes of imagination. This gives rise to excited mental feelings and emotions, which overwhelm all connected objects, and entirely suppresses all real facts and relations connected with the primary truths of that which is supposed to exist, and which would correct such extravagances, if they could be objects of the judgment and the understanding. 4. *The impressions* made upon the mind, by sudden and unexpected events or occurrences, are often the cause of excited conceptions, and a wild extravagance of the imaginary powers. In this kind of hasty mental action, the true principles which are connected, or which lie at the foundation, are lost sight of, and no connection takes

place by the mind deliberately contemplating such events in their true relations. On such occurrences the well-balanced mind is thrown upon the correct exercise of the understanding and the judgment; but the mind tending to alienation, is like a ship loosed from its moorings, yielding to the sport of wrecking tempests.

SECTION IV.

1. *Too intense habits of mental application* often alienates the mind from correct action. In this way the energies of the body and mind become wearied and exhausted, and repeated efforts tend to a continued erratic theorizing, or to speculative imaginations or thoughts. Whenever false impressions become the prominent objects of mental action, the mind is but little removed from the lower degrees of insanity. 2. It has been asserted, from actual observation, that the mind is seldom *ever alienated*, though it be severely disciplined in regard to plain facts, with which God, in his infinite wisdom, has filled the vast universe. The contemplation and examination of such truths, with proper care, is calculated to produce a healthy mental action, in which happiness is much increased. It is stated, by good authority, that, by inquiring into the causes of insanity among any number of persons who have been of studious habits, there is a lower proportion of philosophers, physicians, mathematicians, and chemists, who have become insane, than of almost any other classes devoted to scientific research. 3. It is also stated, that the *highest numbers* include

those who have loved the works of fiction, imagination, or taste, among whom may be classed poets, sculptors, painters, musicians, and artists; but this chain can be lengthened to embrace a still higher number of those who are always looking for that which is enigmatical or appalling, such as look for the speedy destruction of the world, the appearing of ghosts, or will, with breathless intensity, bow low to the incursion and dictates of spirit-rappings. 4. *The punishment of the insane* should not be inflicted without the utmost caution, and then only in regard to the partially insane. Correction is of no use where reason is gone, and where it is not entirely absent, severity only tends, in most cases, to drive those thus affected further from reason by enraging the mind, or by depressing the spirit. The maniac should be kept as quiet as possible, and should always be dealt with in a kind and affectionate manner. The melancholists should have their attention wholly diverted from their special topics of grief, and they should be exhilarated with cheerful music or society, so as to keep them from dwelling on their calamities. Never do any thing to excite those who are addicted to madness, and always avoid every thing that would discourage those who labor under depression of feelings.

CHAPTER XI.

IDIOCY.
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SECTION I.

1. THE term *idiocy* conveys to the mind the idea of a natural defect of the understanding. The degrees which have been acknowledged to exist in idiocy are not well defined, as any thing like partial idiocy is only another department of partial insanity; yet there are some distinctions by which a difference may be discriminated. 2. *Fatuity* includes that kind of mental weakness which differs from the turbulence and fierceness of the maniac, on the one hand, and that of a desponding state of insanity on the other. In the latter case or state, a part of the faculties may retain power of healthy action; but, under fatuitous influences, the mind appears to suffer a general suspension of healthy action in all its departments. 3. *Cretinism*, as it was anciently understood among the valleys of the Alps, contained an amplitude of signification, which will not philosophically apply to a correct idea of idiocy. The cretins were classified so as to convey an idea of the strength and action of the mind. The intellectual action of the first class was not far removed from animal life, having no language to convey thoughts, or judgment in seeking happiness, or in avoiding danger. 4. There is another class, which

evinces some signs of *intellectual action*, with occasional traces of rationality; but the whole mental powers are so inactive that, in looking on such a countenance, we appear to have conceptions of the presence of a form, while the mind or soul appears to have taken its departure. Insanity appears to involve a part of the mental powers, while other powers are capable of action; yet they are, in most cases, unable to arrive at any correct conclusion. But idiocy involves the idea of inactivity of the mental faculties as a whole. 5. When a *rational* mind becomes wholly inactive, we can not, with strict propriety, *call such a state* that of idiocy; for it properly belongs to total insanity. Neither can we properly say that a mind is under the partial influence of idiocy, when all the mental powers are rendered almost inactive and without reason; for such a state would more properly belong to partial insanity.

SECTION II.

1. *An idiot* is one who has ever been under the influence of mental imbecility, so that the mind can not be said to have been, at any time, sound or rational. The mind of such a person has *always been in ruins*. Never has there been power in such a mind to move with vigorous action. It is not reasonable to suppose that this inefficiency is naturally connected with the mental functions as an essential defect; for such a supposition would be unsupported by clear evidence; but it is more reasonable for us to suppose that the natural defect in

its influence is connected with the mind, while the true cause is to be sought for, and to be found, in other considerations. 2. We have already seen that insanity is principally caused by the effect of *disease and deformity upon or in the physical system*. It is reasonable to believe that natural imperfections, or deformity of the physical nature, hinders or impedes the action and proper development of the mind, so that idiocy is the inevitable result. All injuries or debilities arising from the results of accident, or the power of disease, may be remedied with the same hope of relief; but not so with natural deformity, connected with the internal physical organs, upon or by which the mind is dependent for action, or is to be manifested. These internal imperfections may exist when we have no power to apprehend the nature of the influence which affects the physical organs. Such natural defects, preventing mental action, can never be remedied in this world: hence, an idiot must remain an idiot during life. 3. *Idiocy is incurable in this life*, from the fact that the cause, which is principally deformity, can not be removed from such persons by remedies which remove the power and influence of disease. We can have no conception that the essence called mind can be naturally deformed, or that it can be, within and of itself, under the influence and power of idiocy; for such a conclusion would be without proof; therefore, all our ideas of idiocy have their origin in connection with the deformities and imperfections which we believe to exist in the physical nature. 4. We know that our *material natures can*, and that they *do exert an almost unbounded*

control over the power and manner of mental developments. Delirium is often the result of fever and other diseases, which prey only upon the physical powers, and can, in no case, be said to affect the mind only as the mind is affected by its connection with a diseased body. Insanity is often the result of a blow received upon a portion or part of the nervous system. The mind was not affected only by being connected with those deranged physical entities; and just as soon as these are restored the mind is sound again. This shows the influence of bodily organs over mental action.

SECTION III.

1. *If the quick and intense excitement and action of the mind can cause derangement or delirium, the cause of such delirium is not wholly in the mind; for, if so, a state of complete alienation would probably take place instantaneously, or as quickly as the whole powers of the mind felt the influence; but the work of alienation often progresses by degrees, which shows that the excitement of the mind has influenced or affected the bodily organs, so that they perform their office but imperfectly, or they have, in part, or in some way, become paralyzed, and thereby the development of the mind is confused or impeded.* There never has been one philosophical argument advanced, which will demonstrate the assumed fact that mind naturally, within and of itself, aside and apart from any bodily influence, can be either under the influence and power of idiocy or that of insanity; but, on the other hand, we know

that facts can and do clearly prove that insanity can, and often does, result from physical influences upon the mind: hence, it is rational to infer that no person is, by the nature of mental essence, an idiot, but that all idiots are such by reason of natural defects and deformities existing in the physical organs, by means of which mind is more or less connected in its power of motion or action. 2. If the mind is *naturally capable of becoming insane, or of coming under the power of idiocy*, without any possible aid from the physical nature, or connection with it, then it is capable of destruction and even annihilation; for if mind is imperishable, then its being is incapable of any destruction or annihilation from temporal disease or death; then it would follow that any obstruction to the right development of its powers exists either in the nature of the mind within itself, or that such obstructions were caused by defects or the effect of disease in the physical nature. We can have no conceptions of the mind, or the spiritual existent naturally defective in faculties, or without the right use of them; for if any such defects belong to and exist wholly in the mind, then such a mind must suffer such defects forever, as we have no promise of any new creations in the future appearing and existence of mental powers, where deficiencies have or do now exist. To suppose the existence of a mind naturally imperfect in its immaterial nature, or as to the existence of some or all of its faculties, and that it can and will maintain such an imperfect existence in the spirit-world, is to suppose an absurdity, and reflect dishonor upon the wisdom and goodness of its Creator. If our

immaterial nature is capable of being, in whole or in part, destitute of mental elements, then we can only conclude that they must exist forever in the same unaltered condition of partial or total insanity, or that of idiocy. Then it will follow, as an irresistible conclusion, that if the soul can be or always has been totally insane, or idiotic, it has violated no law or rule of right, and must be sane in heaven. An idiot in heaven can never fulfill the design of a gracious Creator, in glorifying and in praising the Author of all good; therefore, such a being will not exist any where on the plains of infinite life. The idiot will be saved, but he will leave his idiocy with the deformity of his body in the grave, while his rational and exalted spirit will ever move the harp of eternity. 3. We are convinced that the *cause of idiocy* exists not in the essence of mind, but in the deformity and diseased condition of the physical organization. There is no evidence, neither can we believe that an all-wise Being ever created an insane mind, or one that was in mind abstractly an idiot. Neither can we believe that the mind can, of itself, cause its own idiocy, unaided by material influences; therefore, if any mind is, at any time, insane, or in a state of idiocy, it is so by reason of its connection with defective physical organs. 4. If the mind was *naturally capable of losing the right exercise of its faculties or their existence*, in whole or in part, then it would have self-power to destroy itself at any future period; but such a position is contrary to all facts, and is absurd. We can form no idea, founded on reason, that the mind, within itself, or separated from the bodily influences, ever has been

or ever can be either insane or idiotic. There will be no insanity or idiocy beyond the vale of temporal death.

SECTION IV.

1. We have evidence of the *destructive influence of the physical organs over the power of memory* in the aged. An active and retentive memory often loses its power of action as a person or individual advances in age. If we say this loss of power is wholly in the mind, then it would follow that the mind is capable of losing its faculties, and it would be reasonable to suppose that they were entirely destroyed, under the power of temporal death, or the destruction of the body. But this is absurd; for when aged persons are unable to recollect the occurrences of one hour past, or even forget that which only took place a few moments previous, yet, if their attention is directed to what took place in the early part of their lives, they can often narrate that which transpired, and connect facts and events together, without any hesitancy. This is conclusive proof that the power of memory is not lost, nor is it ceasing to be; but its action, in advanced life, is trammeled only so far as it is connected with physical organs which are becoming paralyzed by age, disease, and their tendency to decay or death. 2. *That the physical nature curtails the power of hearing*, is clearly demonstrated in the example of those who are far advanced in age. Such persons often become deaf; and if this defect was abstractly in the mind, then we could conclude that the mind, in

this respect, was becoming annihilated; but when the ear-trumpet is applied the hearing is restored: hence, the power is not gone nor destroyed, but is ever living in the nature and essence of the imperishable mind. Then the defect is not of the mind; but it belongs to and exists in the bodily powers, which are affected by the paralyzing touch of age or disease. 3. The *same evidence is true* in regard to the *organ of sight*. The eye becomes affected as persons advance in old age, so that they dimly see objects which pass through the field of vision; but when an optic is applied, the sight is restored. The power is still there, and the whole difficulty must exist in the physical organs. All these facts, and many others, prove that the physical powers can and do often trammel the right action of the mind. Having referred to facts which are conclusive in establishing the destructive power, in part, which matter has over the development and right action of the mind, it is only reasonable to go still farther, and say that the power of disease, and the existence of deformity in the physical organs, may and can give origin to, or cause the existence of idiocy. 4. Then we are forced to the conclusion that the *cause of idiocy* is wholly connected with the bodily powers; for if we believe in the immortality of the soul, we must believe that all idiots are saved in the future, from the fact that they have never had power to willfully transgress any law or rule of right. If the soul or mind, disconnected with the body, is capable of being idiotic, in whole or in part, in this life, it must exist as such forever; and if all the inhabitants of the good world are

there for the purpose of rendering perpetual praise and glory to the great Author of all, then an idiot can have no place there, for he is naturally incapable of filling this design in perfection and holiness. It is consistent with all our ideas of infinite wisdom and purity, to believe that idiocy can exist only in connection with the deformities and infirmities of the bodily powers, all of which may be regarded as a curse, and only the result of sin. If sin, either directly or indirectly, can cause idiocy, then it follows that the remedial plan, in destroying such a power and influence, will reveal rationality as inherent in the very nature of those elements of mind which were locked up during the existence of the body; therefore, we are led to believe, that when the soul of an idiot is released from his sin-diseased body, it will be possessed of rational powers and knowledge, in the enjoyment of which it will flourish in immortality.

Division Tenth.

CHAPTER I. INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

SECTION I.

1. THE soul has *knowledge in itself*, and its power to know and to retain knowledge is wisely arranged by its great Author. It has internally perception, thinking, reasoning, believing, doubting, knowing, with various mental operations, or acts, which are experienced, and we are conscious of their real existence, in connection with which we receive distinct ideas of them, or in relation to them, without traveling beyond the internal being and action of mind, and unaided by the power of the senses as a medium of knowledge in regard to external things. The mind can and does possess ideas wholly within itself, and it receives them with confidence by attending to its own operations or action. 2. *The mind has power of knowledge within itself*, which power is connected with the *existence and action of intuitive mental elements*. The mind is not capable of receiving or of possessing knowledge of external things unless it has knowledge of a purely internal origin; for all knowledge of external facts are unknown to us only as we have internal power to receive them as such. And if those elements of

mind, connected with the origin of intuitions, have internal power to receive external existences as facts, they have power within themselves to know thoughts of internal origin, and to have ideas of interior operations or mental action. 3. *The primary power of knowledge is not material, but is mental*, and has *its origin* in connection with the existence and action of the internal mental elements. Connected with these is the self-power of knowing existing truths, and with them is the origin of all our knowledge. 4. *Knowledge received through the medium of the senses from the external world*, and in regard to external things, may be regarded as of a *secondary* order, or of an ulterior nature, when compared with knowledge of internal origin. 5. *The internal action of the mind or soul*, by which items of knowledge are apprehended, is so connected with such an immaterial essence, or being, that the rational force and vigor are derived from it; yet the soul employs material elements or organs to aid in the acquisition and in the perfecting of knowledge in regard to the external universe of materialities. The soul is aided by material eyes to aid in seeing material existences; also, with other material organs of sense, or those which are in some way connected with the origin of sensation. Aided by these, the mind becomes acquainted with the existence and nature of material existences; yet the soul has knowledge within itself, which has not and can not be imparted to it by physical entities, or by the senses. Though all the senses were to fall under the power of sleep, yet the soul would exist even on forever, and would possess reason and knowledge.

SECTION II.

1. *Knowledge is of internal origin*, though it may be said to begin in the senses; yet only so far as sensations through the medium of the senses, being caused by external things, are necessarily followed by new mental states. But knowledge does not and can not begin with the senses, unless sensation within itself can be called knowledge ere it makes its report to the mind; otherwise, we can have no knowledge of external things, till sensation is followed by the perception of the cause or causes of such sensation or sensations, and the mind decides upon them. Sensation, which is followed by new mental states, may be said to have its origin in connection with the senses; but we can not say that knowledge begins with the senses, only as we have knowledge of the origin of sensation ere its report is decided upon by the mind in determining the cause of such sensations. 2. The *source or origin* of knowledge, according to the general acceptation of the term, is in the mind. In taking this position we must retain in the mind the difference between knowledge as it exists in connection with mental states, and the influences which may lead to or cause the existence of such mental states. 3. *Ideas of internal origin* may be readily and clearly defined; yet it will not be necessary to dwell long here. The origin of the idea expressed by the terms thinking, willing, and believing can not be traced to the power or action of the senses; for they are not the objects of the test or action of any of the senses. Neither can we say that the ideas of cause and effect, right

and wrong, space or infinity, order, truth, and power can have their origin in the senses. The internal operations of the mind can exist and be known to us as primary sources of knowledge. 4. *Internal ideas or notions* may arise in connection with the *power of intuition*, and may be embraced in the understanding, where such ideas or notions may be inspected by the mind, and decided upon by the judgment. 5. *The primary origin of knowledge* can not be said, philosophically, to commence with any ulterior faculty or medium of mental action, but such origin of knowledge must be connected with the power of intuition. Intuitions appear to be spontaneous, and such intuitions, when they are brought under the power and action of reason and the judgment, may be known as ideas or notions. Here appears to be the beginning, under the inspection of the mind, of the knowledge of the existence of such notions or ideas, or the beginning of the knowledge of what such ideas or notions reveal. 6. *This may be extended by noticing complex ideas of internal origin.* Such ideas are composed of elementary facts, and these parts are simple or individual entities. Consciousness, original and relative suggestion, are regarded as contributing to the origin of simple ideas, which are combined by reason and the judgment. The process of combining these ideas may be carried on without reference to external things, and may be entirely an internal action or mental operation.

CHAPTER II.

THE DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY CONTRASTED IN THE EXAMINATION OF THAT WHICH RESEMBLES MIND IN BRUTES.
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SECTION I.

1. WE do not introduce all the contents of this chapter as properly belonging to the analysis of mind, yet it contains many things which should be studied in connection with the examination of the elements of mind. That mind or spirit exists can not be doubted; and almost the next inquiry connected with this conclusion is in regard to the *extent of mental or spiritual existence*. Can any order or form of physical existence below that of man possess, or have connected with it, any thing which in nature is similar, in any respect, to the human soul or mind? If human beings are only possessed with spirit or mind, then all inferior orders of beings are wholly inert, or without sensitive animation. 2. *The mysterious connection of mind and matter* is beyond the power and limits of philosophical investigation; yet it is not improper for us to detect any power or influence existing in matter, or that is superadded to it, which naturally differs from perfect material entities. We can more readily discriminate and decide upon that which differs from matter by commencing with the lowest orders of material existences, and travel up to the real existence of man. 3.

In fixing the attention upon inert and inanimate matter, we can not discover any *property, essence, or influence which resembles mind or spirit*; but some combinations of crude matter may differ from other masses or portions of inert existences. A portion of clay may lie in the earth for thousands of years, without any increase or diminution, or any other change, so far as we can determine from any evidence within our power; but there are evidences which indicate and even establish the fact that other combinations increase in size, or grow with seemingly no cessation or interruption. Petrifications are conclusive of the beginning and advancement of the work of change. The formation and growth of rock can not be doubted. This process of advancement or growth, which characterizes the various degrees or conditions of such inert existences, has been called inanimate life in contradistinction to those existences which contain no real or contingent evidences of change. If the advancement or change indicated in maturing petrifications, crystallization, and enlargement of rocks can be called *life*, it is certainly the lowest order of life of which the mind can have any conception, while the student is left to controvert at pleasure the propriety or impropriety of using the term *life* in this way. We will simply say that no geologist, lapidarian, or mineralogist will dissent from the fact that such life, or change is very different from, and is of a lower degree or order than the life of timber or of vegetation. The latter is periodical, and depends upon the change and condition of the seasons, while the former appears to be continuous and of an inherent

nature, independent of the influence of the vernal sun, summer solstice, or tropical shadow; but in connection with this process or change, there is no evidence of mind or spirit, in any possible way, or in the slightest degree. 4. *That kind of inanimate life, an idea of which is presented to the mind in the growth of timber or vegetation, is of a higher order than that to which our attention has just been called.* The growth of vegetation depends upon certain influences immediately connected, such as the warming and invigorating power of the sun, and the reviving effect and motion of the atmosphere; but a sufficient cause can destroy the emerald hues of the summer forest, which shows that this kind of life is more easily disturbed and destroyed than that of a still lower order; yet there is not connected with vegetable life any thing which indicates the presence of mental or spiritual influences in the slightest degree.

SECTION II.

1. *Animated existences, or animal life, is very different from that of inanimate realities.* Animals or brutes are classed in a higher order or scale of beings than those orders of which we have just been speaking. The evidences of this fact are plain and of universal acknowledgment, and we are forced to the conclusion that beasts, birds, and fish possess something more than is or can be contained wholly or only in material elements or existences. 2. Brutes exist *either wholly or only of material elements,* or that influence or

power which is connected with or is possessed by such elements differing from them, must be *superadded or is superior* to any essence or elements of matter; and if there is, in the existence of brutes, any thing which is different from the essential elements and qualities of matter, and superior to them, we must look elsewhere for such influences or qualities than in those things which are essential to the existence of matter. 3. *Insensibility and inertness* are essential to the existence of matter, and without these matter would cease to be matter; but brutes could not exist and be wholly pervaded and possessed of these. 4. Brutes possess animation, or life, differing very much from any thing belonging to inanimate existences. The life of the zoological world is of a different nature, and under different laws from any existence of an inanimate order. We will now proceed to notice some of the leading differences in which all beings having animate existence or life, and the power of self-action or motion, is superior to all insensible and inert existences.

SECTION III.

1. *Brutes differ* from inert existences in being possessed of life with sensitiveness, or are capable of experiencing sensations; and they can not experience sensations without having internal power to realize such influences; and if they are capable of realizing or experiencing sensations, that internal power by which such sensations are tested is different from crude matter, and is superior to it. If we

have no evidence that matter can or will ever be annihilated, it would be absurd to conclude that a superior influence or nature possessed by brutes, or if it be superadded to them, can or will ever be annihilated. 2. Brutes have *power of self-action*, which is perfectly opposed to the nature of matter, and contradictory to all laws governing material elements or existences. If a brute is wholly a material existent, motion would be utterly impossible, as inertness is essential to the existence of matter; therefore, that power in brutes which moves, or causes motion, is different in nature, and is superior to matter. 3. To a certain extent brutes *see, feel, taste, smell, and hear*. Some of these powers are more acute than they are in connection with the human body, yet they are not connected with a mind that can reason or that is capable of moral influences; but these are so exercised by brutes as to give clear proof that they are not wholly and only material entities. In connection with their physical natures there is something more, or another nature which is distinct from matter, and must be superior to it. 4. *This internal and superior natural and motive power possessed by brutes* has been called instinct; but what is instinct with the lowest degree of meaning that can be properly attached to it? It is a certain internal influence, disposition, or power by which, independent of all instruction or experience, animals are correctly directed to do spontaneously whatever is necessary for the preservation of life, or the securing of pleasure: hence, it is utterly impossible to define the power of instinct to be in nature and reality only matter. We will now

proceed to notice the powers and action of that which is called instinct in brutes, which resembles mind, and appears to establish the fact that brutes are possessed with that which may be called spirit, as well as that part of their existence which is called physical.

SECTION IV.

1. *Volition*, to some extent, is evidenced in the *freedom of animal action*. This can be noticed in the manner of their movements or acts. If they are escaping from danger, there is care manifested in selecting the safest and quickest way of escape. This is clearly tested from the fact that they never choose the direction of danger or of their foe. Whether this power of voluntary preference should be called volition or not, we are certain that it is not matter, and that it is superior to it. 2. Brutes appear to have power to *detect approaching danger and a knowledge of the way to escape*. This appears to be connected with the nature of their existence; but it also admits of degrees of maturity; for the young of all sagacious animals appear at first to have but little alarm at danger, though this is soon remedied by a more matured degree of care. All of these things are unknown to the nature and existence of matter. 3. Brutes appear to *have naturally a knowledge of courses*, and have but little confusion in determining and in pursuing the proper direction to any place where they have ever been, and often are seen moving from one section of the globe to a more plentiful region, though they may have never

passed that way before. Bears, in times of great scarcity, have traveled from their native woods through cultivated parts of the country for hundreds of miles, on a direct course to a new wilderness abounding with supplies. And with what exactness and certainty do the different kinds of birds direct their course in the heavens, alternating with the seasons in going from one climate to another! No philosopher can say that all these evidences of mind, in some way, and degree, are wholly the result of material entities and of material laws. Such implications would almost astonish the insensible earth. 4. *The horse and dog know their masters by sight, and they know them by the sound of the voice.* They are capable of being so trained that they will act or move in different ways by certain motions or sounds of the voice. This is positive proof that they are more capable of improvement or cultivation than mere inert matter. No one can doubt such a conclusion. 5. *The power of judgment and comparison* appear to be evidenced, to some degree, in the acts of some animals. Some horses have been known to move with much more care if some female or timid person is driving them, and especially if the harness should begin to give way in some dangerous place. A fox was once observed to run down into water, and gradually sink under, holding a lock of wool in his mouth above the water. On drawing his head under the water, the wool floated off, which was found to be full of fleas. Another instance is given of a fox that was observed in a field, playing round a group of pigs as though the large swine were objects of terror.

The fox suddenly caught up a piece of wood about the size of a pig, and running toward the fence, jumped through a large crack; then he dropped the wood, and returned to the swine, seized a pig, and ran through the fence with it at the very same place. No doubt but that he *compared* the pig with the size of the wood, in order to judge of the chance to escape with his prey. All these traits of mind or spirit can not be the result of insensible matter. The foregoing facts are evidences of a spiritual nature; and if brutes have a spiritual nature, we will have to call it an immaterial nature; and if immaterial, we have no evidence to believe but that it is indestructible; for if we have no evidence that material elements will ever be annihilated, we have still less reason to doubt the imperishability of spiritual existences.

SECTION V.

1. We have, from the preceding arguments, arrived at the fact, that *brutes have some kind of a spiritual existence or nature*, as well as a material one. This is clearly set forth in the great and multiplied differences existing between inert elements, whether separate or compounded, and the condition, action, and conduct of brutes as they are. This is also established upon the degrees of difference among brutes themselves. Some are by nature but little removed from mere self-moving matter, while others are naturally sagacious, and are capable of improvement by careful training. 2. Whatever may be the *character of brute intelligence*, and notwithstanding

the high degree to which it may be elevated by careful training, yet they are very far removed from real rationality, and the power and action of any thing like conscience. 3. *That natural inclination or influence* which is present with brutes in aiding them to search out that which is naturally adapted to the appetite, or the demands of their constitutional existence, has been called instinct; but that power which is susceptible of being cultivated, and of choosing ways and means adapted to certain results, has been called instinctive intelligence; yet the student is not to conclude from such facts that brutes are reasonable, moral, and intellectual beings, for they are far from such an exalted position. With all the manifestations of their nature and being, they only serve to draw that contrast by which intellectual man stands pre-eminent above all, towering in thought amid the imperishable realities and glories of infinite duration. 4. *Instinctive intelligence* is manifested in the conduct or operations of bees. How appropriately they arrange the house of the governing bee! and whenever this bee is there all is harmony. If this bee leaves the hive, all of the others will follow; and if this bee dies, the fact is soon known throughout the hive. The work is suspended, gloom spreads over them, and they appear to die in despair; but there appears to be wisdom and skill displayed in the manner and form of their work. The very form of their cells evidences wisdom. Mathematicians are indebted to them for a form after that of the cells of the honeycomb, which will hold more than any other upon a base of the same dimensions. Similar intimations of a

high order of instinctive power is evidenced in the mysterious ways in which wild animals procure or take their prey. These traits are not matter.

SECTION VI.

1. There is a great *dissimilarity existing between the powers of man and that of the brute.* The former is naturally constituted with superior powers, and has control of them in the examination of any subject. He can combine or abstract at pleasure. His cogitations can be continued or suspended, varied or changed by a voluntary act. The brute may be said to have perceptions of external things, and may move in the direction of some object of sight; yet there is no power to combine facts or to reason in regard to them. 2. There is an *intuitive inclination* in man to look for a cause when an effect is produced, and involuntarily we begin to progress in thought or argumentation from the effect back to its corresponding cause; but there appears to be no power connected with the manifestations of instinctive intelligence to look at any thing in this way—no contingencies are seemingly involved. 3. The human mind, from the *nature of its structure*, and its power of *action*, is *really scientific* in its research. It is from its organization naturally directed to the apprehending and comprehension of primary truths, following them out either singly or in a combined relationship to their various results. In this process the mind must be capable of making science explain enigmatical scientific propositions and combinations of supposed facts.

The brute appears to act from what he sees, hears, and feels, without any reference to the cause, or as to why such cause or causes exist. He appears to be governed by a simple perception of objects, without any explanation in regard to them. 4. The human mind is capable of *progressive improvement*, and its rising efforts and conquests in scientific knowledge appear to be bounded only by the feebleness or paralyzing weakness of physical organs. The brute intelligence appears to be susceptible of improvement, in some instances, to a very limited extent, and none of them can pass beyond certain limits or bounds. They may be said to remain in their generations in the same limitations of instinctive action ; but the imperishable mind of man, limitless in research, sends out its exploring thoughts, like a burning sun radiates its million beams of light, filling the universe with the brilliancy of effulgent day. Man is possessed of a conscience, and feels himself to be a moral agent, and accountable to God ; but the brute is without any innate moral principle, and can not possess moral feelings, or internally, from desire, perform a moral action.

SECTION VII.

1. The human mind can not become familiar with scientific research, and arrive at true knowledge, without the presence and action of *self-consciousness, reason, original suggestion, the understanding, and the judgment*. These appear to be absent in the manifestations of brute intelligence ; or, if there be any resemblance of them, in connection

with the existence and acts of brutes, it is so faint that it is not worthy a passing notice at present. The absence of reason only would destroy all power of arriving at scientific knowledge, and many other faculties would be rendered useless if not destroyed. Reason appears to be absent in brute instinct: hence a distinguishing difference between man and the brute. 2. The brute *does not appear to possess the power of reason, self-consciousness, understanding, judgment, classification, nor generalization.* These are essential to a rational and an intellectual mind; but the entire absence of them in brute intelligence is evident, and enters into the cause of such a great difference between the contrasted existences. 3. Man is a moral agent, and is subject to moral feelings, his conscience constituting the great court of appeal; and, in connection with it, the moral sensibilities, emotions, and feelings appear to harmonize. Here *intuitive convictions arise in regard to right and wrong;* but the brute, *being totally destitute of all these,* must hold a lower position in the scale of beings, having claim to a spiritual existence. 4. We have proceeded far enough in contrasting the *mental powers* of man with the *instinctive intelligence* of the brute. It is sufficient for us to know that the human mind is very different, and that it is almost infinitely superior to any thing possessed in brute instinct or existence; but, on the other hand, it is illogical and absurd to deny the brute that which he does possess, and that which he possesses to our certain knowledge. 5. That which appears to have been overlooked by writers is that the brute has, as far as we can determine, a

spirit as well as a body, and that the spirit in its manifestations is far more *intellectual* than mere *inert matter* could be in its most refined nature.

SECTION VIII.

1. The brute, to a limited extent, *is capable of being taught*, which is utterly impossible, if there was no principle of any kind capable of being taught differing from any thing that can be found in matter. The fact that they can be taught to any degree, or that they naturally know any thing, or have self-power to move, is conclusive proof that they have a nature differing from matter, and superior to it. 2. The dog can be *taught* to go errands for his master, and to look for game in any direction, by the motion of the hand. If he is commanded to watch at any certain place, he will remain there till released by his master. The sound of two words will change alternately the course of a horse. 3. Animals have been *learned to dance at the sound of music*. This has been thought to arise from the fact that they were trained upon hot plates of iron in the first place, and that ever afterward, on hearing music similar to that played while they were dancing on the hot iron, they would begin to dance; "and that the associations which had been established between the sound of music and the mere animal sensibilities reproduced dancing." If this is true, and proves any thing, it proves too much; for then the brute must have power to distinguish such associations of music from other associations of music, or of sounds, in order to know

when to dance; and, in the next place, it proves that the brute has power of memory in calling up the associations connected with music and circumstances long since past; therefore, we know that the principle of their nature which can be thus affected, can not be inert matter, and all we contend for is true, that brutes have a spiritual nature which must be superior to matter. 4. That *memory* in the human mind is *distinctly different* from *brute memory* is very clear and conclusive; but the idea that no such thing exists in connection with brutes as memory is absurd. It will not do to define it to be nothing more than mere animal sensibilities affected in a certain way. To say that, when a brute has been affected in a given manner, the same sensations are reproduced in him when under similar circumstances, and the same actions are repeated, is acknowledging, in substance, the very fact which is intended to be refuted by transferring the power of memory from any thing like spirit or mind in brutes to mere sensations or sensibilities which can not be within and of themselves inert matter; and if we have to acknowledge some spiritual power connected with brutes—and to this issue we are driven whether we desire it or not—then we can have no difficulty in believing that this superadded or superior spiritual nature can exercise, to a limited extent, the power of memory, and just such a memory as the wise Author of their being saw best adapted to them as brutes.

SECTION IX.

1. *A horse can recollect* the road in returning to his home from a distant country. We have an account of a horse, owned by an itinerant minister in this country. In one part of his circuit he always turned off from the highway, along a path at a certain tree. After the lapse of seven years, he was returning along the same highway; when he came to the same tree, the horse turned off with an enlivened speed, and it was with difficulty that he could be turned back to the road. Such facts are common to those who travel with horses. To account for such evidences of memory and knowledge in any other way than that of real memory, and real knowledge, in a limited extent, existing in connection with the existence of brutes, is impossible. 2. We are compelled to believe that in brutes there is an active, living principle which in itself is not and can not be matter. However revolting this may be to unthinking minds, let them meet the case with arguments and facts, and we will submit the whole matter at once. 3. Then, is there any thing more upon which we can ground a belief that brutes have spirits? We will say, first, that we have no evidence, from any source, which clearly shows that they have no spiritual nature, but there appears to be some additional evidence proving that they have.

SECTION X.

1. The term *ruach*, as it is used in the Hebrew Bible, when applied to human beings, means the

soul; but the same term is used in Scripture in regard to beasts, and means, without doubt, the spirit, or soul. But there are other terms which define the great difference which exists between the human soul and the soul of the beast. It is clear that, from the meaning of the term, men have souls, and that beasts have souls. The difference appears to be also defined, that the human soul was made for God, and it was intended that he should be its portion; that it should return to him and enjoy endless happiness; but that the soul of the beast was adapted to this lower world, and is to derive its happiness from it.

2. If the brute has a *spirit, or soul*, will not that spirit, or soul, *exist forever?* We may base an argument on this position upon the fact of the indestructibility of matter, or that we have no proof that any property of matter can or will ever cease to be. We have seen that all matter is under the influence of change only by reason of, or in connection with, the existence and effect of sin. When the world was made it was holy, and we can but believe that it was designed to continue so forever. If this be true, then it follows that when the effect of sin is wholly removed, all material elements will still exist, and never to be annihilated. If this be true, it is reasonable to infer that the spirit of brutes, which we have seen differs from, and to be superior to matter, will exist forever, and that, in connection with their bodies, immortalized in the restoration of all things.

3. Does it not appear reasonable, that if beasts existed before the fall of man, they *were pure in nature and free from servitude;* and that they were designed to be happy

forever? If their sufferings and death were brought upon them by man, and are the results of sin, what can be their condition and state, when sin and its effects are wholly removed, but that of happiness and life? If the brute suffers innocently it is only reasonable to suppose that they will be restored. 4. It is impossible for us to conceive that an all-wise Being would create beasts for the *purpose of annihilating them* at some future time. If they had been created suffering and dying before the fall, then we might have room to doubt; but as they were originally pure and happy, it is reasonable to suppose that such will be their condition in the final restoration.

CHAPTER III. INTUITIONS.

SECTION I.

1. By *mental intuition* is understood a natural internal power which acts in perceiving realities. It is the act by which the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two or more ideas, or real facts or truths, the moment they are presented. It is the power of perceiving facts immediately, without the intervention of reason, arguments, or testimony. It presents truths to the mind on bare inspection, and this simple inspection is knowledge.

2. This intuitive power has *its origin* in connection with the *primary elements* of the mind. Here philosophical inquiries must pause, as we can go no further back than original elements.

3. Several of the primary elements of mind may be regarded as intuition faculties; but there are no powers of our being more closely connected with the origin of intuitions than consciousness and conscience.

4. In the reciprocal relations of intuitions it is impossible for them to be opposed to each other. They appear to arise as perfect spontaneities of empirical order. They are simple in their origin, being free from all contingent influences which may follow; and it is impossible for the intuition faculties to be opposed to each other, or to the different intuitions which arise in connection with each one or all of

them, as there can be nothing in the philosophy of mind anterior to those primary elements which lie at the foundation of mind.

SECTION II.

1. *Ideas arise in the mind in connection with the existence, nature, and power of original elements.* When intuitions arise they are immediately followed by the action of the judgment, in discriminating difference and resemblance, which presupposes the presence of consciousness, and afterward they are embraced by the understanding and reason. Thus, ideas may be said to commence with the notice the mind takes of intuitions in conditioning them, and in amplifying or changing them from the concrete to ideas known to exist either as entities combined or abstracted. 2. *Simple ideas arise without natural classification.* It requires a special action of mind in evolving them as objects of reason, and in combining or in eliminating from the original, simple concrete. 3. *General ideas, or notions,* may arise in connection with simple or even eliminated ones. We may, in the first instance, have the perception of a tree without any general idea of more at first than a specific tree; but the perception of a second tree is succeeded by the suggestion of a third or more, till the judgment, discriminating, causes the mind to be led in contemplating an extended number of trees. The same process will hold good in regard to other objects.

SECTION III.

1. *Spontaneous action, or developments* of the intelligence, are those which exist in the mind anterior to attention and a full apprehension of them; but a correct and distinct apprehension of objects depends upon attention; for, till the mind gives attention to them, they can not be properly apprehended, and be inspected or considered, in which they become the objects of reason and judgment. But there are states, or intuitive motions or affirmations of mind, which exist anterior to any act of attention. Such internal motions, states, or affirmations, which become objects of the motion and direction of attention, are spontaneous eliminations or developments of intuitive power. 2. When spontaneous developments are *sufficiently apprehended to secure attention*, then the full apprehension of them, in connection with which they are conditioned and decided upon, is voluntary as well as the exercise of those other powers in receiving them as knowledge; but the manifestations or development of spontaneities previous to the voluntary action of the power of apprehension, attention, and judgment, must be regarded as involuntary. We can only be said to have merely a consciousness of them, and also, from the act of apprehending them, that something must have had an anterior existence. 3. In connection with the *action* of these internal spontaneous affirmations is the intuitive conviction of self, and by reason of such action is the mind revealed to itself, and its real existence becomes knowledge. 4. Though a *knowledge of self* is re-

vealed by reason of these spontaneities, acting out or from natural intuitive power, yet the *character of self* must begin with apprehension, attention, reflection, and consideration. Under the inspection and decisions of the mind the process is continued, and our knowledge matured, after our existence has been first affirmed by natural or spontaneous intuitions.

SECTION IV.

1. *Instinct is that power or disposition of mind* by which, wholly unaided by instruction or experience, *brutes* are spontaneously and unerringly directed in self-preservation; therefore, instinct is not material in nature or existence, but it is spiritual, and belongs to mind. 2. It has been admitted that the human mind is capable, and that it does *possess instinctive power*. This power or disposition of the mind arises in connection with intuitive affirmations of the mind, and is spontaneous without instruction, experience, deliberation, or reasoning. 3. If this be the true origin of *instinctive manifestations*, how can we so distinguish between its essential nature and action and that of mind so as to determine that it is not of mind? If we admit the existence of instinct, we are compelled to acknowledge that, wherever it exists, and in connection with the origin of all such existences, there is mind, or a soul; but the order or character of such a mind, or soul, must be determined by the facts existing in connection with it.

CHAPTER IV.
COMMON SENSE.

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SECTION I.

1. COMMON *sense* may be regarded as the process or power of practical judgment. In character it is regarded as that which is sound and safe, and it is efficient in directing us in proper deportment and to correct action.
2. It may be defined as the *immediate or instantaneous decision* of correct reason. It is universally appealed to as a correct guide in detecting falsehood, and in testing that which is true, and so presenting the same, confirming our confidence, while the objects of its power and action are received with the utmost degree of certainty.
3. The mental process which results in *that* to which the name of common sense is applied, appears to be controlled and modulated by certain facts, or classes of facts, common to the notice and experience of all minds; and there is a peculiar similarity in the way all minds are affected and influenced, or are conditioned by such classes of facts. The sameness as to a general medium in which many minds are thus affected and guided, forms a concentrated equilibrium of practical judgment, which is common to all minds in apprehending such truths or facts, and the influence they thus receive in common. This process gives rise to what is called common sense.
4. *Mental affirmations*, which arise in connection

with the same order or classes of truths common to all minds, being a result of unaffected reason, forms the peculiar condition and sound mental action, inspecting and presenting to us those events or facts which we immediately depend on and receive as true. Such a mental process, under circumstances common to all minds, forms the basis of certain action, and in connection with it is our belief of real facts or events; therefore, common sense becomes something like a similar and medium court of appeals common to all minds, and by which much uniformity of action among all classes is preserved, and that of correct sentiment and feeling. It is the instantaneous decision of reason in connection with real mental affirmations.

SECTION II.

1. *The vivid and correct exercise* of this mental power, which is not really a faculty, is of the *utmost importance* in constituting a well-regulated mind. Some minds are capable of being called great and overwhelming in that which might be called uncommon sense, while they are almost entirely destitute of common sense. The former is attended with strong, hasty, and ill-timed efforts or action, while the latter is characterized with prudence and successful efforts with increasing influence. 2. The mental action or power called common sense is manifested by no appeal to casualities or assumption, but it *commences with the real affirmations of the mind*. The origin of its action is not with external objects, but it commences wholly within the mind,

in connection with truths apprehended, and the immediate action of reason. 3. Common sense is not only dependent upon the power and correct action of *reason* in connecting facts necessary to final results, but it is more dependent upon a *well-balanced judgment*. Real mental affirmations can not be connected with the true facts and principles of common sense till they are, by a proper discrimination, classified, combined, or abstracted, which is the work of the judgment. In this way all the facts connected with any subject, or class of objects, are carefully considered, and contribute their proper weight, while the mind is deciding upon any subject or course of action. The mass of mankind, in different ages of the world, have been appealed to, and have heard almost every variety of contradictory views and doctrines; yet they were not and are not compelled to adopt any extreme by falling back upon that uniformity which is found in the general medium called common sense. 4. The reality of common sense *involves a general understanding of facts*, notions, and feelings evident in themselves, which are the objects of the judgment, giving strength to belief and direction to our action. In the very nature of this power there appears to be a healthy action of the various faculties concentrating in a common consent to, and a correct understanding of *that* which is true of the thousands of facts and events which are present. This process appears to be common to all minds, and forms a medium in the judgment and for the action of the masses. Then it is peculiar to the office of common sense to direct in solving questions from our experience in,

and knowledge of past and present truths ; and it is, in reality, a combination of solutions to questions forming a basis or power in judging and acting correctly.

SECTION III.

1. *If common sense be affirmations common to all minds*, and that these are immediately connected with the exercise of reason and judgment, then it can not be absent in any mind, or such a mind must act almost by accident, and always appear to be unsettled and unhappy in the midst of contentions, or when surrounded by storms. 2. Common sense directs in correct investigations, and is a guide to truth. Its aid in the detection of error is of the utmost importance. An appeal may be made to this power with full assurance, and with confidence of certain success. We can not have confidence in the correctness in any process or conclusions which are perfectly contradictory to it, as the lapse of time and the bestowment of more thought almost invariably reveals some error or absurdity. This power must have its place, and exercise its influence in the mind, or we are soon wild with extravagance and endless delusions. To think of ever or of really feasting the immortal mind in extended fields of mere assumptions and conjecture, is only to be always deluded, and rendered unfit for that which is, good or honorable within the range of that requirement which will not tolerate impurity. 3. This power, so indispensably connected with a well-regulated mind, may be cultivated and rendered more

efficient in directing to proper conclusions. This may be done by carefully attending to the process or reasoning, and the true and correct discriminating power of the judgment. Repeated efforts should be made, under deliberate reflection, to compare and properly weigh all the facts present, which form an aggregate union or equilibrium force of agreement, which may be regarded as a safe basis or ground of confidence or belief, in regulating our decisions and action. Common sense is an invaluable treasure of the soul, and wherever it exists the mind is capacitated for undisturbed happiness and great usefulness in the world.

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Division Eleventh.

CHAPTER I. VOLITION.

SECTION I.

1. VOLITION has been regarded as the *power of willing or of determining*. Under the just and equitable laws by which the Creator governs the work of his hands, volition is essential to the existence of sentient beings of high moral destiny. This power is very closely connected with the existence and nature of the entire faculties of the mind, or soul. 2. It is also defined to be the *act of willing* and the *act of determining choice*, or of forming purposes to be carried out by the action of the whole mind. We shall see that this subject is of the highest importance, and that it has been trammelled under the power and influence of prejudice and imperfect reasoning for ages, and that, without a clear and correct knowledge of it, the writer and speaker will always be embarrassed in presenting and in enforcing some of the most important truths connected with our happiness in this life, and our felicity in a peaceful immortality. 3. A president of one of our western colleges, favorably and extensively known, *defined volition*, in a baccalaureate address, in substance as follows: "Volition in man

is that power which moves his body. That it has, in whole or in part, any power or influence over the mind, is a doctrine we think long since lost in oblivion." How are students to gain correct ideas of mental powers from such instruction? It would be far better for them to trust their own cogitations and the books, without any other means of instruction upon the subject. If volition has power to move matter, and has no power or influence over the mind, then it is neither matter nor immaterial in its nature. If matter it would be inert, and if it was of mind it would act with the mental powers, and have power and influence, otherwise it would not have the power to move the body. 4. *Volition is, in nature, freedom within itself.* It has power of and within itself to act or refuse to act. This is implied in the use of the very term, its meaning, and the nature of the power it is intended to represent.

SECTION II.

1. *There is or there is not* such a power as volition. If there is no such power, then all arguments about it are unmeaning; but the existence of such a faculty or power has been acknowledged by general consent; therefore, if there is such a mental power, it is characterized by its nature, office, and its relation to other faculties or powers. So far as it can be defined, its existence is real, and its natural power to act within and of itself is untrammeled. 2. The doctrine that volition is only and simply the "act" of the will, or that the "will is the

mental power or susceptibility by which we put forth volitions," and admit such volitions to be simple action, can not be clearly sustained; for *action* is only *action*; and if we say the will has power to act, then volition would be lost in the same action, unless we were to say it was a secondary or double action in one. But this would be absurd; therefore, we claim that there is a more extensive and deeper meaning to be attributed to volition than simple will-act or will-action. 3. If volition be only *simple action*, such action may be applied to the action of water, or of the atmosphere, with as much propriety as it can be to the action of the will, if its reality is wholly dependent upon the action of the will; therefore, we must understand volition to have a far more important meaning than that which has been given to it by the preceding statement. 4. *Volition* can not be any thing more or less than an *internal power* existing naturally of *self-freedom* in action. No power of the mind restrains its action, in any way, by an authoritative or mandatory power, or by an unalterable necessity. It is a power truly volitive in its essential nature. Its action, naturally within itself, is unembarrassed, forming a basis or reason why sentient beings can have an existence; for this power renders us capable, freely of and within ourselves, to render praise to, and to glorify the Creator; and this design could not be complied with, or be fulfilled by us, unless we were constituted with liberty to either render such homage or to refuse. And of necessity this universal liberty must be given, or the great object of man's creation would have been destroyed by law; and,

therefore, his existence would have been impossible; and as he is not compelled by law to glorify God, neither is he legally compelled to decline or refuse such homage.

SECTION III.

1. *Volitions differ from volition only in the plurality of their various actions, or the almost simultaneous eliminations of spontaneous motion, corresponding to various qualities of objects, or to those entities closely combined.* 2. It is impossible to give a true definition of the *nature of volition or of volitions*. It is not proper to say they are simple states of mind, or that they are either mental determinations or conclusions; for they are still more important, and lie back of all these. The moment we appeal to conscience and our experience, we are satisfied as to the existence of the power and action of volition, though the nature of either or both can not be defined. Consciousness appears to be the test power in relation to a knowledge of many influences and principles of internal origin; therefore, when we follow a subject, or fact, till the analysis, by means of reasoning, is lost, or can go no further, then, if we can have a belief in realities, grounded upon the approval of consciousness, and relatively strengthened by experience, we are safe in our belief in such existences, and should not yield to doubt without being influenced by a new class of intuitions and convictions. 3. Volition may exist in reference to *some object or objects, and also without any object*. The belief that it can not exist without some object,

is contrary to all our conceptions of its nature and office. If it only exists with an object, then its existence is either an accident, as an object may or may not exist, or the object is the cause of its existence; therefore, such an existent has its origin wholly in or in connection with the object which may be inert; but this is absurd. We can form no correct idea of it only by the aid of consciousness: hence, the origin of our knowledge of it commences with consciousness. If the existence and action of intuitions are spontaneous, we can only conclude that volition may and does exist and act without any object; for its very nature is freedom and self-authoritative action; yet it has power also to act in relation to objects. 4. If volition *can not exist only in relation to or with an object*, then it follows that, if there is no object present, volition is non-existence. It is dependent upon the presence of an object for its real being; therefore, volition may have its origin in, or in connection with, external material entities. This position is false, though it is a correct conclusion drawn from the statements of some writers. The existence of volition is not dependent upon either the existence and presence of an object, or any ulterior action of the will; it is a power of the mind, and has, from its nature and action, an internal origin, and is not a casual entity, wholly dependent upon certain contingencies or abstract action for its being. It has its origin in connection with the existence and action of intuition faculties and intuitions. 5. It is utterly impossible for volition to *consist only and wholly in the action of any faculty or faculties of mind*; for then its

existence would be an accident, as such faculty or faculties may or may not act; and if such action was not put forth, then volition could not be called up from nonentity, which would be natural to it; and if it could be thus called up, then each appearing of it would be a new creation, which is absurd, as no element of the mind has power to create another element or faculty. The definition of volition, as it has been given by a majority of writers, is based upon assumptions, without one clear and conclusive argument or fact given in favor of such a definition; for if volition is, in nature, only action, then the very idea of action implies something capable of acting; otherwise, action could not exist and volition would not and could never have an existence.

SECTION IV.

1. *Volition can and does exist of and within its own essential nature;* and such real existence is independent of all contingent entities. It exists either with reference or *without any reference to what we believe to be in our power.* The latter consideration, which may be the object of belief, can neither create nor annihilate the abstract existence of volition as belonging to and existing in the mind; and the action of belief has nothing to do in originating this internal power. 2. *The exercise or action of volition can exist either in reference to or without any reference to what we believe to be in our power;* for the very nature of this internal power is self-liberty of motion or action; and though such action

may be restricted or varied by opposing causes, yet these are not necessitated laws authoritatively imposed upon it by its Author. In nature it is still real, and possessed of spontaneous action. 3. *Volition* is one thing, and *volitive action* is another. The former is an *abiding power*, and the latter may or may not exist. The former may exist without the latter, but the latter can not exist without the former. No man believes that he can fly, yet he has power to desire to do so; and he is capable of volitive action in regard to it, though he may not make the effort, and he may, as many have done in the past, make the effort, however unreasonable it may be. Volition, in relation to any impracticable thing, or results, is no more than the free motion of the volitive power toward or in relation to them. We are not to understand, therefore, that volition implies that the act desired is actually performed in order to constitute volitive action; for, in that case, it would appear that the action must first be completed, in order to know that we have had volition or volitive action.

SECTION V.

1. *Volition and desire* are not *one and the same*. The former may exist in nature independent of the latter, and it may act in reference to an object, or refuse to act. It can also act from its liberty in relation to inaccessible objects, or those we do not expect to obtain; yet such action is soon suspended on the clear apprehending of intervening impossibilities; but desire, in many instances, seems to be

undying in its nature. When we have fondly cherished our desires for some object which we think might reasonably be ours, though there is not the slightest possibility of realizing the object, yet we can not totally suppress our desires. 2. The power of volition *exists in the mind*, and it can so exist at times, and under certain circumstances, without action; but we generally understand by the term volition this power acting or in action. The desires have no authoritative power over volition in controlling it; yet our desires have their influence in inducing volitive action in the direction of them. 3. *Desire* is no more than an emotion or excitement of the mind, directed to the attainment of some object, or a mental passion existing by the love of some object, which may be either good or bad; but volition inclines or influences the mind to act in reference to objects, whether they be desired or not. 4. *A difference between desire and volition* can be tested by consciousness. We can experience an internal discovery and decision of the two existences with a conviction of the reality of that which is peculiar to the nature or character of each as clearly distinct. If from consciousness and experience we can have knowledge of such powers, with their dissimilar characteristics, then it is impossible for us to ever have conceptions of them as one and the same. These differences have already been discussed to a sufficient length. We know that we often have volitions, and act entirely contrary to our desires. Persons may desire to participate in some luxury, pleasure, or gain of earth, fraught, to some extent, with evil, while the strength of such de-

sires are overruled by the volitive power, in determining and in pursuing a high and holy Christian course.

SECTION VI.

1. *Volition differs from desire* in its power of sudden change, and its controlling power over it or in counteracting it, while the latter can not readily change, and can only affect the action of the former by a mild influence, inducing action. Volitions can be changed with the rapidity of thought, till such changes may number thousands in a few hours. So rapid is this process, that we have only to appeal to the action of this power as it is experienced in each mind, as proof or knowledge of the fact; but desire, though it may be attended with joy or heaviness of spirit, yet it can not be easily changed under certain circumstances. The traveler from home may desire to return, but he voluntarily conquers its power by pursuing his lonely journey, while his eyes give vent to his feelings in a flood of tears. That man who has been exposed to the storms of maritime life can not change his desires to see his loved friends at home, having been long absent from them. No person who is rocked on ocean waves, in returning from some transmarine country, can cease to cherish a thrilling desire to see his home and dearest friends in his native land. 2. If the power of volition necessarily acted in conformity with our *highest or strongest desire*, we would be destitute of any rule of morality, which would be capable of restraining from any evil a depraved nature could wish; but

conscience furnishes correction to evil desires by dictating that which is right and that which should be done. In this way conscience furnishes motive to volition, but in no case can it command or control it; and if the presence of correct motive is wholly dependent upon conscience and consciousness as that which is proper for volitive action, and that neither conscience nor consciousness has, by nature, power to authoritatively govern the volitive power, then it is absolutely certain that motive furnished by them can not peremptorily govern or control volition, or the will, under any circumstances; therefore, motive may and can invoke volitive action, but never can command its action: hence, such an idea is not only without proof, but it is clearly absurd within itself. 3. There is a vast difference in the *condition or character of motive* furnished by the elements of mind, which lie at the foundation of moral action, and that which is furnished by our propensities or passions. The former is presented in counter-distinction to impure influences, while the latter corresponds with the corruption of our fallen and depraved natures; and to pursue it or to be led by it is delusion and hopeless despair. 4. Intellectual and moral beings are capable of being *led by pure motive*, and such motive is furnished by those mental powers which lie at the foundation of moral action. Without the development of these powers of moral action, man would be like the brute, led by desires which correspond to and act in conformity with mere animal nature; but, possessed of moral susceptibilities, we have light to act correctly, and if we refuse, guilt is the result.

And when we voluntarily act in reference to any object, we have an immediate, internal conviction as to whether it be right or wrong.

CHAPTER II.
VOLITION, CONTINUED.

SECTION I.

1. THE volitive power is manifested with various *degrees of strength*. Like other mental powers, it may be strongly or vigorously developed in some minds, while others appear to possess not so much of strength or degrees of power; and this power, in the same mind, may be more vivid or energetic at some times, and under some circumstances, than others. This waning, so far as it is manifested in the latter case, may arise from a confused or wearied state of mind, or a diseased physical nature may trammel its action; but the former difficulty may exist in the natural condition of the mental constitution. 2. The same *degrees of difference* may be applied to the *force of the action* of the volitive power. Action may be either weak or strong, and the force of such action must, necessarily, depend upon the original power to act; for without such power action would be wholly an accident, if it could possibly have an existence. The different degrees of force connected with it are similar, in particular respects, to those connected with the action of other powers of the mind. A knowledge of these differences or degrees can be readily apprehended or determined by an appeal to consciousness, in which we feel satisfied that what we realize

is true, and our belief is unshaken; yet these degrees may be varied by other causes than those immediately connected with the immaterial nature—the incursive defects or diseases of the body may have either a direct or remote influence. 3. *The action* of the volitive power becomes vivid and strong in *proportion to the strength* of our feelings and desires in relation to or for any object. Though volitive action may take place in regard to any object of our wish or desires, yet it is not naturally dependent upon them for such action. We have seen, from its nature, that it has power to act either with or without such desires, and also with or without any special object. 4. *Volition* differs from *feeling*. The former is the power of free or liberty-action, and its leading characteristic is motion or action, and not emotion or feeling: hence, volitive action is not necessitated by preference, feeling, or desire; it has power to act either in connection with them or wholly without them. We should be very careful always to distinguish between those powers which lie at the foundation of mental action, and those which lie at the foundation of moral action. The nature of volition is clearly different from the moral sensibilities.

SECTION II.

1. Volition relates to *self-action*, both as it relates to *body and mind*. The body may move voluntarily or involuntarily, yet it can be made to move or be set in motion by volitive power. We may determine to put forth action of the bodily powers

instantaneously, or that it shall be done at a certain epoch in the future. The mind can act either with or without any physical motion. In this way the mind can act in arranging any process of future or contemplated events or facts. It is difficult to express the liberty and limitlessness of the volitive power. It is peculiar in nature to itself, and can not be arbitrarily trammeled by preference, desires, or motive. In its essential nature and existence it is free from all of them; yet its action may, in a contingent way, be influenced by them. 2. We have seen, by the preceding argument, that volition, in its nature, embraces more than *mere action*, being a power capable of action, and at liberty to act in any way independently of other powers of the mind. It may and can be influenced in acting by other internal powers, but such action can not be compelled by contingent or external causes. We have demonstrated that mere *action* can not exist if there is nothing capable of acting: hence, the very term volition implies the action not of non-existence, but of something capable of motion or action. We have seen that volition is not desire, and that the essential existence of the former is not dependent upon the latter; neither can the latter authoritatively originate the former. It may exert an influence upon it, but can never compel volitive action. 3. *Volition differs from choice.* If our liberty consists wholly and only in our power of acting according to choice, then choice must invariably precede action, and be the cause of such action; therefore, we can not commit crime till we first choose to do so, neither can we do a righteous

act till we choose so to do; but when a variety of objects are presented to us at the same time, we can have no voluntary mental action of any kind in comparing the properties or preferable qualities of them, in order to choose which we prefer, till we first choose to know that we can apprehend differences in them, and that we can choose to originate mental action in apprehending their existence at all. This is absurd. Choice can never give origin to the volitive power. It may have a contingent or persuasive influence upon its action, but it can do no more. 4. *Volitive liberty* is, within itself, the power *of acting or not acting*, and that either with or without choice. Choice has no creative power by which volition is a mandatory result. Man's free agency consists not in the power to originate volition, but in the liberty of which such a power is naturally constituted. If this liberty is destroyed by necessity, then our existence has never taken place, as we would have no self-power to voluntarily glorify the Author of our being; and we can have no conception that such an infinitely-wise and holy Being could ever have been employed in creating intellectual and inert blanks to adorn the perfection of limitless creation; therefore, liberty is essential to our existence.

SECTION III.

1. Volition is *anterior* to choice; for choice, in its very nature, implies the possibility of a different or opposite selection to that which is made. Then if a different selection could have been made, the power

and liberty of such selecting must necessarily exist anterior to choice, and the selection made; therefore, choice can not exist till we have volitive action, at least, in connection with apprehending the presence of objects of choice. 2. There is an *antecedent volitive power*, in which there is always an *alternative* to that which the mind decides on, with the consciousness that we can choose either. This is a liberty we can not doubt. If many objects are presented to the mind, we are in possession of the same liberty to choose or not to choose any one or class of them; and to deny this is to disorganize the rational mind, raftering in darkness the canopy of its being and future hope with immovable confines and eternal clouds. If choice can not precede volitive *action*, it is clear that it can not precede the existence of the volitive power. 3. Then it follows that our choice, or *act of choosing*, is free, being opposed to any thing like an unchanging necessity. Volitions can exist as opposed to the laws over matter and natural causation, and even the laws of instinct. Thus, the mind has volitive power to choose, in which alternatives are disposed of without respect to any natural relationship, elements, or of cause and effect. The mind of man is free to act in accordance with the course of natural laws and tendencies, or contrary to them; and this same liberty exists in relation to immaterial elements and laws. Mind is free in its natural existence, or liberty of action, amid all relations and laws of realities around him. 4. Volition is possessed either of *self-freedom*, or it is under the law of fatal necessity. If it is governed

by choice, and choice is an effect of our constitutional organization, then the whole mind is under the law of necessity, whether it be regarded in a primary or a secondary point of light. It has been asserted that we are free, or are at liberty to act according to choice; but we have seen that volition is anterior to choice, and that choice is dependent on it for existence. Sentient beings have self-power to act as opposed to natural tendencies and physical laws. The wheels of an extensive manufactory tend to rest, but they can all be thrown into motion by the great water-wheel, which yields to the weight of water, according to the law of gravitation. The force of this law is the cause or necessity of action. If man acts only under the law of necessity, then it is the *law* which is accountable for either good or bad deeds, as it is wholly the cause of every act of every order or kind. The idea and the possibility of choice, without the possibility of a different or a contrary choice, is utterly impossible; and this liberty to choose is anterior to choice, and is only found in connection with intuitive power.

SECTION IV.

1. Another *false* proposition is, that "motives are causes, of which volitions are effects." It is again asserted that "every volition has a motive, and if the motive be single, which operates upon the will, such motive will determine it; but if there are several operating upon it at the same time, the strongest one will determine the will-action." It would appear that no proposition, or propositions, could be

much more unreasonable or absurd. 2. Motive may be regarded as *that* which has power to *invoke will-action*; and when we speak of it, in connection with volition, we do not say motive is action, but it is that which invokes action of the volitive power; otherwise, motive and volitive action would be one and the same. If motive is not volition, then it can only influence the mind to action in a secondary way; for it is clear that, as it is not volition, it can not act either as or for volition, but it is rather a contingent object or influence inducing volitions. Then, in all cases, volitive power must exist anterior to motive, and motive can not and does not have any authoritative power over it. All that it can do is to invoke volitive action, which may be granted or refused at the pleasure of the will. 3. The *origin* and arrangement of motive, or motives, *presupposes* and proves the pre-existence and action of the volitive power. If we can pre-arrange motives to produce in the mind certain volitions, then the determining to make such pre-arrangements is a volition, which volition must exist previous to motive, as its being is a prelude to the origin and arrangement of motive. Motive can exist, in the order of time, after volition; but motive, in the human mind, can never precede and give origin to the power of volition. 4. Volitions are *spontaneous*, and can exist *independent* of motive, and, in many instances, without being influenced by it in the slightest degree. Like intuitions, they can exist and become connected with the action of other powers of the mind; so there is nothing like chance or irrationality in regard to them while connected with sentient

beings. We know, from the preceding argument, that motive can only have a secondary or an ulterior influence upon volition. The same principle applies to mind in general. The relation of cause and effect, when referred to the acts of the divine Being, destroys all law of motive-control. Such a law, then, could not exist unless by Divine volition. Then, if he could act once without motive-influence, he could continue doing so forever: hence, motive can not authoritatively control either mind or volition.

CHAPTER III. VOLITION, CONTINUED.

SECTION I.

1. Motive *can not control* the Divine mind. Dr. Edwards, in trying to sustain the doctrine of motive, gives us to understand that the "*energy of motives* exists in the nature of things anterior to the will of God." Mr. Upham says that "the supreme Being is *inevitably governed*, in all his doings, by what, in the range of events, is wisest and best." Thus, he is inevitably subordinate to that which is superior in control, and which governs him; therefore, motive is superior to every thing, and it governs all beings in the vast universe. If the above propositions be true, the sovereign Ruler of the universe, or of universal being, is the *energy of motives*. This conclusion, if true, or if we could believe it to be true, would compel us to adopt Atheism as an inevitable result; but we have seen already the absurdity of all such statements, in the fact that volition in mind any where is anterior to motive, and that motive never can originate volitive power, nor authoritatively control any of its acts. 2. Such a high motive-law *leads to materialism*; for the mind could not move only as it was influenced by motive, and in the same direction, and to the same degree, with motive-influence. Then, if the volitions of the mind should be operated upon by two or more mo-

tives of the same or equal importance in every way, the mind must cease to act, and remain at rest forever; therefore, mind would become inert, and if so it would become insensible, as sensation would imply action, and action could not take place. Deity in wisdom placed fixed laws over the material universe, but he has placed self-moving and imperishable minds under very different laws; and it only requires plain, common perception in order to discern the difference. 3. It is utterly impossible to establish a conclusion that *motive governs volition*, without reasoning in a circle. If we ask certain philosophers what controls and determines the volitions, they answer that it is the strongest motive. But what constitutes the strongest motive? They say, that which determines the volitions. And they can not, neither dare they travel beyond this circle; otherwise, this high law of motive is broken or severed forever.

SECTION II.

1. That volitions are authoritatively controlled and determined by either motive or choice is directly opposed to the *consciousness* of mankind. Of nothing are we more competent to judge, or are we more thoroughly prepared to decide, than that the volitive power lies back of both motive and choice; and nothing do we know with more absolute certainty than in regard to the action of the volitive power, as to whether it is necessitated or free. Evidence, reported to the mind through the medium of the senses, may deceive us, from the fact that the

physical organs connected with the senses may be affected or even paralyzed by disease; but an appeal to consciousness is an end to all controversy or doubt. Its evidence can not be increased within itself, and its testimony is direct without the frailty of intervening material nerves, tending to paralysis and decay. If it be unreasonable to doubt evidence or testimony from external objects, it is infinitely more unreasonable and absurd to doubt our consciousness or its evidence. Its voice is without contingencies, or the possibility of deception, and to doubt its unerring truthfulness is to be coerced into universal doubt and skepticism. 2. In the unerring truthfulness of consciousness, we feel and know that our action in choice, and even in the selection of correct motive from evil, is not *arbitrary*, but *free*; and we can no more doubt it than we can the consciousness of self as a reality. In calling up our past acts which were evil, we feel that we were free at the time to have acted differently: hence the responsibility and accountability, a sense of which we could not feel if our acts were necessitated. If we intend to do wrong, at a certain time in the future, we feel that it is positively in our power to avoid such an act, and consequently we feel and know we shall incur guilt, a sense of which we could not have if our volitions were controlled and determined by either choice or motives. 3. The *untrammeled liberty* of our volitions is clearly established, from the fact that the existence of consciousness in man prevents him from being effectually reasoned out of a sense of his accountability. They who have faithfully tried to extinguish this internal light, have

found it to be like smuggling subterraneous fires, the accumulation of which suddenly rends every obstruction with the throes of an earthquake. The reason is plain. We are more absolutely conscious of the liberty of our volitions in acting right or wrong, than we can be of any law of motives or even as to whether they can have any existence at all. We can have no sense of remorse for any act, however bad, without consciousness. While we feel that our evil acts are freely our own, we experience condemnation; but if our acts are not wholly voluntary, it is impossible to feel that we have done wrong.

SECTION III.

1. We are more *vividly conscious* of the sensations or feelings we experience in choosing, and in *voluntarily* choosing motive, than we can be even of the real objects of choice, or of that which gives rise to motives. When many motives influence the mind, such influence implies a previous voluntary action, which must take place in apprehending the presence or existence of such motives. The strongest among many motives can not be determined till a previous voluntary action takes place: first, in apprehending them; and, secondly, in comparing them, in order to determine upon the preferable or strongest one; otherwise, the strongest one could never be known to the mind, as such motive or motives have not self-power to make themselves known to the mind. 2. There is a *difference* between *resolving to act* according to the strongest motive, after it is voluntarily discovered, and in acting

from fatal necessity. In the very act of yielding to the strongest motive, after we have voluntarily determined it, we distinctly feel, in the resolving to conform to it, that, at the same time, we are entirely able and free to resolve on a different course. While standing on the projecting rocks of Niagara Falls, I may determine not to throw myself over, and, at the same moment, feel that I am able and can leap over and fall into the abyss below. From an internal conscientious sense, I know that I am perfectly free to either result, and to doubt it is utterly impossible. In all cases we have a distinct consciousness of a power to act either in accordance with motives or in direct opposition. 3. If motives *control and determine* the volitive power, we are unable to find any well-founded and sound arguments establishing such a result; but when the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations arising in the depths of its inner being, we feel and know that we are free from any law of fatal necessity. 4. The *strongest* motive affecting the mind is embraced in the *law of self-preservation*; yet we feel and know that it depends upon ourselves whether we may adhere to such a law or not. It is, with us, to become obedient to the rules or laws of health, or to be intentionally reckless of them, or we are at liberty to destroy life by violence; but if we were compelled to this by motive, the act would be perfectly harmless, as we have seen, according to the law of necessity, maintained by others, in which they hold that motive governs the entire universe; but this is absurd.

SECTION IV.

1. The law of *motive-necessity* is contrary to the conscious feeling and acts of mankind in general. All claim to refer, in some way, to right and wrong, reward and punishment, merit and demerit. There is a universal feeling prompting to reward him who does right, and to punish the transgressor. This universal conformity of belief, conduct, and actions, which are regulated according to an internal conscious feeling of liberty, in which we know that they can be correct or the reverse, according to the freedom of the volitive power, forever destroys any necessitated restrictions upon our spontaneous volitions. 2. Volitions are *spontaneous and free*, from the fact that there is a universal conviction experienced in the human mind that our former course of conduct or acts might have been different from what they have been or are. No further proof is necessary, further than to attend to our feelings when we recall to mind the imperfections of our past acts. With deep regret we feel that they might have been right, or very different from what they are. This conscious regret is evidence that we could have acted differently; for if the acts of our past lives, however wrong, were necessitated, it would be utterly impossible for us to experience any regret in regard to them; but having such regret, or remorse of feelings, is positive proof that our acts are voluntary. If others commit crime, it is impossible for us to feel guilty of their offenses; and so it is with us. If motive controls us into crime, we are innocent, and can not feel remorse; for the crime or guilt

is wholly in the motive which controlled us, and was the cause of that which was wrong. 3. The remembrance of past acts is attended with a conviction or consciousness the most positive, that, in the same condition, or under identically the same circumstances, our volition and acts might have been precisely the *reverse* of what they were. In the recalling of any act, the consciousness of our power to have voluntarily determined and acted differently will be distinctly recalled in connection with the act, and the one is as clearly vivid as the other. If we are certain that we have ever had action of the volitive power, we are equally as conscious and certain that we were free, and at liberty to have willed and acted to the reverse of such action. 4. In deciding upon the acts of others, we have a conscious sense of that which is right or wrong. These convictions arise from a consciousness of mental liberty. We have an unerring conviction that all offenders might act differently if they would: hence their condemnation; for if we could feel and believe that their acts were necessitated, it would be impossible to censure them for any act. Therefore, the fact that we feel justified in condemning that which is wrong in others, is conclusive proof that we have an intuitive and spontaneous conviction that volitions are controlled or determined by no other faculty or power of the entire mind.

SECTION V.

1. This *conscious sense* of liberty is evidenced in regard to acts of present time. If a variety of ob-

jects are presented to the mind, we know that we have power to collect any one of them, or any class; and by this act of volition the object or motive is distinguished and selected, in connection with which we can act, continue to act, or refuse to act at any time. We are just as conscious that we naturally possess this liberty-power as we can be that there are any real entities in the universe. 2. The doctrine that "motive produces volition, and that volition produces the act, and all the circumstances, taken together, constitutes the motive," is only favored with words and confusion of thought. It is a specimen of that continuous, argumentative circle which is adopted by all who vindicate the laws of fatality. Volition is antecedent to choice, and choice is anterior to motive. 3. *Volition* may be regarded as spontaneous liberty-power of action in any way, though this power may not be exerted in action. 4. It is the *power of motion* in determining an action within itself, and in relation to other things, though the action of the mind toward or in reference to such objects may not be completed. 5. It is the power of action, of *determining action*, and of enforcing action under the full meaning of the will. 6. The *ground* of our *accountability* exists in the possession of a liberty-power to do right, and to refrain from evil or wrong. No where can we find the ground of accountability beyond the fact and nature of voluntariness. We are satisfied that man is accountable for all his voluntary acts, and we are equally as well satisfied that he is not accountable for any thing beyond this; therefore, if our volitions are controlled and coerced by any law or influence

in the range of thought, then free will and all accountability ceases together, and our ideas of obligation, right and wrong tend to fatal deception. 7. Man naturally *possesses* volition, and he is capable of volitive action, or of *putting forth* volitions. If he is not capable of voluntary action, then it is needless to exhort him to action in order to do right; for he has no power to act. If we could ascertain, by some process, what the sovereign motive-power was, then it would be reasonable to appeal to that; for man is passive, while the motive-power is the whole action and cause of action. Indeed, it would be useless to let man know any thing about duty, as motive must do all and is accountable for all; therefore, if he should not act he is clear, and the whole blame is with the motive-power, which governs him. But we have pursued this topic far enough. The human mind exists in perpetual or unending freedom. By its self-power of action, under its present relations to its Author, it either rises to happiness and heaven, or forces its way into gloomy despair.

SECTION VI.

1. Mr. Stewart says that "will properly expresses that power of the mind of which volition is the act." If volition is only the act of the will, why call it volition? for the act of the will is the act of the will, and it is no more or less. If will has real action, it would be foolish presumption to say that volition was the same action, and only the same, in essence and action; yet this would be the case if volition is the action of the will; but this is false.

Then, if volition be only the action of the will, and is dependent upon such action for its origin, and can not be the action of the will, as the will is acknowledged to have its own action, it must be an accidental and superadded action, which may have a casual being, and then sink into annihilation; but this is absurd. 2. Then we must come to a more rational conclusion that volition can not exist *only* as action, unless there is something capable of moving or acting. The very idea of action implies a power capable of acting; therefore, volition is a power of the mind capable of motion or action. 3. Mr. Upham says the will is "the mental power, or susceptibility, by which we put forth volitions." This amounts to about the same thing as that given by Mr. Stewart. But it would stand thus: that volition, or the *act* of the will, is that which puts forth the *act* of the will. Who can understand such logic? Here comes again the same old hackneyed argumentative circle, the last resort of every philosopher who attempts to chain or fatalize the free and imperishable human mind! 4. Volition and the will are not distinct powers of the mind, neither are they co-ordinate branches of any mental power. One can not give rise to the other, nor are they dependent upon each other for existence. The two terms refer the mind to the different conditions and degrees of strength naturally connected with and contained in the one intellectual power. 5. The term *volition* refers the mind to the natural liberty-power, essentially free to act in any way or manner corresponding to the nature of such freedom. 6. The term *will* refers the mind to the same mental

power of action, embracing not only its primary spontaneity, but involves an idea of its higher degrees of strength, and authoritative and mandatory power, not only in giving origin to action, but in continuing, contracting, and in compelling action. All the difference that need be referred to in this place, in the meaning of the two terms, is embraced in the nature of the condition of the one power in its varied manifestations. We now enter upon the analysis of the *will* in its more extensive manifestations, and will define, in brief form, its relation to other faculties of the mind.

Division Twelfth.

CHAPTER I. THE WILL.

SECTION I.

1. THE will is that faculty of the mind by which we *determine* either to *do* or *forbear* an action. It is an inherent power or faculty which we exercise in deciding among two or more objects, as to which we shall choose or pursue. Its very nature precludes the necessity of an extensive analysis; therefore, we do not feel called upon to amplify by following the example of previous writers, taxing the time and toils of the student in examining a general variety of subjects, having only a very remote and common relevancy to the important doctrine of the will; yet we desire to involve in the argument more facts intimately connected with the doctrine of the will than can be found in any one work now extant. 2. The will, in its *very nature*, is the *liberty-power* of the mind. The peculiar condition of its essential being is the nature, which is self-freedom and self-power of action. 3. It is not only free in its very nature, but it has determining power, deciding in the mind that something *shall* be done or forborne; and it possesses mandatory power, leading to such mental action as will be effectual, or will secure cer-

tain results. 4. The mind is *controlled* by the will in a sense superior to the nature, office, or capability of any other faculty or power of the mind. This will more fully appear when the nature, office, and power of the will are examined in connection with other faculties which are closely connected with it.

SECTION II.

1. The *will* is closely connected with the *judgment*, and can be and is often influenced by it; yet, while the latter can discriminate and decide upon realities or facts, it requires the presence of the will in determining or in compelling action. The judgment can only act in relation to truths; and when it decides, such decision is knowledge; but the mind is wholly free to act or to forbear action. But when we will to secure that which is the object of decision, the powers of the mind are directed to the work necessary to be accomplished. 2. The understanding *can not control* the will. It has power to contain or embrace all that is necessary to be brought under the inspection of the mind, and, in this way, it can go no further than to invoke volitive action. 3. Reason may connect the different steps, or a chain of facts, from the premises to the result, but it has no authority over the *will* in causing action. Its power is under the control of the will, by which its action can be continued or suspended at pleasure. Its process may aid in inducing volitive action, but never can command such action. 4. We understand by the term will a *commanding power*, or a power which can direct. The understanding

appears to contain or embrace all that is necessary to be furnished for immediate mental action; the judgment determines which is preferable, while it is the province of the will to decide on which to pursue, and to act in relation to that which is the object of such decision.

SECTION III.

1. We object to the *order* of the "classification of the mental powers," according to the arrangement of some writers, upon the nature of the will. A fine specimen of seemingly-unintentional, though intentional, design may be detected in the assumption, that "a knowledge of the will implies a preliminary knowledge of the intellect;" and that such "knowledge implies a preliminary knowledge of the sensibilities." This arrangement will claim that we have knowledge of the existence and action of several faculties as anterior to our knowledge of the will, thereby fixing a previous basis containing laws governing the will. The absurdity of this arrangement will be clearly defined hereafter.

2. To define the *relation* of the will to other faculties, or to all of them combined, in order to find some one or a combined influence as a law or laws of the will, by which it may be and is governed, is wholly unnecessary, as the very nature and relation of the will to all the other powers of the mind will forever preclude any idea of the correctness of such confused positions and argumentation.

3. *Feeling, thinking, and willing* are three faculties distinct from each other. They have been known as the

sensibility, intellect, and the will. All sensitive states and feelings are referred to the first; all intellectual operations are referred to the second; all mental determinations are referred to the third. These three powers of the mind are clearly distinct, and all that is embraced under each one. The will is distinct from all other powers. It is improper to call an act of the will either a thought or feeling. It is a determination or act peculiar to itself or its nature. 4. "*Laws of the will*" constitute a heading for lengthy arguments, according to some writers. The term law implies not only the power to rule, but a power which does control or direct. If philosophers, in using "laws of the will," intend to convey the idea that the will is governed by any law, or laws, beyond its own nature and being, it will be necessary for us to call on them for more light.

SECTION IV.

1. No material element, or elements, anterior to the existence of will in the human mind, can, of or within themselves, contain any *law or laws* possessing *action*; and if inertness would be essential to the nature of such existences, they could have no power over the will. 2. If they intend, by the "laws of the will," to say that the *laws* which Deity has fixed over the *material universe* have power to control the will, then mind is matter, and the will within itself is inert; but this is false. 3. It can not be possible that they *refer* to the existence and controlling power of the divine Being; for they

could not call such an existence the "laws of the will," and if they do, it would follow that he is the action of our wills, and we are both passive and not accountable. 4. It can not be that they refer to any *other faculty* of the same finite mind; for it would be just as improper for any faculty to have volitive power to act in the place of and for the will, as it would be for the will to act for itself. The will has power of action, and does act, in its own capacity, without calling any other faculty or faculties to act for it.

CHAPTER II.

NATURE OF THE WILL.

SECTION I.

1. We have already seen that "*laws of the will*," as contained in some works on mental philosophy, can not exist, or, if it is possible for such to be real existences, the human mind is incapable of having any satisfactory knowledge of them. 2. The will is *governed by its own law*, and from its nature it is impossible that any other faculty or faculties should control it; and if the other powers of the mind have no authoritative power to control it, then it is absurd to say that any object selected by the mind can contain power to govern the will. 3. "*Contingent action of the will*" implies the continued being and power of action as possessed by other faculties of the mind, and that volitive action is accidental. If the action of the will is wholly accidental, then there is no abiding or real principle capable of being called the will. Then, if the will is contingent, or only exists in *action*, it follows that, when such action is suspended, the will is annihilated; but contingent volitive action, as taught by many, is false, and is resorted to only for the purpose of destroying the liberty-power of the will. 4. If the mind has power to act within and of itself, the condition of such power is *freedom, or liberty*; otherwise, no action could take place without an imping-

ing cause. And if action is compelled, in any way, or by any power, beyond the identity of self, then action is caused by such an influence or power. Then *that* which causes mental action is that which acts while the mind is passive or wholly inactive; but if the mind has self-power to act, it is reasonable to suppose that it possesses some faculty capable of acting, or of determining action. It is just as reasonable to suppose that the will possesses such volitive power as to refer such power to any other faculty or influence.

SECTION II.

1. The doctrine that the "*will has its laws preliminary to that of its freedom,*" as taught by Mr. Upham, and others, is clearly incorrect. Under this proposition, it is assumed that "the will is subject to laws." An argument to prove this is drawn from the fact that all things in the universe are subject to law, and that the mind of man can not be regarded as an exception. This general blending is very objectionable. Why was there not a distinction made between the laws governing the inert part of the universe, and the laws governing the intellectual and immortal soul? If an uplifted rock is ponderous, and will naturally gravitate to the earth, is that conclusive proof that the soul is ponderous, and that it must naturally and always obey the same law of gravitation? If so we are undone forever. 2. The decision having been made, by Mr. Upham, and others, that "*the will is subject to laws,*" then they make this deduction: "*the freedom of the will,*

whatever may be its nature, must accommodate itself to this preliminary fact." Here we have at least the will fatalized under the infinite law of necessity. But for this desired result, the "immortal" work of Mr. Edwards, Upham, and others, would probably not have been so amplified in the order of careful argumentation. While it is our happy privilege to profit by all that has gone before, we would humbly beg leave to give reasons for our belief and views of the doctrine of the will. 3. *The argument seems to stand thus:* The will is subject to and is governed by laws, and that the freedom of the will is the "liberty of acting" under and according to the nature and requirements of such laws. These laws are regarded as being infinite, and all they require is of infinite necessity. This system of philosophy teaches and enforces the doctrine of free will, which is our "freedom or liberty" to act according to necessity. This view of free will is absurd, as correct arguments will show. 4. We have already seen that the will is *not subject* to such laws; and it will be remembered that "laws of the will" have been assumed, without any attempt to define them, or any one of them. The first position assumed was, that a knowledge of the will implied a previous knowledge of other powers of the mind. If that be true, it does not follow that those previously-known powers were laws governing the will; for the very nature of those powers, as specified by them, would forever refute such a position. The next general position is, that "the will has its laws preliminary to that of its freedom." Here "laws" are assumed without telling us what they are. We will now pro-

ceed to notice those things which have been specifically mentioned and pointed out by them as governing the will.

SECTION III.

1. *The will may be influenced by desire*, but it can never be controlled by desire, or desires, only in a subordinate way. The doctrine that the will is authoritatively controlled by desire, is too absurd to require any thing more than a passing notice. Desire is no more than a mere emotion or excitement of the mind, directed to the attainment of an object. It is an inclination or wish for something to be enjoyed. That which we wish for or desire may become the object of the determining power of the will, or we may determine to pay no attention to the object of our desires, though the strength of such desires may remain unchanged. In traveling from home and friends, we may often desire to return; yet we have volitive power to continue our onward course to some far-off and perhaps uninteresting part of the world. 2. Desire, being only an emotion, can never, within and of itself, exercise any *mandatory* influence and power over the will. 3. Desires may arise *voluntarily* and *involuntarily*. We have volitive power to turn our attention to an object, or class of objects, till such object, or something connected with the class of objects, becomes the object of desire; and, in connection with some peculiar condition or fitness in some object, which claims our voluntary attention, may arise a desire to have the same in our possession. In this way desire may be

successive to volition, if not a result of volitive action. Desires may be involuntary, though the will has power to cross or counteract the strength of such desires; and, by repeated efforts, it has power to diminish and to destroy them. 4. Desire can *invoke volitive action*, but can never command such action, and control its determinations. Our desires can exert an invoked subordinate influence upon the will; and, in this way, induce volitive action; but they can do no more.

SECTION IV.

1. Another position assumed by many writers, to enslave the will, is, that it is directed and positively controlled by *choice*. The liberty of the will consists in the power of acting according to choice; therefore, choice controls the will, and our liberty is wholly embraced in obeying *choice*, our sovereign ruler. If choice has mandatory control of the will, it would follow that, when choice is exercised by any inert object, and as the power of choice could not act without such an object, the object would cause the exercise of choice; therefore, the inert object governs choice, and choice controls the will: hence, an inert object may be the sovereign ruler of the soul, with power to determine its fate forever; but this is false. 2. The very nature of choice implies the possibility of a *different* selection to that which is made. We intuitively feel that there is always an alternative to that which we choose or decide on; and as we compare different objects together, we have an abiding consciousness that we

are at liberty to choose any one under our inspection. We know that we have volitive power to choose or not to choose, and it is utterly impossible for us to complete the act of choosing unless we determine to do so. When two or more objects are presented to the mind, we feel that we have power to choose any one of them, or to refuse making any choice. If choice can not be controlled in any way by the will, and is the result of some anterior constitutional determination, then it would follow that choice is inevitable, and that it can only take place as effect follows its cause. Then, choice could never take place only in an involuntary way. 3. We know that choice does exist; then its origin must be caused by the laws of natural necessity, or the mind has natural and volitive power to decide between alternatives. Choice can never be free if it be *produced* by the laws of necessity. Our freedom to act according to such necessity is bondage, but choice can be voluntary. When we have made choice, we feel and know that we were at perfect liberty to have abstained from such choice, or to have made a different one. If choice is produced by laws of natural necessity, it can never be free; but choice, in its very nature, implies liberty or freedom, and without this it ceases to be choice; therefore, volitive action is essential to the existence of choice. 4. The position of some writers is, that *choice controls* the will, and that choice is the effect of the laws of natural necessity. Then, for the effect of a natural cause to govern the manner, qualities, or condition of itself is impossible: hence the perfect impossibility of such an effect causing

volitive action, for that would be an effect causing an effect. Choice may and does have a subordinate influence upon the will, but has no mandatory power over it. The will can control, determine, or confirm our choice, and it has power to act contrary to our choice. It is very common for us to feel and say, in regard to some *act* of ours, that it was not our choice.

SECTION V.

1. Another assumption is, that the will is *governed* by motive. Mr. Upham says that "the will acts in view of the strongest motive, and *necessarily so acts*." If such action is *necessitated*, of course it could not be otherwise; therefore, the will is governed by motive, which is clearly and forever incorrect, as arguments will show. 2. Motive is that which *incites to action*, having only subordinate influence upon the will in inducing volitive action. The very nature of motive implies no mandatory power over its own origin and action; and if it possesses no self-power of government, it would be impossible for it to govern the will or any other faculty in a positive way. The highest power of motive consists only in action toward an object, and this is granting more than its nature strictly demands. It is acknowledged, on all hands, that the will, in its lowest signification, has power to act. As the latter, in its very nature, has higher claims to liberty than the former, why should it be regarded as subordinate to motive? 3. The only way for motive to *govern* the will is, that its action be anterior, in the

order of time, to the origin of the action of the will. It is utterly impossible to prove that the action of motive in the mind is anterior to the origin of the action of the will; and if it could be done, it would be no evidence that motive-action could control the action of the will; and the very nature of the former, compared with that of the latter, precludes the possibility of such a conclusion. 4. If motive has power to *act*, and such action can only be induced by the presence of an object, then the object controls the motive, and the motive controls the will. Then it would follow, that when the object was inert it would control the mind. We are not prepared for such a conclusion. Motive may have power to induce volitive action, but it has no authoritative power over such action.

SECTION VI.

1. It has been maintained, by many writers, that motive governs *mind in general*; that it governs volitions in the human mind; and that, in the same way, it applies to the Divine mind. Mr. Upham says, "Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same with that of the supreme Being himself. He is *inevitably* governed, in all his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and best;" therefore, the divine Being is "*inevitably*" governed by a superior. We understand Dr. Edwards, and others, to teach that the "*energy of motives*" existed, in the nature of things, anterior to the will of God. In this way, many writers take the ground that motive governs the will of man,

and that motive governs the will of Deity, being anterior to it: hence, we are driven to the conclusion that motive governs all beings, and that it must be, of necessity, the supreme ruler of the universe, with power to fatalize all things. Notwithstanding the opinions of such writers, we can not and never will acknowledge *motive* as the great ruler of the universe. 2. Motive, in the Divine mind, is subordinate to volitions. If "*motive*," or any "*certain fixed and irresistible influences*," control the acts of Deity, such controlling power could not have been originated and arranged by the supreme Being; for, in that case, he must have *willed* the existence and arrangement of such pre-existing and controlling power. Then it follows, that such a controlling power must either be anterior to any act of Deity, and thereby superior to him, or such an assumed controlling power could not have existed till the Divine volition willed it into real being; and if it could only exist by the *will* of Deity, he had power to act independent of such supposed influence. If he had power to act once independently of this motive, or natural irresistible influence, he had and has power to act on independently of such supposed influences forever: so, farewell to the eternal sovereignty of motive! Sleep peaceably on forever! 3. We have already seen that motive has no power to control the *volitive power* in the human mind. It may have subordinate influence in inducing volitive action, but nothing more; for, in order to control the will, it must be proved, without a doubt, that motive exists anterior to the action of the will, and that it has volitive power to act in causing the will

to act. Without this liberty-power of action, it can not move the will and determine such motion; but, from its very nature, it can not have such volitive power of action; and if it could, it would be just as fatal to the law of necessity as to refer such power to the will, where it belongs. From the very nature of things, there is no possible way to control the will by any law of motive. 4. Another position assumed and strongly argued by Mr. Edwards, is, that "the will always is as the greatest apparent good;" but he explains this by admitting that the "will is *determined* by the greatest apparent good." Both methods amount to the same meaning. To blend the will with the intellect is absurd; for we can not say that it is a thought; and it is equally as incorrect to blend it with the sensibilities, for it is not a feeling. If any other faculty, power, or influence of the mind has authority to control the will, such faculty, power, or influence must have not only liberty of self-action, but volitive power to cause the will to act; otherwise, the will can not be controlled in this way. And if the will can only be governed by such volitive power, why not refer such power to the will itself, where it naturally belongs, and not labor against all plain reasoning to give the power of the will to some other power, where it does not naturally belong? And if motive can induce volitive action, under the law of necessity, then it would follow that when an inert existence was the object of motive; that as the object controlled the motive which controlled the will, so would such an object control the will: hence, we would be compelled to serve material elements and laws in common with

every thing else possessed with power to influence motive; but this is false. 5. That the will is *untrammeled* is in perfect accordance with the *consciousness* of mankind. Of nothing are we more positively certain than in regard to our acts, whether they be voluntary or of necessity. Knowledge received through the senses, connected with diseased and perishing physical organs, may deceive us; but consciousness, possessed of its own evidence, is knowledge, without demanding an increase of testimony from the senses. It is of and within its own existence and nature the end of all controversy or doubt. To doubt its power is to doubt the reality of all things. Our consciousness of self-action, as to whether such action is of infinite necessity, or is free, equals our consciousness of existence itself; and we can no more doubt this than we can doubt the existence of self and that of every thing else. When we contemplate future action in regard to many objects, we feel and know that we have natural volitive power, or ability, to choose any one, or to determine on any course we please in relation to one or all of them; and we are perfectly confident that we have power to refuse action contrary to either motive or the power of choice. When we reflect upon a wrong act in the past, we feel an internal conviction that we were free to have done differently: hence our deep regret or sense of sin; for without this conscious liberty, we could never regret the imperfections of the past, or feel that we had ever sinned or done wrong. As long as we feel that we are accountable for our acts, we feel a consciousness of liberty in acting. If a consciousness

of liberty could be removed from the mind, just as long as such a sense was gone, we would be incapable of any regret or remorse. However much we may dread the results, yet if we do not feel an intuitive liberty, we never can experience any thing like regret or remorse in regard to any past act. Just as long as we could feel that we had no conscious liberty, we would be compelled to feel our acts were not our own.

CHAPTER III.

LIBERTY OF THE WILL.

SECTION I.

1. THE expression “*free will*,” is, to some extent, objectionable, as it would seem to imply the opposite, or that there could be such a thing as the will enslaved under a law of infinite necessity, which we have seen to be incorrect. *Will*, in its very essence, or nature, is a free principle. Liberty is its essential condition or law. *Free will* is as incorrect as *bound will*. Liberty is essential to its nature, and it is not *will* if it be *not free*; and if it be *bound*, it ceases to be *will*. Volitive power of action is essential to the being of the soul, and to all rational, intellectual, and accountable beings. Action and self-action are essential differences between matter and spirit. Spirit has self-power of choice; matter has not. Ratiocination is essential to intellect, and it can not take place without action. Connected with these, volition is forever inseparable; therefore, mind can not exist without self-liberty of action. 2. The will, in its *acts* and *determinations*, is subject to the law of self-liberty in opposition to the law of necessity. We have seen already that the will can not fall under the law of infinite necessity; therefore, it must fall under that of liberty, as opposed to necessity. If we know that we are under the law of necessity, then we have the same power of know-

ing that we are not accountable. To suppose and believe that our actions are necessary, and that we are accountable for such actions, is to suppose and believe an absurdity; for we never can experience remorse for any act, or acts, which are not wholly voluntary, either by intention or permission. 3. The doctrine of liberty is clearly established by consciousness, in which there is a universal conviction that our past acts, even under the same circumstances, might have been very different. Such a conviction could not exist only in spontaneous origin or liberty. 4. In connection with the presence of many objects of choice, we have a positive consciousness that two or more acts of the will may be put forth, or that we may will to refuse them all, and that contrary to motive, desire, or choice. This truth can be tested by any one, at this moment, in regard to the very next act of the mind. The consciousness of liberty we now have, can no more be doubted than we can doubt our own existence.

SECTION II.

1. We objected wholly to "laws of the will," as used by different writers. The will knows no law only *that of liberty*, which liberty may be regarded as absolute, being entirely and forever opposed to any law or laws of necessity. 2. I may determine to go to London, and while this determination remains unchanged, all the other powers of the mind must be subject to the controlling power of the will. This determination may be continued or suspended only by the power of the will. The absence of voli-

tive action does not imply that, during such inactivity, the other powers of the mind are unemployed; but the office of the will is to preside over the mental operations. 3. The effort to sustain the law of necessity has involved *reasoning in a circle*. Necessitarians have assumed that "the action of the will is always in the direction of the strongest motive." In defining the strongest motive, they say it is the motive in the direction of which the will does act. They have no way to define the strongest motive at first sight, but wait till the will acts, and then assume that the motive, in the direction of its action, is the strongest. They have to assume that motive determines the will, without accounting for its authority. If we ask them what determines the will, they will answer, The strongest motive. Then, what is the strongest motive? *That* which determines the will. Here is the same old circle; but this generation seeketh after evidence. 4. Mr. Edwards says "that every act of will whatsoever, is excited by some motive." Then, motive causes the action of the will; therefore, all volitions are effects of motives. If an effect can not be greater than its cause, we are forced to the conclusion that no action can exist, or take place, either in the mind or body, unless it be caused by motive. Then, motive is the only being having right to command and to control our entire existence; but we have already seen that this is false.

SECTION III.

1. *The spirit of dependence* can not exist under the law of necessity. The conviction that we are lost without an interest in the merit of Christ, is common to all; but to properly feel our dependence implies a *voluntary* act, in which we humbly and confidently rest all our hope upon Divine assistance. The soul is dependent with a voluntary trust in God.

2. *But the doctrine of necessity* can not naturally tend to mellow the exercise of the heart, and enkindle, with holy awe, the spirit of fervent love to the great Donor of all good. Under the law of necessity, we may feel conviction; but we can not depend in Divine grace with humble gratitude; for a convicted mind, which believes in infinite necessity, can only realize the presence of infinite law, ever hearing the deep tones of the breaking thunder.

3. It appears that the learned Dr. Chalmers said, "*If man is not a necessary agent, God is a degraded sovereign.*" Dreadful sentiment! If the doctrine of liberty be true, Deity does not preside over the myriads of earth's population for the purpose of executing the laws of stern and infinite fate; for such laws could need no additional power to enforce their claims, as such claims have been executed and enforced from all eternity. From the very necessity in their natural existence, no new claim or arrangement can ever take place, or ever has legally taken place, since the real existence of the laws of fate in eternity back; but such laws must either be self-existent and eternal, or there must have been a point somewhere in the range of duration when such laws

took place, or became real. Necessitarians can not admit that they were created by Deity; for then he would have *willed* their existence. Then they must have had an existence anterior to any volitions in the Divine mind: hence, the existence and claims of the laws of fate were all arranged before they came to the knowledge of the divine Being; and, of course, he is subordinate to their control. Such a conclusion is worse than Atheism. O, how grateful the thought that the Lord still governs all things, and that he will freely, and with omnipotent power, rule forever! 4. A design in the creation of man was, that he might *voluntarily* serve God; and without such power, he could never glorify his Creator. Doubtless, without *natural liberty* to glorify God, the design of our being would have been destroyed, and this would have prevented our existence at all. Man must exist free to serve his Creator, or his service would not be acceptable to God; and without such liberty he could not serve him. And if it is necessary for him to have natural liberty, in order to glorify his Creator, then he is free to pervert the exercise or action of such liberty-power, and voluntarily fall from the favor of God, as in the case of our federal head. The mind is free, and, under this power, we may aim at the sun, step the silent paths of innumerable worlds, shout to their eternal flight; but, higher and infinitely better still, we, through the assistance of grace, may *will* the approach of heaven, the possession of its joys, and the full glory of endless day.

CHAPTER IV.

POWER OF THE WILL.

SECTION I.

1. It is difficult to define the difference between the *liberty* and the *power* of the will. Some have thought that power was capable of degrees, while liberty remains the same. Whether there be naturally degrees in the power of the will, is not easily decided; for the apparent difference may be caused, to a considerable extent, by imperfect or diseased physical organs; yet it would appear that liberty, in all orders of mind, was essentially the same. The partially-developed mind, or that of a child, as well as the strong mind, enjoys the same liberty. The power of the will, as to the quality of its essential nature, can not admit of degrees; but it differs in different minds as to the degrees of vigor, vividness, and strength in its mandatory action. While liberty may be regarded as absolute, being opposed to every thing like infinite necessity, power may be regarded as more dependent. Liberty is without any compulsory infringement in any possible way; yet power is often incumbered by many contingencies. Liberty does not appear to be capable of being increased; but power, by repeated efforts, can become more vigorous and irresistible. 2. Mr. Upham says, "Although the will has power, it is not, therefore, independent—it is subject to law." This is in ac-

cordance with many other writers; but we have seen, by previous arguments, that the *will is not subject to law*, as taught by necessitarians. The will is independent in its very nature and relation to the other powers of the mind. 3. *The power and freedom* of the will is clearly evidenced in self-preservation. If I were in a boat, peacefully floating on the silvery waters of Niagara, above the Falls, I feel distinctly that life depends upon the efforts of myself, and only upon myself. I feel as conscious as I can of any thing, that I have power either to *determine* to row to the shore, or to determine to go over the Falls without any effort. 4. Connected with the remembrance of past *errors*, we experience a *consciousness*, which is clear and positive, that, under the same circumstances, we might have done differently; and connected with such recalled determinations, there is a vivid consciousness of the power we had to have determined differently. If the affirmations of conscience are uniformly or are always wrong, then we may have some ground for distrusting the liberty-power of the mind; but if such affirmations are true, then the doctrine of the liberty of the will is true and irresistible.

SECTION II.

1. The will has *self-determining* power. It is not a matter of astonishment that necessitarians should doubt the self-determining power of the will; but they acknowledge that the mind, as a whole, has self-determining power. So do we; and we hold that the will, in its nature and office, presides over

all the other faculties, and determines all the processes and acts of the mind. No event, object, or fact can be made the subject of knowledge only by the self-determining power of the mind; for nothing can be brought under the inspection of the mind without mental action, and such action is in the mind, and is a result of its self-determining power, as no self-action can arise without such a power. 2. Mr. Upham says, "If by the phrase self-determining power of the will be merely meant that the will itself, that distinct susceptibility of the mind which we thus denominate, has *power of action*, we grant that it is so;" that is, the will can act, but not authoritatively—it can only act under the control of law or the strongest motive. The freedom of such action is in conforming to necessity. But hear him again: "The will acts, and with such freedom and such power as to lay the basis of accountability." With how much freedom does it act? Let him answer, "It is free to act according to the law of necessity." This is the substance, and amounts to the fact that such action is coerced by the law of fate. Wonderful freedom of volitive action! Yet, he bases our accountability upon the liberty of the will, and the will, at the same time, incapable of acting only in obedience to the law of eternal fate. How is it possible for students to ever gain a correct knowledge of self, the powers of mind, and their accountability from such logic? 3. Mr. Edwards says, "*If the will determines the will, then choice orders and determines the choice.*" This might, in part, be correct, if we were to acknowledge his previous positions on this subject to be correct; but we

do not acknowledge such positions as true. Then, that which would destroy his argument would be clear and true with others. First. Why did he make the proposition unfair, by lugging in the term "*orders*" in the latter part? This is sophistical, whether so intended or not. If the will can determine the mind, it certainly can determine the will; for the will is a faculty of the mind, and the self-determining power of the mind has been acknowledged to be true. We have already seen that no faculty or faculties of the mind can determine the mind except the will; then the will has power to determine both the *will* and *choice*: so we have no difficulty on the subject. 4. *Voltions are spontaneous*, and are independent of any law of necessity; therefore, the very nature of the volitive power is freedom with self-liberty to act in any way.

SECTION III.

1. *The superior power* of the will is that peculiar power it possesses by which it is not only distinguished from the other powers of the mind, but determines the action of the mental powers as a whole, or as united in the acts of the mind. 2. The ground of offense in the sight of God, is not only our *power to perceive the difference* between right and wrong, and an *abiding conviction* as to what we should do, but it is embraced in the fact that we possess the *power to do* that which is right, and *to refuse to do* that which is contrary to the Divine will. 3. Connected with *voluntariness* is the ground of all accountability. Take this away, and it is ut-

terly impossible for us ever to be called to an account for any thought or act. We can neither be applauded nor blamed. 4. *The doctrine* of the will, as taught by many writers, has been confused unnecessarily. Too many topics have entered into the argument; and as we contemplate defining its connection with and relation to the elements of mind, which lie at the foundation of moral action, in the second volume, we will close this volume with one more general proposition.

SECTION IV.

1. The will possesses *mandatory power*. The mind certainly has self-determining power, by the consent of philosophers, and in the very nature of its being and operations. By general consent, and true analysis, this power has not been defined as being diffused through the nature and power of all the faculties, separately or combined; but the determining power has been referred to some one faculty of the mind. No faculty, from its essential nature, can possess mandatory power but the will. 2. The will appears to *preside* over the combined action of the other faculties, and has power to control mental action. 3. Some necessitarians have erred in trying to confound the will with the *sensibilities*, and refused to appeal to special and universal consciousness. 4. Another evidence of the independence and controlling power of the will, is contained in the fact that we can will to *perform impossibilities*; that is, we can will the reality of an impossibility. The Atheist may finally be possessed of such a hor-

rible dread of the truths of the Bible, that, with all his soul, he may will its annihilation; yet he knows, at the same time, that this is impossible. 5. *Such is the will, the free liberty-power of the imperishable mind.* Under its vivid power and mandatory control, the minds of the high and the lowly, enkindling with feelings of lofty and holy aspirations, may assert their right to triumph over all embarrassments and storms, the mere results of physical tendencies, or the requirements of their laws; but mind, intellectual and immortal, may determine upon the advance of infinite happiness, and the interminable progression of imperishable knowledge. How can we define the true character of the soul, when perfected in its separation from the imperfection and decay of the physical organs which trammelled its manifestations in time? Possessed of all the facts and knowledge of the past, its thoughts freely range all through the boundless future; but infinitely higher, to our conceptions, must be the character of that soul perfected in the knowledge, favor, and love of God! With holy triumph and increasing joy, burn on, thou spirit of endless day! As the accelerated travel of a star, range the progressive series of heavenly knowledge; and when thy flight has surpassed the utmost bounds of unwearied contemplation, still thou art in heaven!

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ELEMENTS OF MIND
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